What could have ended the Midland's 'small engine' policy

[scots region]

Hello all, this might not be the place for this. But anyway, as a few of use will know the Midland Railway made famous use of a 'Small-engine' policy, this doctrine set out by Darby called for numerous short trains hauled by 0-6-0s and 4-4-0s, with double heading common place. This largely conservative take on Locomotive development was the famous source of the numerous delays suffered by the Midland network and of the image of vast plodding coal trains. The Midland clung on to the policy right up to the Grouping and the stanch refusal of derby to seriously recognize the need for change crippled the LMSR in it formative years. At least that is my understanding of the situation. 

 

Yet paradoxically the Midland did produce two famous 'large locomotive' designs, the famous S.D.J.R 7F 2-8-0 and the equally well known 0-10-0 banking locomotive for the Lickey incline "big bertha" and from what I can tell there every suggestion that, in particular with regards to the former, that the best of Derby practice had been carried over to the Somerset goods. The Midland was very good at producing simple and rugged, if small, machines. For Example the 3F 0-6-0 which endured right up to the 60s, some thirty years after the company that had created the design had ceased to exist.

 

This has left me wondering, what could have forced the Midland Railway to have abandoned its small engine policy sooner? One idea was for the L.N.W.R to have a direct link to Derby, putting a sword jabbing at the Midlands heart. Another was for the MR to have directly absorbed the S.D.J.R, thereby forcing the requirement for larger machines.

 

Please let me know what you think.

 

Yours

ScR 

[Allegheny1600]

I would have thought that economics would have done it!

The persistent use of the small engines must have increased operating costs, surely?

Two locos to keep fuelled and maintained, let along two crews wage bills.

One would have thought that economics would have already sorted out the Midland propensity for small journals on loco axles for one thing, certainly by the turn of the 19th Century or at latest by the first world war.

The fact this didn't happen was indicative of management intransigence IMHO. According to J. Powell in "Living with L.M. Locomotives", the journal size problem was something that persisted well into LMS days, hence the "ruination" of the Garrats by 'Midland' insistence on such things, ignoring the advice of Beyer Peacock themselves.

And, how to get rid of such management?

Shareholder action!

Such action would have been forced on the Midland if money was tight.

Money would only become tight if other companies ate into Midland profits, this only started to happen during the 1930's.

Even had the LNWR put a dagger into Derby, I doubt it would have siphoned off sufficient traffic to make the difference, after all the GNR did just that and the Midland persisted with it's outdated ways!

Cheers,

John E.

 

PS as a Great Northern fan, formerly from Derby - I may have a rather jaundiced eye for the Midland!

[Horsetan]

I think I came across a pretty detailed explanation in LMS Locomotive Profiles, no.13 - The Standard Compounds (published by Domestic Duck) as to why it adopted the engine policy that it did at that time. Well worth reading, and actually makes a lot of sense. The Midland engineering top brass weren't that stupid, regardless of what numerous railway historians have written (and parrotted) since then!

[scots region]

I shall seek it out horse, I'm not denying that Derby could put out a quality product, it was just too small.

[Guest Belgian]

Curiously, one could argue that the Midland was right, and everyone else wrong. The 'proof of the pudding' and all that is that the modern railway follows the Midland's policy of short, frequent trains and it is this frequency which has resulted in the upsurge of passenger loadings rather more than the 'benefits of privatisation' since it was BR in the 1980s which set this service frequency in motion.

 

Similarly, in the USA the policy of simply adding more motive power units to accommodate heavier freight loadings follows the Midland's policy of small goods engines whereby an extra one is added when the train gets heavier. It certainly helped to keep people in work!

 

JE

[jwealleans]

I'm sure there was some discussion about just this on one of the Yahoo groups this week.  The theory was advanced that double-headed loaded coal trains south was a convenient mechanism because it left two engines at the southern end to convey empties northwards (and there was an overall north-south imbalance in loaded traffic, I believe?).  For example (figures are mine, not quoted), if 2 x 3F can take 80 loaded mineral south  - 80 being the line limit - then each can bring, say, 60 empties north, while an 8F or Garratt can also only take 80 south but 80 north as well, reducing the flow of empties back to the coalfields.

