ECS Derailment - Paddington

[Rods_of_Revolution]

That map is almost correct except - as you can see from the pictures I linked - the angles of the two bridges to each other are not drawn correctly and in addition the distance has been greatly compressed between the platform ends and Westbourne Bridge thus missing out Bishops Bridge as this Google extract shows -

 

Paddington approaches.jpg

 

Thanks for the response.

 

It seems strange the map would omit a significant structure like Bishops Bridge, especially as all other bridges, both under and over, are included and named; Is that a standard thing to do when compressing a track layout? To me the omission of Bishops Bridge makes it ambiguous as to the position of the catch point and signal.

 

All the best,

 

Jack

[Reorte]

About the location of the trap point, I'd say that it's done its job. It's good if nothing gets damaged but that's not really going to be practical to arrange everywhere, but it kept a train going past the signal away from the other lines and left us with a nuisance rather than a disaster.

[Poor Old Bruce]

Another photo https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ClGStI5WMAAWHu3.jpg:large

Who puts a trap point leading into an overhead mast?

 

Not just any old mast but apparently one with anchors and tensioning weights.

 

In that location a wide-to-gauge trap might be better but I doubt it would have made much difference

 

If anybody in that part of the world believed in wide-to-gauge trap points there would not have been the collision at Ladbroke Grove.

[w124bob]

I know of several locations where depot exits are not provided with TPWS. Longsight southend is short headshunt, north end 4 signals leading to a double track exit protected by trap points, Newton Heath is headshunt as is Stockport. My sympathies are with the driver as First group management are not known for dealing with incidents like in this positive manner.

[Talltim]

About the location of the trap point, I'd say that it's done its job. It's good if nothing gets damaged but that's not really going to be practical to arrange everywhere, but it kept a train going past the signal away from the other lines and left us with a nuisance rather than a disaster.

In this case yes, but the consequences of running trains into overhead gantries are unpredictable, another train could easily have hit the downed gantry across any of the other tracks

About the location of the trap point, I'd say that it's done its job. It's good if nothing gets damaged but that's not really going to be practical to arrange everywhere, but it kept a train going past the signal away from the other lines and left us with a nuisance rather than a disaster.

In this case yes, but the consequences of running trains into overhead gantries are unpredictable, another train could easily have hit the downed gantry across any of the other tracks

[Rugd1022]

Paddington... 50 041, 1983...

Trouble is that mucked thIngs up for quite a while; sorting this one is an easy job compared to that and all should be back to normal by morning.

 

A whole week on twelve hours per shift sat on 31 124 with a rake of seacows in platform 10 for me, yes it certainly took a lot longer to clear up back then with much damage to the P/Way.

[david.hill64]

The only question I have is was the Signal passed fitted with TPWS?

 

Mark Saunders

Further to the Stationmaster's observation, I would add that if you did the risk assessment for this location and noted that SPADs were already mitigated by the presence of a trap, you would probably conclude that the risk was already ALARP. The only benefit for TPWS in this situation would be if the train stop managed to stop the train before it was derailed by the trap. The enquiry will answer that question. It is clear that the unit must have been at some speed to get that far in the dirt.

[jonathan452]

Paddington station rail delays: City worker handcuffed during travel chaos after train derails - http://www.standard.co.uk/news/transport/paddington-delays-moment-city-worker-handcuffed-amid-rush-hour-chaos-after-train-derailment-a3274041.html

[roythebus]

According to reports on the FB "Lost Boys" group, the train also hit an equipment cabinet, knocking out some of the signalling equipment as well as causing the OHLE to be isolated. One report said the driver was a "boilee" (a boil-in-the-bag, ready in 2 minutes) or new driver; another report was to the contrary.

 

Lack of information and communication seems to be a big problem with the privytised railway. 

[Glorious NSE]

Lack of information and communication seems to be a big problem with the privytised railway. 

 

Either that or the usual railway rumour and mis/information mill is running full tilt!

 

I can't imagine anyone who needs to know the drivers actual employment history as a part of the official investigation will not have an accurate answer to that quite quickly, if they haven't done so already...

