DfT issues formal ITT for South West franchise

['CHARD]

Out today in line with its own timetable, there are some interesting things in here (if you're into that sort of thing, or do it for a living as I do):

 

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/533363/swf-itt.pdf

 

 

[Supaned]

So that's another DOO dispute on the cards then...

['CHARD]

So that's another DOO dispute on the cards then...

 

Correct, and on the same day the Hayes and Harlington incident report has been published.

 

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/report-122016-passenger-accident-at-hayes-harlington-station

 

 

 

Now, where's my RMT badge...?

[Supaned]

Indeed. It's never the fault of the person who ignores hustle alarms and closing doors....

[Zomboid]

The SWT inner suburban trains are DOO as far as the passenger knows anyhow, since the guard just hides in the intermediate cab where no one can get to them.

[Southernman46]

Unlike the good old days of the 4-SUB's where the guard would blow his whistle, wave his green flag all at the same time as trying not to injure himself getting back through the brake van door which was nine times out of ten swinging merrily shut (and cos they opened outwards so couldn't be kicked back open like an inward opening one)  as it start to accelerate down the platform ..................................

[Talltim]

Indeed. It's never the fault of the person who ignores hustle alarms and closing doors....

Don;t call it a hustle alarm if you don't want people to hustle

 

1. to proceed or work rapidly or energetically: to hustle about putting a house in order.

2. to push or force one's way; jostle or shove.

[dmustu]

The SWT inner suburban trains are DOO as far as the passenger knows anyhow, since the guard just hides in the intermediate cab where no one can get to them.

There are two grades of guard on south west, AFAIK anyhow. Commercial and Non-commercial. The Non-commercial guards are the ones who work the inner suburban stuff and are not trained to do all the ticket stuff. They are also paid less than the Commercial guards, understandably.   

[Harry Lime]

...there are some interesting things in here (if you're into that sort of thing, or do it for a living as I do):

 

Wow, that's a spectacular set of instructions, especially in Section 4 where you are even told what font, font size and margins to use. Having written many submissions to government departments over the years for funding or other purposes, I have never seen such a****y retentive control over a process.

 

I hate to imagine how many hours are occupied with people writing the documentation, followed by even more hours of DfT time taken simply checking that each submission meets the criteria described under Section 4 - let alone whether the ITTs are leading to value for money bids. I'm not going to even ask if there is a better way of doing this...

[Edwin_m]

Wow, that's a spectacular set of instructions, especially in Section 4 where you are even told what font, font size and margins to use. Having written many submissions to government departments over the years for funding or other purposes, I have never seen such a****y retentive control over a process.

This is quite common in the ITTs I've seen (rail industry but not franchises).  Otherwise if a client sets a page limit on a particular response, suppliers will reduce the font or margins or perhaps print on larger paper because it's a lot quicker than re-writing the text to use fewer words and there is no risk of deleting something important. So as well as there being more text for the client to wade through, it's probably illegible as well...

[ColinK]

Agree with Harry, setting font sizes etc is nuts.

 

Plus from what it says, the DaFT are going to check that the font etc is compliant (cost to taxpayer) and change the font if its not (more cost to the taxpayer).

 

If the DaFT reformat it and the document exceeds 1000 pages, do they then bin it?

 

There has to be a better way.

[Ian J.]

I'm surprised (or not, maybe) that there isn't a purely electronic way of getting the data, either a website, or a locked down form style PDF. That way, the submission can be controlled without the risk of formatting cheats.

[royaloak]

The SWT inner suburban trains are DOO as far as the passenger knows anyhow, since the guard just hides in the intermediate cab where no one can get to them.

Speaking as an ex SWT guard who always patrolled his train whenever possible  I find your remarks distasteful and inaccurate unless you can prove your point!

[Zomboid]

I travel on the inner suburban trains relatively frequently. Never seen a guard anywhere other than in the intermediate cab.

I also use the longer distance trains as a commuter and the guards on those almost always come through, and they clearly add value to the passenger experience. Going DOO on the Exeter line for example would be a terrible mistake. Going DOO on the Chessington line would make no detectable difference to the passengers' journey.

At least in my experience. I guess you weren't on any inner suburban trains which I caught.

