Hixon crash 1968

[The Stationmaster]

It's not only familiarity which breeds contempt, it's also complacency (unfortunately in this case).

 

I share Colins view of the book - like the recent(ish) book on the Quintinshill crash which apparently had major revelations and new reasons for the disaster and was in fact a lot of tosh and conjecture (imho)

 

The Quintinshill book also stated that an absolutely correctly placed entry in the Train Register Book was on the wrong page - just one very obvious example of the abysmal research that produced 'a lot of tosh and conjecture' as you so accurately put it.  

 

As fra as AHBs are concerned one major failure shown up by Hixon was the way in which professional road vehicle drivers and even police officers lack familiarity withe the Highway Code - when I took my Driving Test in April 1965 I was, rather oddly, questioned at length on the recently considerably amplified part of it dealing with automatic level crossings and what was there was pretty clear.  ('oddly' because there wasn't an automatic level crossing within a considerable distance of where we then lived).

[D9020 Nimbus]

Reading Adrian Vaughan's account of the accident in Obstruction Danger, it seems one factor was that the drivers and the police were concerned about clearance underneath the overhead wires. That might have caused them to overlook the danger of a train coming—a plane once crashed in the USA because the crew were trying to fix a blown light bulb.

 

The collision might have been even worse had the driver of the rear tractor (pushing) not noticed the train coming, sounded his horn and accelerated. This took him closer to danger but resulted in the train hitting the weakest part of the trailer and not hitting the transformer head on. He's about the only person to emerge from this affair with any credit.

[Colin_McLeod]

There was mention of the angle of the signs in the original report. IIRC an expert in interpreting aerial photos was used to work out the angle of the signs to the road from photographs someone had taken before the accident.

Why not just measure the angle, or was the sign removed by the accident?

[Oldddudders]

Why not just measure the angle, or was the sign removed by the accident?

 

An aerial photo taken before the crash could not have been tampered with. The photo we have seen was taken after the full horror of the crash had sunk in. Someone might have had a motive to swivel the sign to protect themselves or another.

[TheSignalEngineer]

Why not just measure the angle, or was the sign removed by the accident?

The photographs were taken by an amateur photographer on two dates during December 1967. There was a dispute as to the angle of the signs at the inquiry and this evidence was used to ascertain the position of the signs before the accident.

[w124bob]

I've read the account in a book, "Obstruction, danger", by Adrian Vaughan, Patrick Stephens Ltd., and it brought home a lot of confusion. The then BR must shoulder quite a lot of blame: signs were wrongly erected and depite it being pointed out to them on a previous occasion when a heavy load stalled on such a crossing, that these sort of loads could cause problems, their reply left something to be desired:"...the contingency of a road vehicle stalling on the crossing and becoming immobile was one that was considered (when such crossings were in the planning stage), and found too remote to be taken seriously.....in brief, road vehicles must not become immobile on these crossings. (my italics). If they do, they become not only a hazard to themselves but to the trains and whoever is travelling in them. Nothing which has been said above detracts from the action of your driver. We are obviously grateful that he removed the hazard at risk to himself.I must emphasise that the hazard was of your making."Their arrogance in that last sentence beggars belief.The book contains a sentence that chilled me then, as it still does now:"Mr. Groves, [one of the heavy load drivers], did not see, or hear the warnings [that sounded], but he did see the express slipping swiftly and silently through the flat green fields towards him."He must have been petrified, but, instead of getting himself clear, he tried his best to move the load forwards, and, in so doing, actually putting himself in more danger!. I believe his bravery was rewarded.It's very starnge that a small area of the UK, Hixon and Colwich, less than 4 miles apart, should have seen THREE major accidents since the coming of the electric railway.The road over the crossing where the accident occurred has now been lifted onto a bridge. No AHB remains.

Is that including the light plane that crashed at Colwich?

[JeffP]

Ages since I wrote the above, but it appears to be, yes.

[robertcwp]

The photographs were taken by an amateur photographer on two dates during December 1967. There was a dispute as to the angle of the signs at the inquiry and this evidence was used to ascertain the position of the signs before the accident.

