Mike_Walker

Thanks Rob, praise indeed from such a talented modeller as yourself! Yes they are Tasma Products and would be suitable for O gauge.

As it's a bank holiday Old Ged is busy hoeing his prize winning cabbages and cauliflowers. I don’t know what “muck” he’s using but they aren’t ‘arf growing well! They were listed as OO but they actually look much too big to me so I think I’ll replace them with some N gauge ones. Meanwhile, Sam the Shunter or is it George the Ganger (depends if there’s a train about or not) is contemplating how great life is in the Camel Valley.

As it's a bank holiday Old Ged is busy hoeing his prize winning cabbages and cauliflowers. I don’t know what “muck” he’s using but they aren’t ‘arf growing well! They were listed as OO but they actually look much too big to me so I think I’ll replace them with some N gauge ones. Meanwhile, Sam the Shunter or is it George the Ganger (depends if there’s a train about or not) is contemplating how great life is in the Camel Valley.

Here is a classic example. 6165 brings a down passenger train into Bourne End formed of a variety of stock, a LMS brake, a BR Mark 1, a GWR Hawksworth compartment coach and a SR van for good measure in 1961. Photo by Mike Peart from the Marlow & District Railway Society archive.

I would also question the caption that 6106 was photographed at Reading a "few months before withdrawal". I believe it was the last steam loco overhauled at Swindon and on return to Southall she was a regular on the High Wycombe pilot for many weeks and was kept in immaculate condition. We schoolboys from the Wycombe Technical High School saw it every lunchtime. It later got sent to Bromsgrove for banking duties and photos there show it was still well cared for. In the picture at Reading it looks too shabby.

As long as you don't bump into Doc Martin on the way! 😁

A couple of pictures from that infamous day, 9 February 1986. 59002 having been declared a failure at Woodborough. Mutterings of "we told you so" and "what are we going to do now..." 56055 and 56031 to the rescue and dragging 59002 away from Savernake. I later got to know someone very senior in EMD who admitted it was not their finest hour and actually a huge embarrassment. I was told it was a simple wiring error made worse by the same arrangement having been used in every EMD product for the preceding 20 or more years.

Before someone asks; VCB: Vacuum Circuit Breaker.

Fine, but from where?! 😁

Kevin, can I ask which nursery you got the plants from or did you grow them yourself?

Simply superb.

Oops should have looked more closely! 😊

Interesting; that the bridge is posted as 14' 0" yet that bus is a highbridge type around 14' 6". Perhaps the middle bit is marked as 14' 6" hard to tell. The reverse of what existed in Staines where a bridge was posted as 14' 9" but clearance was actually less as London Country found out the hard way when they took a brand new Atlantean under it. Investigations showed that a Routemaster just squeezed under without the clearance everyone thought it had!

To confirm, I understand there was no error on the part of the driver so it was obviously down to a failure of the equipment either on the train or lineside. Hitachi and GWR are conducting an investigation.

Yes they are and the distance between the end of the OLE and the next bridge is 33 chains. 1C78 was non-stop so potentially was travelling at up to 110mph so whether this allows sufficient time for the ADD to activate I can't say. Given that automated power changes take place probably hundreds of times daily across the GW network (and elsewhere) without incident and those such as this can be counted on the fingers of one hand since they were introduced would suggest that is far from the case.

Not really, the automatic end operation of the pantograph and engine management at the boundary of the OLE takes a task out of the driver's responsibility allowing him to concentrate on the safe operation of the train. In this case not all trains stop at Newbury to effect a manual changeover. The driver can see this has happened correctly from the TMS display in the cab and should therefore intervene if it does not. As mentioned, the pan on 800316 failed to lower yesterday and hit the first bridge beyond the end of the OLE which at Newbury extends far enough west of the station to enable a turnback move to be made over the crossover. To early to say what/why but no doubt several "please explains" have been circulating. It is quite permissible to switch manually between diesel and electric only operation at full line speed in specifically designated areas and elsewhere at low speed (IIRC up to 20mph).

They are but something went wrong with 1C78 today - either the balise or on the train. It's happened there before apparently.

Even a green 9F

It would obviously make a lot of sense to procure a common fleet for the whole country but that creates problems. Do you obtain all your trains from a single supplier in which case it's a classic case of eggs in one basket and you lay yourself open if that supplier subsequently fails and what about the other suppliers in the field? If you source identical units from multiple suppliers you run the risk of wanting to share IP and patents which manufacturers, understandably, might be reluctant to do. In the case of GWR, it's probably well-known by now that they are developing what is called "Operation Churchward" within the company. Alone among the TOCs, GWR have retained an active project development team who are involved in bout rolling stock and infrastructure development - the main reason why the DfT has placed the Vivarail battery trial in GWR's hands. Operation Churchward envisages a family of multiple units to cover all the company's requirements. It would have a common platform and bodyshell with a common cab. The power would be modular and could be diesel, battery, hybrid or straight electric (even "Bionic Duckweed"! 😂) and be suitable to be changed easily say from diesel to battery. The body will have two or possibly three different interior configurations depending on the intended use; for example those on the Bristol-Southampton corridor would have a more "inter-city" style compared with those used on say the Bristol Metro or Cornish branch lines. The use of a common, standard design would give considerable cost savings in maintenance and training. A driver passed on the new design could drive any of them something not currently always the case; if you sign a Class 150/1 for example you can't drive a 150/2 unless you done both the training courses due to the differences between the two - and not just those the spotters can identify. Despite the government's green agenda there is still a reluctance to spend on new trains for secondary services. As usual, the Treasury appears to know the cost of everything but the value of nothing. Take an example. GWR 150202 has in the past week returned from a 7 month spell in Wolverton works during which time much of the body work was completely replaced to address corrosion issues. Not only were stretched GWR without it for that time but the job ended up costing nearly as much as a brand-new unit would have cost yet at best they'll get another 10 years out of it not the 30-40 from a new unit. Why? Well the Treasury's accounting rules insist that work done on existing trains, even as drastic as that done to 150202, is classed as "maintenance" whilst new trains come under "capital investment" and they are too myopic to see that they are actually spending the same amount for a considerably inferior return!

It is not an invitation to tender but a request for expressions of interest in supplying trains. Chiltern have issued something similar recently and GWR are preparing to do likewise. The object in each case is to determine what options are likely to be available and use that information to prepare a business case which can be submitted to the government. Only when (if) that is accepted will formal ITTs be issued. The aim in each case is to replace the remaining BR era multiple units and some newer ones as the industry aims to decarbonise by 2040.

Not sure, I've assumed they simply took any traffic up to Wenford then shunted on the way back. As far as I know, it was generally up hill all the way to Wenford so running wagons into the siding by gravity might have been a little tricky.

59002 didn't! Jack Whelihan, one of EMD's senior field engineers, once told me how embarrassing it was when it sat down in front of an audience of BR types and enthusiasts at Woodborough on its first trip especially as the fault was a simple one that should have been spotted before it left La Grange!

Yes Mike, the train had been given a proceed aspect but the correct right away procedure from the platform staff had not been carried out as the train was still loading/unloading.

Which is pretty concerning given the size of the company and how long it has bee in business. Are those "accidents" or "incidents" such as the SPADs at Wootton Bassett and Reading?

Beattie 30585 pauses to shunt Helland Wharf. Still quite a bit of detailing to add but we're getting there...