Forgetting a banker/not knowing you having a banker on your train?

[OnTheBranchline]

In Great Western Railway Journal No 46. Spring 2003, former fireman Bob Crump talks about being at Reading from 1948-1959 writes about an amusing incident:

 

"Occasionally, when we had a rough engine, we'd stop at Moreton-in-Marsh for water and I would try to make a can of tea while the tank was being filled, but will fail to do so because the kettle didn't boil in time! One night I tried shouting at the bobby in Honeybourne box to ask the bobby at Moreton to have the kettle on for us. We thought no more about it until, when dropping down into Moreton station, we came to a sudden stop without applying the brake. I was pulling coal forward when his happened and ended up knee deep in lumps. What had happened was that the signalman at Honeybourne misunderstood what I had called out and had attached a banker to our train without our realizing. It was the banker that stopped us. Its crew didn't want to go any further and we never got the can of tea!"

 

Did this ever happen in practice or was this story written possibly for the benefit of the reader?

Edited November 6, 2023 by OnTheBranchline

[LMS2968]

When running with a banker with a loose-coupled train there a few things you had to bear in mind. The couplings at the front of the train would be stretched while the buffers to the rear would be compressed, so care was need in both applying steam and starting to brake. So you needed to bear this in mind as you were running and how you could forget there was a banker attached is not something I suggest is likely.

[Stoke West]

10 minutes ago, LMS2968 said:

When running with a banker with a loose-coupled train there a few things you had to bear in mind. The couplings at the front of the train would be stretched while the buffers to the rear would be compressed, so care was need in both applying steam and starting to brake. So you needed to bear this in mind as you were running and how you could forget there was a banker attached is not something I suggest is likely.

When banking from Honeybourne to Chipping Campden the banker was not coupled but if going through to Moreton-in-Marsh was coupled due to some falling gradients

[johnofwessex]

Peter Smith recalls an incident on Parkstone Bank where a 9F hauled express outran the banker which ended up 'winded' on the climb

[The Johnster]

2 hours ago, LMS2968 said:

When running with a banker with a loose-coupled train there a few things you had to bear in mind. The couplings at the front of the train would be stretched while the buffers to the rear would be compressed, so care was need in both applying steam and starting to brake. So you needed to bear this in mind as you were running and how you could forget there was a banker attached is not something I suggest is likely.

 

Generally, yes, but in this case a failure of communication with the signalman had resulted in a banker being attached without the knowledge of the train loco crew, who only wanted a kettle boiled for them.  Bit lax, one would have thought they'd have realised when they looked back to get the tip from their guard when they started off, and shouldn't whistles have been exchanged?

 

Running loose-coupled trains over undulating roads is a dark and occult art* requiring a psychic connection between the driver and the guard, who must accurately predict each other's precise actions.  Throw a coupled banker into the mix and things start to get a bit complex...

 

 

*I know, as the brake van end of the operation was once my responsibility.  As well as knowing what your driver was about to do, you had to know exactly where you were, all the time.  Well, that's easy enough, Johnster, you are thinking, you sign the road and you've worked over it loads of times, all you do is look out of the window; yeah but, now imagine it's dark, foggy, and you can't see a hand in front of your face; you're down to echo-location by cutting sides and bridges, counting rail joints, and listening for bridge rumbles.  Worked a train of empty oil tanks down from Swindon one night, sat in front with the driver, and seeing out was acadmic as soon as we'd passed Rushey Platt; it hadn't been much more than about 20 feet in the middle of town.  We were following a class 8, which was obviously feeling it's way along in the freezing fog and behind something else; the AWS blew hooters at us at every signal, which we had to locate by means of your intrepid reporter hanging out of the door with a Bardic.  I had to climb about 3/4th up one signal to be certain what the aspect was; this was a controlled signal with a calling-on light so must have been Hullavington loop entrance; you couldn't see the feathers, which weren't lit.  After about an hour of this, I confessed to the driver that while I wasn't lost, the area in which I was certain I was located was rather large, somewhere between Brinkworth and Alderton I thought, probably...  He confessed that he wasn't any more aware of where we were than I was, after 25 years running up and down that stretch!  

 

As soon as we entered Alderton Tunnel, the signals ahead cleared green and the fog cleared for the rest of the run!

[Southernman46]

Everybody must remember this ......................... "oh my wheels"

 

[Nearholmer]

^^^ That's exactly what I thought.

 

personally, I reckon the tale that the OP reproduces is a tall one.