There were it seems suggestions that the sign had been moved, possibly in the immediate aftermath of the crash and possibly deliberately. It also appears that the amateur photographer was not called as a witness and that the presiding judge basically decreed what position the sign had been in. 

 

In any event, the sign was not conspicuously a warning or a mandatory instruction and not sufficiently eye-catching. 

 

The real issues underlying Hixon went much deeper than missing a sign or the haulage company and its drivers not being sufficiently aware of the dangers. The whole design and approval was flawed and there was no proper assessment of the risks, even after the near miss at Leominster. Following that event, the BRB's letter to the haulage company after they had written to BR was incredibly arrogant in tone and very dismissive of any suggestion that anyone other than the haulage company was to blame. The Railway Inspectorate even tried to do away with phones at crossings and seemed fixated on minimising costs and delays to road users.

 

People may complain today about a nannying health and safety culture but the absence of proper risk assessment when AHBs were designed and installed shows how far things have come.

 

Not that mistakes haven't been repeated since, most notably with the AOCR crossings such as the one at the centre of the Lockington accident in 1986. I remember seeing an article on those crossings in Modern Railways and immediately thinking that another Hixon was on the way, and so it proved to be.

[Enterprisingwestern]

No matter what measures are taken, the probability of collisions is always higher where forms of transport come together, rail and road, road and pedestrian, road and road, there are only 2 answers, remove all interfaces, impossible, or educate users, equally impossible, but it should be the easy option.

 

Mike.

[jjb1970]

No matter what measures are taken, the probability of collisions is always higher where forms of transport come together, rail and road, road and pedestrian, road and road, there are only 2 answers, remove all interfaces, impossible, or educate users, equally impossible, but it should be the easy option.

 

Mike.

 

That goes to the heart of all risk management, it is universally accepted that the most effective control is risk elimination however practically means that we have to accept some degree of residual risk by applying risk reduction and mitigation measures. At the risk of sounding flippant, to use an example, the only way to eliminate risks associated with train crashes would be to not operate trains. There is also the unfortunate reality that cost - benefit is important, many recoil from this and claim it is putting a financial value on life (which in all honesty it is in a sense) but there does come a point where you could throw huge sums at trying to lower residual risk for little real benefit. Not only is that expensive but more importantly that is money you don't have to spend elsewhere and it could potentially deliver much greater benefits if spent in other ways.

[jjb1970]

The book is written from a point of view: that HMRI were too gung-ho about the crossings and that they didn't learn from a near miss at a crossing in Herefordshire (also involving a Wynne's low loader) and that the culture was one of "we know best". I'm not sure if that is actually wrong. When I read it I did think more than once that the author was on a crusade to traduce the HMRI and BRB/DTP officers involved and put them up as arrogant villains complicit in the deaths of innocent passengers but I don't actually think it hurts to have such a critical tone even if you disagree with it. Some of the issues and points made are worthwhile, and whilst I did think on occasions that there might have been a more "nuanced" reason for things which the author places store on, I don't think a partisan approach is bad so long as it is backed up by events, and the author does give reasons and historical events as justification for some of the arguments he raises. Above all, having a "stance" does make you think and perhaps reflect on the circumstances leading up to the crash.

 

In the end, and despite at first thinking I wasn't going to enjoy it, I found it a worthwhile read. Don't let Amazon's useless pen picture put you off, but, do be prepared for something that is not going to read like an impartial official document and at times might make you fell you disagree with the views being expressed. Sometimes it takes a partial view to open up a wider debate.

 

I've never read this book, but as a general observation I tend to think it is quite healthy to ready books or articles which challenge our existing knowledge/opinions and even if the overall conclusions of a book are flawed it does not invalidate all the points and arguments presented. Confirmation bias seems to be an increasing issue for societal attitudes as fewer people consider counter arguments.

[62613]

 The whole design and approval was flawed and there was no proper assessment of the risks,.................. The Railway Inspectorate even tried to do away with phones at crossings and seemed fixated on minimising delay and costs to road users.

 

In view of the times in which these decisions were taken.....