[Chris116]

I regularly travel from Wimbledon to Alton to work on the Mid Hants Railway. The train from Wimbledon to Surbiton is a suburban service and I see the guard walk through about 50 per cent of the time which given how short a time I am on the train is pretty good. On the service from Surbiton to Alton they come through at least once about 90 per cent of the time.

[Supaned]

Hustle alarm is the industry name for door closing bleepy noise which people seem to think signals "stick arms, legs, suitcases, umbrellas in the doors as they are closing". Class 220/221 are fitted with a sensitive edge which detects an object trapped and prevents the door being closed (and thus interlock and brake release ie the train cannot be moved). Over time this sensitive edge becomes damaged leading to door and interlock faults.

 

Don;t call it a hustle alarm if you don't want people to hustle

[caradoc]

Rather than hustle alarms these are actually door closing warnings, and there are plenty of signs on trains instructing people not to join or alight when they are sounding. As with all such instructions however, some people believe they do not apply to them.

[Chameleon]

I did think it rather telling that in all the reports and news articles on the matter, not one pointed the finger at the woman for sticking her hand into an already closing door which is clearly an unsafe and stupid thing to do. No doubt, as usual, it's the railways fault for not protecting someone from their own stupidity.

['CHARD]

I would be pressing disagree with some regularity if it was still available.

 

When you read the Hayes and Harlington RAIB report fully, it is clear that a train operator who has failed to recognise that a risk of a 'trap and drag' event even exists, needs to explain its policy on risk review fairly urgently and inventively.  

 

The RIS on duty didn't record the incident as serious, because they didn't consider it so, despite the passenger, a 60 year old female, being dragged 19 metres along the platform before she fell, and - fortunately - rolled away from the train.  The chance that she could have been fatally injured is substantial.  

 

The driver refused to honour a request to telephone control on arrival at Paddington, oblivious as he was to the incident having happened, and because he hadn't been relieved from duty, he wasn't tested for drugs or alcohol.  He had had his mobile phone switched on during his shift and received a text message at the previous station.

 

Don't get me wrong, I'm all for apportioning blame where it should reasonably lie.  This report makes very unsettling reading, and First Great Western do not emerge at all well.  They could, and in my view should, have received a far worse mauling from the RAIB.

[John M Upton]

He had had his mobile phone switched on during his shift and received a text message at the previous station.

 

A driver having a mobile phone switched on whilst in the operational cab of a train is an offence that often results in instant dismissal, probably one of the biggest no-no's for train crew in recent times.

 

However a driver can still be contacted through the GSM-R system on the train (I presume they all have them installed now?) which is effectively like a installed mobile phone system so getting hold of him/her whilst the train was stationary at a station shouldn't have been a problem.

[Edwin_m]

I didn't read it as trying to contact the driver by mobile or GSM-R - he was met at Paddington and asked to phone the ticket office at West Drayton, which he didn't do apparently because of only having 10min before his next train. This may not be unreasonable if he didn't know the reason for the request. 

 

It seems the incident details passed through the hands of several GWR staff who didn't believe it was possible for a train to move off with a hand trapped in the door, before they were reviewed by someone who took it more seriously.  If many of the staff aren't aware of this risk then how can we expect the public to be? 

[Talltim]

Most automatic doors nowadays will reopen if they detect an obstruction (although the internal doors on Voyagers appear to have missed that memo). I don't know what the lady was thinking but i suspect she never considered that the train doors wouldn't. Not a mistake I suspect she or anyone who knows her will make again.

However train operators have far more experience of train door incidents and they really should know better

['CHARD]

A driver having a mobile phone switched on whilst in the operational cab of a train is an offence that often results in instant dismissal, probably one of the biggest no-no's for train crew in recent times.

 

However a driver can still be contacted through the GSM-R system on the train (I presume they all have them installed now?) which is effectively like a installed mobile phone system so getting hold of him/her whilst the train was stationary at a station shouldn't have been a problem.

 

This driver, somewhat unhappily, had loads of previous, and was subsequently suspended.  Seemingly, he wasn't contacted because the severity of the incident hadn't sunk in with other staff members, as Edwin describes below.