[The Stationmaster]

Definitely a tall tale which ignored certain facts of the way in which such assistance had to be dealt with.  In addition back in those days, judging by what happened at various other places, if the engine in rear had stopped dead it was far more likely that a wagon drawbar would be pulled out rather than the leading engine being jerked to a standstill

[MJI]

17 hours ago, johnofwessex said:

Peter Smith recalls an incident on Parkstone Bank where a 9F hauled express outran the banker which ended up 'winded' on the climb

 

I read that too, and it showed how capable 9Fs were

[Titan]

4 hours ago, Southernman46 said:

Everybody must remember this ......................... "oh my wheels"

 

 

I remember it well, although in this case Thomas was not the banker, he was the station pilot who had brought in the ECS and they forgot to uncouple, as with many of the original stories based on a real event (or two).

[Southernman46]

Yes I knew that but that wasn't the point - never mind 🙄

[Michael Hodgson]

Trains being assisted in rear were not necessarily coupled to the banking engine - some places banked "loose" which meant that there was no need to stop the train once the train engine was over the summit and coping by itself.  Depended on local practice (local instructions).  It was not completely unknown in this situation for the banker to fall away from the train before reaching the summit if the train engine was up to the job but the banker itself was having problems.  It was then important that the banker did not try to catch up again cause a rear end collision, also that the signalbox should not give train out of section until the banker has also arrived.

[Stoke West]

11 minutes ago, Michael Hodgson said:

Trains being assisted in rear were not necessarily coupled to the banking engine - some places banked "loose" which meant that there was no need to stop the train once the train engine was over the summit and coping by itself.  Depended on local practice (local instructions).  It was not completely unknown in this situation for the banker to fall away from the train before reaching the summit if the train engine was up to the job but the banker itself was having problems.  It was then important that the banker did not try to catch up again cause a rear end collision, also that the signalbox should not give train out of section until the banker has also arrived.

The Honeybourne banker was unusual as it very often was tender first usually a Collett 0-6-0 , even photos taken in the summer so not weather / wind direction related

[Edwin_m]

37 minutes ago, Michael Hodgson said:

Trains being assisted in rear were not necessarily coupled to the banking engine - some places banked "loose" which meant that there was no need to stop the train once the train engine was over the summit and coping by itself.  Depended on local practice (local instructions).  It was not completely unknown in this situation for the banker to fall away from the train before reaching the summit if the train engine was up to the job but the banker itself was having problems.  It was then important that the banker did not try to catch up again cause a rear end collision, also that the signalbox should not give train out of section until the banker has also arrived.

An example of the hazards of this sort of operation: Report on the Collision that occurred on 18th May 1969 near Beattock in the Scottish Region British Railways

[pH]

26 minutes ago, Edwin_m said:

An example of the hazards of this sort of operation: Report on the Collision that occurred on 18th May 1969 near Beattock in the Scottish Region British Railways

Rather unusual circumstances, though, with a complete following train (itself banked) being used to assist a stalled train.

 

When trains were routinely banked up Beattock, bankers were not coupled up. 

Edited November 7, 2023 by pH

[The Johnster]

5 hours ago, The Stationmaster said:

Definitely a tall tale which ignored certain facts of the way in which such assistance had to be dealt with.  In addition back in those days, judging by what happened at various other places, if the engine in rear had stopped dead it was far more likely that a wagon drawbar would be pulled out rather than the leading engine being jerked to a standstill

 

At the very least there would have been a violent snatch, and for the story to work that would have to have been blamed on the guard.  Human nature would demand that the leading loco crew looked back in order to more effectively direct their invective at him, but they should have both been looking back at suitable intervals anyway to make sure that the van was following them.  They'd have realised at that point that there was another engine banking them!

 

It is perhaps surprising to discover that when couplings broke and trains divided, something that happened fairly often before the widespread introduction of instanter couplings on part-fitted or unfitted trains, the loco crew were unaware of the occurrence for some time, and often so was the guard!  It becomes easier to explain when one considers the circumstances in which couplings failed, which were violent snatches.  These might happen at the bottom of inclines after the train has buffered up and the loco is now under power again; the guard may have released his brake on the van too early, the power pickup may have been a bit enthusiastic*, or release of the vacuum brake on the fitted head may have been unpredictable.  A snatch of this sort is very apparent both on the loco and in the van, but if the coupling breaks there is much less of this sort of indication, because the coupling has broken, in itself a much less violent occurrence.