[Edwin_m]

A very pertinent message has just appeared on the RAIB website in an unrelated context:

 

 

This accident demonstrates the importance of:

• ...
• assessing the risks of using trap points to protect lines and why assessments should include an examination of the potential consequences of derailing, such as the possibility of vehicles fouling running lines or encountering other hazards

[Talltim]

Either that or the usual railway rumour and mis/information mill is running full tilt!

 

I can't imagine anyone who needs to know the drivers actual employment history as a part of the official investigation will not have an accurate answer to that quite quickly, if they haven't done so already...

I thought the post was about the rumours about the cause and the driver too, but on rereading I think it was referring to the passenger (mis)information problems in the Evening Standard article, e.g. People being told to go to Ealing Broadway and then told to go back when they got there.

[The Stationmaster]

A very pertinent message has just appeared on the RAIB website in an unrelated context:

 

Although the idea is hardly a new one of course.  A review of trap points in lines used y passenger trains followed a derailment through traps at Old Oak Common back in the 1980s leading the removal of most (if not all) which still remained at that time.  similarly I'm sure though has been given to the position of traps, particularly on the Western in the past following an incident when a train ran through the traps in Ruscombe loop and demolished a 'relay room' (actually a building containing cable terminations and jointing which was there to avoid putting them in location cabinets) although no doubt those whose memory didn't go back that far were less wary of such traps when siting trap points.

 

Logically trap points sited in potentially awkward places could have sand drags or similar but single rail sand drags seem to be a thing of the past.  No doubt RAIB and NR HQ will manage to reinvent the wheel or - more likely in my view - come out with a load of new restrictions which ignore risk based assessment and work on fear instead.  Sorry to be cynical but if anything runs too hard through traps (as appears to be the situation here?) then it will inevitably hit and probably damage something, the important thing is making sure that what it hits is not another train, particularly a  loaded passenger train.

 

Edit t correct a typo - no changes in meaning.

[The Stationmaster]

I thought the post was about the rumours about the cause and the driver too, but on rereading I think it was referring to the passenger (mis)information problems in the Evening Standard article, e.g. People being told to go to Ealing Broadway and then told to go back when they got there.

I'm not really sure what went on and why.  Inevitably in the past when there was a serious blockage on the GWML east of Reading passengers would be told to go to Waterloo - which offers three potential diversionary routes to Reading while Reading itself now has even more capacity than it has ever had in the past to turnround long distance trains from further west.  I'd have been off to Waterloo like a rocket, remembered Ascot was on and them headed via eitehr Guildford or Basinsgtoke - easy enough to tell others to do the same.

 

Ealing Broadway is a sensible diversionary spot for passengers for Acton, Ealing itself and Hanwell ('bus service available) plus probably Southall.  The problem is really serving West Drayton outwards although local services from further west can easily be turned round at Slough while turning them round at Southall is not impossible.  LHR passengers can, albeit at time cost, be told to take the UndergrounD.  

 

Almost all of that is straightforward stuff that you could almost do in your sleep when advising passengers although arranging the train turnrounds requires a bit of ingenuity and thought - although it's hardly an imposition for a wide awake operator.

 

But, as ever - and definitely the case going back into BR days - the big problem is trying to find out from the right people exactly what the infrastructure damage situation is and what impact it will have for how long?  But with modern comms kit, such as mobile 'phones, it shouldn't be difficult once people have got to site - and that need take no more than a couple of hours at the very worst I would have thought.

[caradoc]

I know of several locations where depot exits are not provided with TPWS. Longsight southend is short headshunt, north end 4 signals leading to a double track exit protected by trap points, Newton Heath is headshunt as is Stockport. My sympathies are with the driver as First group management are not known for dealing with incidents like in this positive manner.

 

My sympathies are more for the tens of thousands of passengers who were greatly inconvenienced last night (and who continue to be inconvenienced today), particularly those who were trapped in stranded trains due to the OLE power tripping out.  