 

Fair to say the view was not unchallenged, but that was the principle advanced.

[Poggy1165]

In the Peak District I believe that one issue was that loops were too short for longer trains, and the shorter trains were light enough for small engines to manage. In other words, to have used larger engines economically would have involved spending £££££s on civil engineering.

 

That covers the goods trains. The Midland's policy on double heading passenger trains is harder to figure.

[tomparryharry]

Direct access to a Swindon No1 boiler.... Its close cousins went on to 842 black 5's, and the Jubilees. Not forgetting all those 8F's......

 

As for coal traffic flows. It depends on how the traffic was managed to the customer.

 

Regards,

Ian

[asmay2002]

Hello all, this might not be the place for this. But anyway, as a few of use will know the Midland Railway made famous use of a 'Small-engine' policy, this doctrine set out by Darby called for numerous short trains hauled by 0-6-0s and 4-4-0s, with double heading common place. This largely conservative take on Locomotive development was the famous source of the numerous delays suffered by the Midland network and of the image of vast plodding coal trains. The Midland clung on to the policy right up to the Grouping and the stanch refusal of derby to seriously recognize the need for change crippled the LMSR in it formative years. At least that is my understanding of the situation.

 

There are several factors why the Midland did what it did.

 

Firstly the Civil engineering on the London extension didn't allow heavy engines until well into LMS days especially when the civil engineers were using weight per foot run to measure bridge loadings up until the 1920s. Deeley's big compound 4-6-0 didn't get off the drawing board for this reason. When they got the chance it was Midland men who ordered Garratts.

 

Secondly, there wouldn't have been vast plodding coal trains unless the Midland was getting it's freight policy very right (customers would just have used other routes).  The Midland had a very sophisticated system of controlling freight on it's network that was not matched by other pre-group companies. They were simply better at this and hence got the business. 

 

Thirdly it's difficult to see in what way the Midland policy "crippled" the LMS during it's early years.  Fast frequent trains are what the customer wants.  They still do today - and this doesn't necessarily mean big engines which spotters like hence a lot of the ignorant rubbishing.  The LMS in the pre-war years ran more passenger trains at a 60mph or better start to stop average THAN ALL OF THE REST OF THE BIG FOUR PUT TOGTEHER including the railways with hundreds of (in reality) plodding pacifics.  Ths was the Midland policy at its best.  Good service for everyone not just for the few who could afford once a day luxury trains seen on other railways.  The LMS was still profitable in 1948 thanks to its MR heritage which is more than can be said for some of the others.

[34theletterbetweenB&D]

I think you will find the chosen metric was express services scheduled 58mph end to end speed in the interwar period. Expressed as a proportion of the passenger mileage of express routes - the potential to run fast both in terms of the track infrastructure and the revenue opportunity - there was litte difference between the groups. (As much the largest group in the most populaous area of the UK, and possessing much more express route mileage than any other group, the LMS had to have more fast trains scheduled than any other group simply to maintain parity. And as one wag observed at the time, between the schedule and the achievement lies the rub.)

[scots region]

There are several factors why the Midland did what it did.

 

Firstly the Civil engineering on the London extension didn't allow heavy engines until well into LMS days especially when the civil engineers were using weight per foot run to measure bridge loadings up until the 1920s. Deeley's big compound 4-6-0 didn't get off the drawing board for this reason. When they got the chance it was Midland men who ordered Garratts.

I apologize I was not aware of that factor

Secondly, there wouldn't have been vast plodding coal trains unless the Midland was getting it's freight policy very right (customers would just have used other routes).  The Midland had a very sophisticated system of controlling freight on it's network that was not matched by other pre-group companies. They were simply better at this and hence got the business.

This makes sense, I must research the Midland freight policies before I move this forwards 

 

Thirdly it's difficult to see in what way the Midland policy "crippled" the LMS during it's early years.  Fast frequent trains are what the customer wants.  They still do today - and this doesn't necessarily mean big engines which spotters like hence a lot of the ignorant rubbishing.  The LMS in the pre-war years ran more passenger trains at a 60mph or better start to stop average THAN ALL OF THE REST OF THE BIG FOUR PUT TOGTEHER including the railways with hundreds of (in reality) plodding pacifics.  Ths was the Midland policy at its best.  Good service for everyone not just for the few who could afford once a day luxury trains seen on other railways.  The LMS was still profitable in 1948 thanks to its MR heritage which is more than can be said for some of the others.