 

I didn't read it as trying to contact the driver by mobile or GSM-R - he was met at Paddington and asked to phone the ticket office at West Drayton, which he didn't do apparently because of only having 10min before his next train. This may not be unreasonable if he didn't know the reason for the request. 

 

It seems the incident details passed through the hands of several GWR staff who didn't believe it was possible for a train to move off with a hand trapped in the door, before they were reviewed by someone who took it more seriously.  If many of the staff aren't aware of this risk then how can we expect the public to be? 

 

He was blissfully ignorant, and it is suggested in the report that this was because he did not recheck the platform screens having obtained door interlock.  Had he have done, he would have seen the woman at the train side, and one assumes, not taken power.

 

Most automatic doors nowadays will reopen if they detect an obstruction (although the internal doors on Voyagers appear to have missed that memo). I don't know what the lady was thinking but i suspect she never considered that the train doors wouldn't. Not a mistake I suspect she or anyone who knows her will make again.

However train operators have far more experience of train door incidents and they really should know better

 

Voyager infernal doors are certainly an oddity and I can't believe there haven't been near-misses, especially with children getting hands trapped.  I confess that on Class 165s, like this one, I was aware of the obstacle detection on closing, which seems to have worked as designed, at least when the unit was tested at Reading a couple of days later.  The sensitivity however, being to detect a 10mm x 50mm piece of bar - which I would equate more to an average human palm under compression, rather than outstretched fingers.  

 

Certainly train operators should be very aware of the potential for incidents such as these, and the fact that GWR confessed that 'trap and drag' was not even categorised as a risk raises very uncomfortable questions.  Yes, many passengers are regular users, but how many infrequent users might assume that doors in a public realm would be capable of harm?

[The Stationmaster]

I would be pressing disagree with some regularity if it was still available.

 

When you read the Hayes and Harlington RAIB report fully, it is clear that a train operator who has failed to recognise that a risk of a 'trap and drag' event even exists, needs to explain its policy on risk review fairly urgently and inventively.  

 

The RIS on duty didn't record the incident as serious, because they didn't consider it so, despite the passenger, a 60 year old female, being dragged 19 metres along the platform before she fell, and - fortunately - rolled away from the train.  The chance that she could have been fatally injured is substantial.  

 

The driver refused to honour a request to telephone control on arrival at Paddington, oblivious as he was to the incident having happened, and because he hadn't been relieved from duty, he wasn't tested for drugs or alcohol.  He had had his mobile phone switched on during his shift and received a text message at the previous station.

 

Don't get me wrong, I'm all for apportioning blame where it should reasonably lie.  This report makes very unsettling reading, and First Great Western do not emerge at all well.  They could, and in my view should, have received a far worse mauling from the RAIB.

 

I think part of the 'reporting' problem seems to have been down to having a rather confusing organisation with what amount to parallel reporting lines.  It strikes me as perfectly natural and logical for a member of station staff to report an incident to their supervisor/manager and for that supervisor/manager to assess what has happened and make sure that the appropriate action has been/is being taken in respect of obtaining reports and following- the incident.

 

If the requirement - as it appears to be - is to report directly to a person in Control then that should be made very clear in very plain English in a suitably localised version of the SMS.  It is hardly rocket science to do that and it is no less difficult to make sure that staff are fully aware of procedures which apply to them and incident etc reporting procedures area critical part of any SMS.  Either FGW had not done that or they had not done it in away which was clear to, and easily remembered by, the staff at Hayes (or any other station).

 

In many respects it was fortunate that the incident occurred at a station where CCTV evidence was available and where CCTV coverage of the train is also present.  There are stations on the GWR London suburban network where DOO is in operation but there is neither CCTV nor a mirror to enable the Driver to view his train - I wonder how soon it will be before that changes (Crossrail works apart)?

[Edwin_m]

One rather obvious measure would be to record the DOO cameras as well, but I don't recall that having been mentioned still less recommended.  However, the delay in recognising the incident also led to the train OTMR and some of the CCTV evidence being overwritten before it could be saved. 

 

I'm rather surprised the ticket office supervisor was trying to speak to the train driver, as I would expect anything like that to be referred smartly up to someone with some sort of responsibility for incident investigation. 

 

Edit: Just noticed this isn't the Hayes and Harlington thread, it's supposed to be about the South West Franchise!