[Edwin_m]

I know of several locations where depot exits are not provided with TPWS. Longsight southend is short headshunt, north end 4 signals leading to a double track exit protected by trap points, Newton Heath is headshunt as is Stockport.

Is there any location where TPWS is provided in addition to trapping?  Usually the trap is immediately after the signal so even if there was also a TPWS loop the train (unless going very slowly) would be through the trap before it stopped.  Overspeed loops on the approach would nearly always be ineffective too, because trains on this sort of line will usually be going dead slow although perhaps not in this case. 

[brian daniels]

Got TPWS and traps coming out of Didcot yard onto the up relief.

[The Stationmaster]

Got TPWS and traps coming out of Didcot yard onto the up relief.

 

There is also TPWS (and ATP I believe) and traps on the Up Goods between Foxhall and Didcot West End - but that is a running line of course so rather different.

[Fat Controller]

Cardiff services were running at 1 TPH vice 2 when I came up this afternoon.

[corneliuslundie]

Paddington... 50 041, 1983.

 

But my company's Red Star package from our printer in St Austell was only a couple of hours late at the office in central London. Mind you, the printer's van driver was on the platform waiting for the train to come in. He had a bit of a surprise.

Jonathan

[Wheatley]

Not just any old mast but apparently one with anchors and tensioning weights.

 

 

If anybody in that part of the world believed in wide-to-gauge trap points there would not have been the collision at Ladbroke Grove.

Proper flank protection would have done.

[Edwin_m]

Proper flank protection would have done.

The line the Thames train was using ended at Ladbroke Grove.  Had flank protection been provided it would have diverted the Thames train onto the Down Relief, risking a sidelong or tail-end collision rather than the head-on that actually happened.  But as the crossover to the Down Relief was quite a bit before the eventual convergence with the Up Main there would have been less time for the driver to realise his error or for the replacement of signals after the SPAD to stop other trains.  So it's a choice between a less severe but more likely and a more severe but less likely outcome, and without the benefit of hindsight it's not easy to say what choice should have been made. 

 

As I've said before, TPWS would have prevented Ladbroke Grove if it had been installed and in use.

[The Stationmaster]

The line the Thames train was using ended at Ladbroke Grove.  Had flank protection been provided it would have diverted the Thames train onto the Down Relief, risking a sidelong or tail-end collision rather than the head-on that actually happened.  But as the crossover to the Down Relief was quite a bit before the eventual convergence with the Up Main there would have been less time for the driver to realise his error or for the replacement of signals after the SPAD to stop other trains.  So it's a choice between a less severe but more likely and a more severe but less likely outcome, and without the benefit of hindsight it's not easy to say what choice should have been made. 

 

As I've said before, TPWS would have prevented Ladbroke Grove if it had been installed and in use.

 

I quite agree and the other point is that proper Road Knowledge would have made a significant difference too - in advance of SN109 a train could only made a right direction move through either a connection leading to the left or, a bit further on, a connection leading to the right - there was no straight ahead route and the connection leading to the right would have taken the train back to the line it had come off towards SN109.  And just there it isn't difficult to know which road you're on - if you know.

 

That apart there was effectively the best part of a half mile overrun in which a train had time to stop when it was obvious it wasn't going the right way - in fact a Western Driver who had SPAD'd SN109 some time previously had done exactly that - realised he was not going the right way so he stopped.  I'm sure (knowing the designer involved very well, he had unfortunately died of cancersome time before the collision happened) that he had taken such things into consideration when doing the initial signalling design and it would have been (and was) carefully considered when it was signed-off by the Ops people.   In my view what was there was relatively safe and there was - as you have said - no easy choice of an alternative if such a flexible train layout was needed.  

 

And yes - TPWS would have prevented the collision, no doubt at all about that, if it had existed when the signalling was installed.

[bigP]

--

[Zomboid]

Nobody.

Likely question is; who decides to put a mast at the end of a trap point? Answer being some Bods in an office who probaby didn't know the trap was even there.

 

 

Regards,

Paul

You need a mast every 50m or so, any derailment in an electrified area is highly likely to lead to a collision with one.