GTR Timetable Change 2018

[jim.snowdon]

So how come the GWR services are still running between those two stations?

Blocked To Electric Traction?

 

Without access to the Weekly Operating Notice, I can only speculate, using hwat informatin is available via the National Rail website.

 

Jim

[roundhouse]

Blocked To Electric Traction?

 

Without access to the Weekly Operating Notice, I can only speculate, using hwat informatin is available via the National Rail website.

 

Jim

Last weeekend the Tonbridge line had the local Southern services replaced by bus but the Southeastern services form Tunbridge Wells and Hastings were running via Tonbridge and Redhill. This weekend there are the same diversions and the local Southern services to Tonbridge are running aswell but this time no Reigate Southern services. It would appear (only my guess) that there aren't enough train crew to operate all services.

[Mike Storey]

There is a malaise in this country. We just don’t seem to be able to carry out big projects anymore . I have no idea who interfered with what or who didn’t do something. But we need to get a grip , from timetables to large infrastructure projects. There are too many delays . This simply wouldn’t have happened under British Rail . Do you remember any major timetable change cock ups? It’s hard to avoid the conclusion there are too many fingers in the pie and no one taking overall control.

 

Perhaps the 2012 Olympics are a distant memory? A £9 billion scheme (including the huge, extra security, Lea Valley development and VAT, all excluded from the original bid costs), on time in a very compressed timescale, and came in £0.5 billion under the total budget. It had a huge number of fingers in the pie, including internationally. And that includes all Network Rail's bits. Britain can most certainly do it, as it proved, much to everyone's surprise.

 

You could also cite CrossRail and a number of schemes in Scotland similarly (except latterly the E&G now).

 

Why did those go so well but so many others do not, including many outside the rail industry? My opinion, FWIW, is that 2012 had a very clear remit, knew that significant changes were going to come and allowed for them in a strict change control process, and it had a running start, because many of the schemes, away from the stadia themselves, were long standing and just dusted off to be done much earlier than they would have been. The difference between that and with GWIP, which seems to have had an evolving remit even after construction started, and with T2000, which was plagued by planning enquiry after enquiry, let alone evolving and brand new technology in both cases, could not be starker. But it does not explain the delays to the North West electrification, which should have been pretty routine (not helped by contractual problems), as should those for the ECML minor OLE upgrades and other works for the IEP's.

 

I would have said NR and the rail industry supply chain were just too stretched, until I heard that some companies are worried about where their next jobs are coming from. It is very easy to blame people who don't know what they are doing, or have too little experience. That used to be what people said about us in 1980's BR, as a lot of the old railway folk had retired or left due to further reorganisations. It was as true then as it is now. But then you look at the ORR reports,  which admit the vast, vast majority of NR enhancements works have been carried out on time and on budget. It is actually the renewals schemes which are way behind, and the few headline major projects (plus several smaller ones but usually due to planning issues). Given that many renewals schemes include elements of modernisation (the old Modern Equivalent Value regime), I just wonder if there is a much bigger connection, between the failure of one with the failure of the other than appears at first view. I do note that in NR's continuing devolution plans, only Major Projects (major enhancements/upgrades and new works) will be kept at national level, but renewals will go to Routes. Major renewals works were all planned centrally under the Infrastructure Director, previously.

Edited June 3, 2018 by Mike Storey

[phil-b259]

It would appear (only my guess) that there aren't enough train crew to operate all services.

 

Is that a surprise?

 

After years of pissing off their staff is it any wonder that nobody fancies coming in on overtime to help the company out.

 

Yet another side effect of Mr  "I'm going to break the Unions" Wilkinson's vendetta.

[mdvle]

Why did those go so well but so many others do not, including many outside the rail industry? My opinion, FWIW, is that 2012 had a very clear remit, knew that significant changes were going to come and allowed for them in a strict change control process, and it had a running start, because many of the schemes, away from the stadia themselves, were long standing and just dusted off to be done much earlier than they would have been. The difference between that and with GWIP, which seems to have had an evolving remit even after construction started, and with T2000, which was plagued by planning enquiry after enquiry, let alone evolving and brand new technology in both cases, could not be starker. But it does not explain the delays to the North West electrification, which should have been pretty routine (not helped by contractual problems), as should those for the ECML minor OLE upgrades and other works for the IEP's.

 

 

 

Certainly a key way to have success with any long running project is to have a management that is willing to say no unless there are very good reasons to change things - and the related other side of management willing to listen to those speaking up to indicate when problems arise.