Asmay I'm sorry if I came off as ignorant, the sources I have read on the Midland Railway lead me to believe that Derby caused the LMSR trouble in the early years. I have in doing this broken one of the key rules of researching, to be mindful of prejudice. 

[jamie92208]

As mentioned above the so called 'small engine policy' needs to be looked at very carefully. Civil engineering constraints were common on many other parts of the Midland, including the Settle and Carlisle. This was mainly the small accommodation bridges often of wrought iron that had actually been designed for the axle loading and engine weights of the 1870's plus a safety factor that was exceeded by 1900. These bridges were not rebuilt until the 1930's and up till then Royal Scots were not allowed over the S & C.

 

Another major factor was that most Midland loco sheds were roundhouses, usually with 50' turntables. the LNWR tended to go for straight through sheds. Thus going to something bigger than 4-4-0's would have had huge capital cost implications. The Compounds were big engines for their time with the very largest boiler that could be fitted into the loading gauge. It is interesting that Rowsley (The last shed that the Midland built) was straight.

 

Midland lines were built to minimise working expenses. Hence the Goods lines to London had reduced gradients at places such as Sharnbrook. The Midland line from Royston to Bradford that was never built was engineered to a maximum gradient of 1 in 200 compared to the LNWR one up the same Spen valley that had 1 in 70 grades and still retained double heading till the end of steam.

 

David Hunt who writes for Wild Swan gives a very interesting talk about the Midland's motive power policy that looks at it in the round.

 

Certainly Deeley was a very forward thinking engineer as witnessed by the pioneering work that he authorised on electrification in 1907 where was looking to main line freight and reduced operating expenses. He let two young engineers have their head and with his direct backing they had a scheme up and running from scratch in less than 2 years.

 

Many myths about such policies have only looked at the surface and not at the whole picture. The GWR is often criticised for not having Pacifics with big tenders but they didn't have 400 mile runs like the LMS and LNER did. Their biggest engines (The Kings) only worked from London to i believe Plymouth Cardiff and Birmingham due to weight restrictions.

 

Jamie

[JZ]

I'm sure there was some discussion about just this on one of the Yahoo groups this week.  The theory was advanced that double-headed loaded coal trains south was a convenient mechanism because it left two engines at the southern end to convey empties northwards (and there was an overall north-south imbalance in loaded traffic, I believe?).  For example (figures are mine, not quoted), if 2 x 3F can take 80 loaded mineral south  - 80 being the line limit - then each can bring, say, 60 empties north, while an 8F or Garratt can also only take 80 south but 80 north as well, reducing the flow of empties back to the coalfields.

 

Fair to say the view was not unchallenged, but that was the principle advanced.

But surely you cannot take more north than south, there only a finite number of wagons, it's irrelevant whether they are loaded or unloaded.

[jwealleans]

But surely you cannot take more north than south, there only a finite number of wagons, it's irrelevant whether they are loaded or unloaded.

 

It's highly relevant.  Empties are required at the source of the flow and produced at the destination.  The alternative is to run the empties as unbalanced workings and then rely on the native wit of the controllers to get locos and men where they are required.  Don't forget these aren't the only loaded flows heading south.

 

I couldn't find the thread on the group this morning - I'll try to locate it again, unless anyone else reading is a member and has it to hand?

[Neil]

I'm with JZ on this one, if the logic of 2 small engines bringing 80 loaded wagons south but taking 120 empties north is pursued to its logical end then the south will soon run out of empties.

[coachmann]

For a recent publication to say the top men of the LMS were not stupid is mind boggling. That Midland policies simply did not translate well onto the mighty mammoth of the LMS became clear very soon after 1923 and yet the new company sailed forth with ex Midland men in all the top jobs after 1924. Enter lots of under powered Midland Railway loco designs....It is all well documented fact.

 

The adoption of standardised parts like axleboxes, which had shown themselves to be troublesome on the locos to which they were already fitted such as the 4F 0-6-0....Fact.  The adoption of these same axleboxes on the 7F and the Beyer-Garratt locos......fact.