 

If the train had divided, the loco crew should be able to see what has happened by looking back to check that the van was still there, or it's side lamps at night.  But steam locos demand all sorts of attention from their crews; faffing with injectors, clinkered up fires, drawing coal forward; driving or firing a steam engine is a pretty 'immersive' experience.  Poor visibility at night might well mean that the rear of the train is not visible, and curves in cuttings may mean it is out of sight even in clear daylight.  And, remember, the division has taken place at the bottom of a bank, so the loco is working hard and pulliing hard, so if the break is towards the rear of the train, it may appear to the driver that he is pulling rather well this evening; there will still be several hundred tons behind him!

 

The situation may not be realised until the train has passed the next box, which will report 'train divided' because there is no tail lamp and he can't clear back to the previous box because the rear portion is still in the section, but it's too late to stop the forward section's progress, and that will not happen until the box after this one is reached.  We've gone a few miles by now, and nobody knows where the rear portion is (though a bit of deductive thinking will usually give you a fair idea).  The next thing is to decide on recovering it, and you'll usually have to do this from the rear.

 

Meanwhile, back in the van... the first thing the guard will notice is that the train is apparently slowing down.  No sh*t, Sherlock, we're going up a bank.  But a minute or so later, the slowing seems excessive and instead of the slipping and sparks expected from the loco there is only the sound of exhaust beats fading into the distance as the front portion forges up the bank.  B*gger, we've divided, and I'm all on my own out in the dark, I want my mummy...  First job, apply the brake and bring my portion to a stand, and while it is coming to a stand, reverse the side lamps so that they display a red aspect to any train passing on the other line, which will slow down and examine the line and report that you've alerted it at it's next box; the wider railway world will be starting to realise that there is a problem but they won't know what it is yet.  Any rolling backwards is inadvisable, as the first catch point we encounter will prove, so the next job is to pin down enough handbrakes on the wagon to ensure that your portion stays put, then set off on the long walk back to protect with detonators and a red flag/lamp.    

 

Eventually, the guard will be met by the assisting train and he will pilot it on to his van, release the handbrakes, and proceed with caution to the next box, where there will further instruction, usually to enter the following section and propel the rear portion on to the front of the train.  There will be recriminations as the guard blames the driver for rough handling and not looking back and the driver blames the guard for not using his brake properly; they may well both have a point.  The GW had trains dividing about once a week somewhere on their system in their final year, despite the much better performance of it's instanter couplings which had not been implemented over it's entire wagon fleet, and of course pooled wagons from other railways made up the greater portion of it's goods trains.  In nearly ten years of working trains with instanter couplings in the 70s I never heard of a coupling breaking, though the fear of it was deeply embedded in railway culture and folk memory.  Axle failures and derailments were the most common cause of coupling failures, and it had already hit the fan by the time that happened!

 

 

*Driving loose-coupled trains on undulating roads is not easy, as the springing of the drawhooks and buffers means that energy is stored and released by the Troublesome Trucks in unpredictable ways, as well as the moveable feast of vacuum brake release against the inevitable leakage.  Not all drivers were as good at it as they thought they were, and guards varied as well.  I was often told after a run in which there had been minimal snatching that I was rather proud of that none of my efforts could be detected on the loco, perhaps 60 wagon away, at all! 

 

One hears stories of guards sleeping and rear portions see-sawing back and forth in dips between inclines before eventually coming to a stand; I believe there's a book about the Port Road (which must have been fun in a brake van in the dark) that features such an adventure.  I don't believe it, it's extremely unlikely.  Not saying that guards didn't sleep in vans while the train was under way, we all did at one time or another. but one would wake up and immediately ascertain one's position if speed fell off; I still do this nearly half a century later on passenger trains slowing to stops.  If you're running along at the expected speed, all is well, snore away (I'm not recommending this as a method of working trains, of course, but it did happen, and until you've reported for duty at half-one in the morning and are now three hours or so in, exhausted from a rough-riding van, I for one will not readily condemn you); when speed falls off, you soon learn to snap out of it, convince yourself that you were only resting your eyes for a second, and leap into a furious blur of action...

 

 

[craneman]

I'm fairly sure that Terry Essery recalls "Galatea" running away from the bankers on the Lickey on one occasion in "Saltley Firing Days".

[pH]

6 minutes ago, The Johnster said:

One hears stories of guards sleeping and rear portions see-sawing back and forth in dips between inclines before eventually coming to a stand; I believe there's a book about the Port Road (which must have been fun in a brake van in the dark) that features such an adventure. 

“Tales of the Glasgow and South Western Railway” by David L. Smith. That incident didn’t happen on the Port Road, but on the line between Ayr and Girvan, going south.