 

But, particularly with electrification, I wonder if a significant part of the problem is the all or nothing approach government seems to take in order to work with needed election cycles.

 

Perhaps a better method would have been to start on a smaller scale, and then when the institutional knowledge had been attained then just continue building out each year by X miles / or Y £'s.  It would have taken longer, but you would have gotten there in the end for less money instead of the current mess.

[roundhouse]

This morning we saw a 'how did we do' set of buttons near the barriers at LBG.

 

I suspect that the red button will break first. One of our directors said they ought to have a seat there so you can sit down bashing the red button for a the rubbish journeys we have had during the rebuild g strikes and new timetable

[The Stationmaster]

I don't think that this has been mentioned previously but apologies if it has.  It makes very interesting reading and some parts of it would appear to confirm that we do indeed have a nationalised passenger railway in Britain (I'm at a loss to understand why DafT would otherwise need to know anything about traincrew rostering!)

 

https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/The-Thameslink-Southern-and-Great-Northern-rail-franchise.pdf 

[Mike Storey]

I don't think that this has been mentioned previously but apologies if it has.  It makes very interesting reading and some parts of it would appear to confirm that we do indeed have a nationalised passenger railway in Britain (I'm at a loss to understand why DafT would otherwise need to know anything about traincrew rostering!)

 

https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/The-Thameslink-Southern-and-Great-Northern-rail-franchise.pdf 

 

Link does not seem to work for me Mike? Says "not found".

[62613]

And me! 404 'Not Found' error

[phil-b259]

I don't think that this has been mentioned previously but apologies if it has.  It makes very interesting reading and some parts of it would appear to confirm that we do indeed have a nationalised passenger railway in Britain (I'm at a loss to understand why DafT would otherwise need to know anything about traincrew rostering!)

 

https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/The-Thameslink-Southern-and-Great-Northern-rail-franchise.pdf 

 

 

Link does not seem to work for me Mike? Says "not found".

 

 

And me! 404 'Not Found' error

 

Do you mean this one Mike?

 

https://www.nao.org.uk/report/update-on-the-thameslink-programme/

https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/The-Thameslink-Southern-and-Great-Northern-rail-franchise.pdf

[jim.snowdon]

But, particularly with electrification, I wonder if a significant part of the problem is the all or nothing approach government seems to take in order to work with needed election cycles.

 

Perhaps a better method would have been to start on a smaller scale, and then when the institutional knowledge had been attained then just continue building out each year by X miles / or Y £'s.  It would have taken longer, but you would have gotten there in the end for less money instead of the current mess.

It would, and was very much the method adopted for the West Coast Main Line electrification, but then, that was facilitated by the use of loco hauled trains and the ability to change traction at the boundary of the available electrification. Even with fixed formation traction, the ECML and the Southern, in its day, managed quite well by what amounted to a staged changeover of the fleet.

 

Jim

[locoholic]

When was the last time that significant sections of the UK rail network faced a crisis of the same magnitude as the current one on Northern and GTR?

[Mike Storey]

Do you mean this one Mike?

 

https://www.nao.org.uk/report/update-on-the-thameslink-programme/

https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/The-Thameslink-Southern-and-Great-Northern-rail-franchise.pdf

 

Very interesting and well worth reading, as it goes back to the origins of the current problems. Seemingly, NR did try to point out the reliability risks since before 2013, but DfT just told them to sort it out in normal TT negotiations. Finally, DfT have recognised NR's concerns, by giving them an extra £250m to accelerate infrastructure reliability work (£50m more to come from NR's existing budget). But NR say a total of £900m extra will have to be spent, to increase reliability to the levels necessary for 24tph through the hole, but only have enough planned access to spend £300m by Spring 2019. Also of note, is that the majority of this spend is needed on the SE and GN routes, not Southern, which surprised me.

 

Whilst driver numbers issues are covered since the start of the franchise, and the late delivery of the Class 700 trains is also mentioned, there is nothing reported about any concerns for driver training or total numbers leading up to the May 2018 new timetable. That also surprised me. Of course the NAO report was written before these matters became all too evident, but the surprise is that the sorry tale of recruitment and training up to that date, should have rung alarm bells. Even if it was not mentioned by anybody, why did the NAO team not reach that conclusion? It could not have been outside their remit, as they mention plenty of other issues affecting 2018 and 2019.

 

Nonetheless, these reports are giving us much more background than we knew for certain, from any other source.

[mdvle]

Very interesting and well worth reading, as it goes back to the origins of the current problems.