 

Missing completely the benefits of  long lap long travel valves when it was right under their noses on the Hughes 'Crab' 2-6-0 and 2-6-4T....Fact.

 

Not for nothing did the LMS go behind Fowlers back and order  Royal Scot 4-6-0s from outside builders. The LNER and GWR were light years ahead of the LMS with modern express engines by the time Stanier arrived in 1932.

 

But the thing the Midland and the LMS could not stop was the increasing weight of carriages and consequently trains. The LNWR and Caledonian had successfully designed locos to keep up with increasing loads even if coal consumption was a casualty. But for the Midland men to care about coal consumption with its Compounds and double heading was pretty one-eyed when it ignored the wages bill incurred with double heading and numerous lightweight expresses in place of single trains.

[skipepsi]

As I understand the Midland's small engine policy was forced on the operators by the civil engineers department and their refusal to raise the axle loading, having under-specified the original works for cheapness (see the S&C ref in a previous post).  Brunel's flat arch bridge takes multiple times it's original loading for example as a contrast.

[jamie92208]

As I understand the Midland's small engine policy was forced on the operators by the civil engineers department and their refusal to raise the axle loading, having under-specified the original works for cheapness (see the S&C ref in a previous post).  Brunel's flat arch bridge takes multiple times it's original loading for example as a contrast.

As far as I know the problem with bridge design was the emergence of 'scientific' calcualtions to specify bridge dimensions.  the stone and brick arched bridges were largelyt built by masons , trained on the canal system, using their eye and judgement and were in many cases grossly over specified thus many of the early bridges are still in daily use.  However by the 1860's smaller iron bridge decks were coming into play designed accoridng to spec for the axle loding and the weight per length of locomotive.  Thus on the S & C the big viaducts are still fine  but nearly every metal underbridge has long since been rebuilt, often twice.  The LNWR/Caledonian and GWR main lines were built early.  It is often the later built lines that have had to get their bridges rebuilt such as the underbridges between Doncaster and Leeds over the past 20 years. 

 

Jamie

[MarkC]

I do wonder what would have happened, had Deeley not quit? Fowler was not a 'designer' as such, more a 'manager'. Deeley, on the other hand, was looking at bigger locomotives - his proposed compound 4-6-0 might well have changed Midland & subsequent LMS thinking. One does hope that they would have had bigger axleboxes, of course...

 

Mark

[jwealleans]

With regard to imbalances in traffic, Andy Rush has just made a relevant post in the goods train operation thread.

[coachmann]

In the switch to bigger locomotives, many pre-grouping railway companies fell flat on their face with a 4-6-0, the GCR being a big case in point. Gresley too never designed a decent 4-6-0, unless folk rate the 4P B17.

[Guest Belgian]

With regard to imbalances in traffic, Andy Rush has just made a relevant post in the goods train operation thread.

How does one find that?

 

Edit: Found it!

Edited January 18, 2013 by Belgian

[JZ]

With regard to imbalances in traffic, Andy Rush has just made a relevant post in the goods train operation thread.

 

Light engine movements to cater for the imbalance of loaded and unloaded.

[dagrizz]

The Midlands' small engine policy may have worked on their own lines, but after the grouping many of the LMS top jobs were taken by ex-Midland men and they tried to enforce this same small engine policy on the rest of the LMS system. This did not go down well on the LNWR lines which had hitherto introduced larger engines to haul heavier trains. There was therefore a culture clash - the Midland cosseted their engines, whereas the LNWR pushed their locos hard.     

[DerekEm8]

If bridge loadings on the London Line was a problem how did they manage to test the S&D 2-8-0s on the Toton-London coal trains?

I understood that, like LNER the loop lengths were the major problem which were subsequently extended by the LMS to accommodate the Beyer Garratts with their longer trains.

 

It took Hughes (ex L&Y) to generate some improvement with the Horwich designed Crab- spoiled (after his retirement) by an ill fitting Midland standard Tender.

 

Incidentally I have seen a picture of a Midland Spinner 4-2-2 piloting an 0-6-0 on a coal train bound for London - logical ?

Edited January 18, 2013 by DerekEm8