[pH]

During the 1948 Locomotive Exchanges, West Country 34004 ‘winded’ its banker, Caley Bogie 14501 (LMS number), on the first part of the northbound climb to Dalnaspidal on the Highland main line. They had a longer than usual stop at Struan for 14501 to recover, then took 19.23 for the remainder of the climb, instead of the scheduled 31 minutes.

 

(Source - “British Pacific Locomotives” by C.J. Allen)

Edited November 7, 2023 by pH
Transposed digits!

[kevinlms]

On 07/11/2023 at 08:41, johnofwessex said:

Peter Smith recalls an incident on Parkstone Bank where a 9F hauled express outran the banker which ended up 'winded' on the climb

In that example, the banker was intended to be put on the following train, not the 9F hauled one. So the driver hadn't requested one, but he knew it was there, since his fireman pointed it out and deliberately drove in a manner to leave the banker (an M7 tank) behind. The M7 would hardly have been noticed as making any contribution to pushing a 9F hauled train, which if I recall correctly, only had about 6 coaches.

[rogerzilla]

The Chapel-en-le-Frith disaster could almost certainly have been avoided if the banker had been coupled, but that wasn't the normal practice there - it was just used to give trains a shove over Dove Holes.

 

The steam leak occurred on the way up, so in theory the banker could have been warned to stop pushing, and the train stopped, before the summit, but the train engine whistle relied on the broken steam pipe.  It really was a cursed series of events.

[LMS2968]

1 hour ago, rogerzilla said:

The Chapel-en-le-Frith disaster could almost certainly have been avoided if the banker had been coupled, but that wasn't the normal practice there - it was just used to give trains a shove over Dove Holes.

 

The steam leak occurred on the way up, so in theory the banker could have been warned to stop pushing, and the train stopped, before the summit, but the train engine whistle relied on the broken steam pipe.  It really was a cursed series of events.

Not exactly. The brake and whistle were both fed from the same manifold but that would still have provided plenty of steam to supply the whistle. But what was the code for stop pushing? The broken steam pipe was directing a jet of steam across the firebox backplate so I rather doubt that John Axon could have got close enough to reach the whistle handle, high up in the roof, even from the fireman's side. But even had the banker been coupled up and applied the brakes, I suspect that a breakaway would be the most likely result.

[62613]

18 hours ago, Michael Hodgson said:

Trains being assisted in rear were not necessarily coupled to the banking engine - some places banked "loose" which meant that there was no need to stop the train once the train engine was over the summit and coping by itself.  Depended on local practice (local instructions).  It was not completely unknown in this situation for the banker to fall away from the train before reaching the summit if the train engine was up to the job but the banker itself was having problems.  It was then important that the banker did not try to catch up again cause a rear end collision, also that the signalbox should not give train out of section until the banker has also arrived.

One of the causes of the Tyne Dock accident in May 1915, about three weeks after the Quintinshill disaster, was the signalman forgetting he had a banker standing at one of his signals and accepting a passenger train on the same line

[Michael Hodgson]

13 minutes ago, 62613 said:

One of the causes of the Tyne Dock accident in May 1915, about three weeks after the Quintinshill disaster, was the signalman forgetting he had a banker standing at one of his signals and accepting a passenger train on the same line

That's not really any different from a number of early accidents where the signalman forgot there was a train at his home signal, knocked out for it in error and then accepted another train.  This was remarkably rare given that there was no way the box in rear could know there was a problem.  It was probably because the routine train crew's practice with tail lamps and the signalman's sequence of checking the tail lamp as the train passes and also looking out of the window before accepting a train quickly became a habit so it became instinctive.  Once track circuits became more common, this type of mistake could be prevented by the signalling technology.

[Jeremy Cumberland]

1 hour ago, 62613 said:

One of the causes of the Tyne Dock accident in May 1915, about three weeks after the Quintinshill disaster, was the signalman forgetting he had a banker standing at one of his signals and accepting a passenger train on the same line

Are you thinking of the St Bedes Junction accident in December 1915? Although the signalman was held in part to blame, he did not "forget" about the banker, because he never knew it was there.

 

In foggy conditions, the signalman saw the three red lamps on the brake van pass his box and didn't check to see whether there was an assisting engine dropping off the back of the train, even though he knew that trains were often banked up from Tyne Dock. The signalman at Dock Bottom never belled that there was an assisting engine because it wasn't in the list of codes for that box, and it seems that banking trains up from Tyne Dock had never been officially authorised. The inspector put most of the blame on the driver and fireman of the banker for taking 17 minutes to carry out Rule 55 and have the fireman report to the signalman that the train was standing on the line.