An interesting quote from section 1.5

 

 

The Department awarded the contract, worth £8 billion over seven years, to Govia Thameslink after it scored the highest of five bidders for its proposals on service quality and put forward the lowest cost to run the franchise.

 

Maybe others can explain differently, but to me those 2 "wins" in the franchise bid are contradictory - getting better service quality usually means higher expenses, which would seem to go against having the lowest cost.

 

I also find this in 1.10 a bit disturbing

 

 

Gatwick Express services are performing the worst, with the number of trains arriving within five minutes of the schedule being as much as 10% lower than other routes at certain points. Gatwick Express is the smallest part of the franchise, with 46,000 or 4% of services. Govia Thameslink told us that when there are service problems, other, longer distance and less frequent trains are sometimes given priority over Gatwick Express trains, under an established industry process agreed by Network Rail with other operators, since passengers can use other trains to reach Gatwick Airport.

 

While technically true, how many passengers are a) aware of the alternates to Gatwick and b) how practical when dragging luggage is it to then try and use a commuter train and c) can they still meet the time constraints given planes don't wait.  If I was Gatwick Airport this would infuriate me as the whole point of Gatwick Express is to get travelers to the airport, and if Gatwick Express is going to be the first service "thrown under the bus" then it isn't a service my customers could rely on.

[pete_mcfarlane]

When was the last time that significant sections of the UK rail network faced a crisis of the same magnitude as the current one on Northern and GTR?

The post-Hatfield speed restrictions?

[roundhouse]

I see that the amended service to reduce cancellations is working well!

 

A lot of Horsham services cancelled earlier

[roundhouse]

Oops it's just got worse and our train home the 17.21 has now dissappeared

[The Stationmaster]

Link does not seem to work for me Mike? Says "not found".

 

As linked by Phil.  and I'll try again with this (duly tested and it worked for me

 

https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/The-Thameslink-Southern-and-Great-Northern-rail-franchise.pdf

Edited June 4, 2018 by The Stationmaster

[The Stationmaster]

Very interesting and well worth reading, as it goes back to the origins of the current problems. Seemingly, NR did try to point out the reliability risks since before 2013, but DfT just told them to sort it out in normal TT negotiations. Finally, DfT have recognised NR's concerns, by giving them an extra £250m to accelerate infrastructure reliability work (£50m more to come from NR's existing budget). But NR say a total of £900m extra will have to be spent, to increase reliability to the levels necessary for 24tph through the hole, but only have enough planned access to spend £300m by Spring 2019. Also of note, is that the majority of this spend is needed on the SE and GN routes, not Southern, which surprised me.

 

Whilst driver numbers issues are covered since the start of the franchise, and the late delivery of the Class 700 trains is also mentioned, there is nothing reported about any concerns for driver training or total numbers leading up to the May 2018 new timetable. That also surprised me. Of course the NAO report was written before these matters became all too evident, but the surprise is that the sorry tale of recruitment and training up to that date, should have rung alarm bells. Even if it was not mentioned by anybody, why did the NAO team not reach that conclusion? It could not have been outside their remit, as they mention plenty of other issues affecting 2018 and 2019.

 

Nonetheless, these reports are giving us much more background than we knew for certain, from any other source.

 

Another thing which it effectively confirms is that changes were being made to the train plan after submission date (and am I reading it right where it implies that DafT were party to this?).  Para 3.7 is also very interesting reading

[Mike Storey]

An interesting quote from section 1.5

 

 

Maybe others can explain differently, but to me those 2 "wins" in the franchise bid are contradictory - getting better service quality usually means higher expenses, which would seem to go against having the lowest cost.

 

I also find this in 1.10 a bit disturbing

 

 

While technically true, how many passengers are a) aware of the alternates to Gatwick and b) how practical when dragging luggage is it to then try and use a commuter train and c) can they still meet the time constraints given planes don't wait.  If I was Gatwick Airport this would infuriate me as the whole point of Gatwick Express is to get travelers to the airport, and if Gatwick Express is going to be the first service "thrown under the bus" then it isn't a service my customers could rely on.

 

I would hope, in a sane world, that the 1.5 para meant combination of low price and high service?

 

What is subsequently ironic about Gatwick services, as of the real time running results posted since the new TT came in, is that Gatwicks seem to be the one service that has been running fairly consistently well (although I have just seen a screen grab for today which shows one being cancelled - hey ho.). But the tradition of sacrificing Gatwicks for the greater good goes way back into BR days. As SM Brighton I would be screaming down the phone at Essex House Control to give me some more trains during peturbation (as would my colleagues at Burgess Hill and Haywards Heath - we were all on the same pub quiz team naturally), and the relative numbers of passengers made that the logical thing to do. If you never had to deal with Dora Bryan face to face, you won't know what I mean.....

[Nimbus]

The point about DfT having charge of the critical levers for control of GTR was clearly made in one of a series of interviews in a segment on BBC1 London news this evening. Seems the newsroom has been reading the London Reconnections website! Grant Shapps went so far as to suggest handing control to the Mayor of London would provide the ultimate fix.

 

The Nim.

[Mike Storey]

..... and now Mr Grayling has announced another inquiry into why things have gone so wrong, both for GTR and for Northern customers. He apologised in parleyment, and was ridiculed even by tame Tory MP's. Clearly, they scent blood.

 

Mr Grayling blames the Industry Readiness Board (chaired by one Chris Gibb) for telling him that all would be right on the night. We do not yet have their version of events of course, and I wonder if we ever will (if Mr Gibb has no retirement plans as yet).

 

What we do have is a report by the Public Accounts Committee in Feb 2018, which is full of travesties of the truth, I am now beginning to wonder if the conspiracy theories are true. Just one example - they state in their conclusions that NR did not realise the extent of the additional works necessary to sustain a reliable service to serve the 24 tph tunnel service, until 2016. Oh yes they did - it was mentioned in the NAO report that they had raised objections to the planned level of services, due to network condition, in 2013!!! The daft bu88ers had obviously not even bothered to read that, and just took DafT's word for it, plus some compliant lacky from NR who confirmed that the £900m figure was not identified until 2016. Oh, for Betty Boothroyd to return from the grave.

 

Read it and see what you think - https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmpubacc/466/466.pdf

[Fat Controller]

..... and now Mr Grayling has announced another inquiry into why things have gone so wrong, both for GTR and for Northern customers. He apologised in parleyment, and was ridiculed even by tame Tory MP's. Clearly, they scent blood.

 

Mr Grayling blames the Industry Readiness Board (chaired by one Chris Gibb) for telling him that all would be right on the night. We do not yet have their version of events of course, and I wonder if we ever will (if Mr Gibb has no retirement plans as yet).

 

What we do have is a report by the Public Accounts Committee in Feb 2018, which is full of travesties of the truth, I am now beginning to wonder if the conspiracy theories are true. Just one example - they state in their conclusions that NR did not realise the extent of the additional works necessary to sustain a reliable service to serve the 24 tph tunnel service, until 2016. Oh yes they did - it was mentioned in the NAO report that they had raised objections to the planned level of services, due to network condition, in 2013!!! The daft bu88ers had obviously not even bothered to read that, and just took DafT's word for it, plus some compliant lacky from NR who confirmed that the £900m figure was not identified until 2016. Oh, for Betty Boothroyd to return from the grave.

 

Read it and see what you think - https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmpubacc/466/466.pdf

Or Gwyneth Dunwoody.

[jjb1970]

Fear not, lessons will be learned.

 

On reliability and various other things on Thameslink, between 2008-2010 part of my job was to look after the decking over the railway immediately to the South of Farringdon station and to manage maintenance for some rather nasty on the other side of the tunnel wall and installed over the top of the railway. At that time NR had what might be called an aggressive posture towards other parties that might require an outage to gain access for maintenance and the size of the liquidated damages we would be liable for were frightening. I had several discussions with NR engineering people on the subject and they gave the impression of being fully aware of the implications of the very high intensity service which was being planned and were getting their ducks in a row with respect to third parties outside the railway. My employer paid a lot of money over engineering certain things to try and ensure they'd never be responsible for screwing the Thameslink line. Looking at it now I can't help asking myself why we bothered as clearly somebody somewhere wasn't bothered about making sure their bit would work.

 

At least it seems that people in the general media and public are waking up to the baleful influence of DafT.

[rodent279]

It would, and was very much the method adopted for the West Coast Main Line electrification, but then, that was facilitated by the use of loco hauled trains and the ability to change traction at the boundary of the available electrification. Even with fixed formation traction, the ECML and the Southern, in its day, managed quite well by what amounted to a staged changeover of the fleet.

 

Jim

But that approach wouldn't really work on GWML, at least, because you can't really electrify to Swindon, then have a pause, then Bristol, pause, then Cardiff. The smallest section worth doing would be Airport Jn-Reading, for suburban services, then really you've got to go at least as far as Bristol to be worthwhile.