'The Signalman' prototype location questions

[Silver_Link]

Good afternoon all,

 

I have some questions regarding the BBC adaptation of 'The Signalman' by Charles Dickens. As I am looking at attempting a diorama.

 

I am believe it was shot on the SVR with a dummy box for the exterior shots and one of the lines boxes was used for the internal shots.  However, my questions are;

 

1/ Is there a location either open or long closed, that fits this dramatised location; single line with an isolated box at one end in a cutting? There are plenty of locations, near to me, that I can think of with single line tunnels; I'm thinking of the Whitby to Scarborough line. Looking at OS maps of the late 19th and early 20th century none of the tunnels appear to have boxes before the openings and there appears to only be boxes at the stations.

 

2/ What was the purpose of the red light on the tunnel portal which was the charge of the Signalman?  I'm assuming that it is an outdated regulation as it's not something that I've seen on any photos or noticed on the network.

 

3/ Surely even by the extravagant standards of the time, a single line with a box along a line with, what appears to be very light traffic, was excessive and a waste of money/resources?

 

Many thanks in advance.

 

Karl 

 

[The Stationmaster]

Tunnels on double lines were - in some cases - the sight for earluy signal boxes because of the pereceived additional danger they posed.  This is undoubtedly the best know example - as things went somewhar awry -

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clayton_Tunnel_rail_crash

 

It is possibe that it gave some background for the Dickens story, published in 1866, but that is also sometimes claimed to have been inspired by the Staplehurst derailment of a train in which Dickens was a passenger which occurred in 1865

 

https://www.charlesdickenspage.com/staplehurst-railway-crash-1865.html

 

The tv version incorporates various oddities as far as the railway technicalities are concerned but it does portray the signal box as a break-section box on a single line which was not particularly unusual although of itself but far from common in 1866.  However exactly such a 'box, Foxcote was involved in the 'Radstock' single ;line collision in 1876 but was incidental to the collision rather than a cause of it.

 

https://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=7779

 

In the tv programme the fake 'box in theh cutting looks pretty good but a big f giveaway, even for the 1860s, is thghost story for all that

[melmoth]

Hi, and welcome to the forum. As a caveat, I've not seen the adaptation, but I do know this:

 

1. Dickens died in 1870, and The Signalman was first published in 1866, so the railway network was not as well developed in extent or practice.

 

2. Dickens was a passenger on the boat train involved in the Staplehurst crash in 1865 (and indeed died five years to the day after it). This may have had an influence on the writing of the story. It is certainly considered to have been a cause of his decline in his last years

 

3. Having a signal box at either end of a tunnel was used in time-interval signalling days as a way of managing safety in some tunnels. It was the failure of such a system that was a contributing factor in the 1861 Clayton tunnel crash on the LBSC. Dickens would definitely have known about this crash, and perhaps derived the idea of a signal box at the entrance to a tunnel from this.

 

4. Strange as it may seem to us, a red light/signal/sign was not always used as a 'stop' signal in those days. Our generally accepted use of red and green signals was not standardised on the railways until quite late (1900?). I'm not sure the red light is in the story as written - lots of use of telegraph bells in the sto

 

Edit: Mike @The Stationmaster is a far better source on all this than me

Edited January 1 by melmoth
Being in the presence of a greater mortal

[Steamport Southport]

The TV film version was set in the 1900s or 1910s, not 1860s.

 

There was a documentary on the BBC Ghost Stories a few years ago and there was mention it was purposely set just before the First World War. The writer who adapted it Andrew Davies later made To Serve Them All My Days.

 

Some details of the filming here.

 

https://www.svrwiki.com/The_Signalman

 

https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0075220/

 

 

Jason

[Silver_Link]

4 hours ago, melmoth said:

4. Strange as it may seem to us, a red light/signal/sign was not always used as a 'stop' signal in those days. Our generally accepted use of red and green signals was not standardised on the railways until quite late (1900?). I'm not sure the red light is in the story as written - lots of use of telegraph bells in the sto

Hi @melmoth,

 

Thanks for your help. I have attached a picture of the tunnel mouth, taken from IMDb for you to see.

 

 

As you can see, it doesn't appear to be a signal per se, more of a static indicator.

 

The discussion of time interval working is interesting as, and I'm certainly no expert and just guessing, could it have been intended to be a fixed stop; meaning that until the signal-man waves you through, once he has checked with the following box that the train was out of the tunnel, you do not proceed? 

 

Thanks

 

Karl

[Nearholmer]

I’ve only ever read it (freebie here https://gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1289/pg1289-images.html#page312 ), not watched the programme, and I have to say that it shouted ‘Clayton Tunnel’ to me. 

[Silver_Link]

7 minutes ago, Nearholmer said:

I’ve only ever read it (freebie here https://gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1289/pg1289-images.html#page312 ), not watched the programme, and I have to say that it shouted ‘Clayton Tunnel’ to me. 

Hi @Nearholmer,

 

I'm inclined to agree.  The more I look at the accident I can see similarities between the 2.  I also have only recently watched the adaptation, been a while since I read/listened to the story; that's tonight's job, to see where the adaptation and story differ.

 

Thanks

 

Karl

[Michael Hodgson]

You're talking about Clayton in Yorkshire, not the double track one in Sussex?

That's an extremely steep slope to the cutting on the right hand side, and the other side looks much shallower. 

I suspect the whole scene has been edited in the cutting room to superimpose the signalbox onto a still of the tunnel mouth.

 

[Nearholmer]

I’m talking about Clayton Tunnel in Sussex, the southern end, where the drama of the crash was played out, not the better known north portal.

 

Here is an ancient photo of it, stolen from the excellent Brighton ASLEF website:

 

 

The approach from the south is in a very deep, steep cutting, round a very noticeable curve.

The setting of the story, and the point that the ghost (if that’s what it is) gives it’s first warning prior to a collision in a tunnel convinces me that Dickens had this place in mind, probably combining it with other “trench” approaches to tunnels, and maybe images from the likes of The Illustrated London News, which loved to put an artist’s impression  of a train crash on its front page.

 

 

Edited January 1 by Nearholmer

[Matt37268]

37 minutes ago, Michael Hodgson said:

You're talking about Clayton in Yorkshire, not the double track one in Sussex?

That's an extremely steep slope to the cutting on the right hand side, and the other side looks much shallower. 

I suspect the whole scene has been edited in the cutting room to superimpose the signalbox onto a still of the tunnel mouth.

 

Not quite, there was a dummy signal box built for the exterior shots on the Kidderminster side of Foley Park Tunnel at the SVR during the filming, the interior shots were done at Highley. 

[Silver_Link]

7 hours ago, melmoth said:

4. Strange as it may seem to us, a red light/signal/sign was not always used as a 'stop' signal in those days. Our generally accepted use of red and green signals was not standardised on the railways until quite late (1900?). I'm not sure the red light is in the story as written - lots of use of telegraph bells in the sto

@melmoth after listening to the audio book and reading the story @Nearholmer mentioned, there are a number of mentions of the red light, two are below;

 

"He directed a most curious look towards the red light near the tunnel’s mouth, and looked all about it, as if something were missing from it, and then looked at me.

That light was part of his charge?  Was it not?"

 

And

 

"I ran out again faster than I had run in (for I had a mortal abhorrence of the place upon me), and I looked all round the red light with my own red light, and I went up the iron ladder to the gallery atop of it, and I came down again, and ran back here."

 

This sounds more like a signal gantry to my untrained mind.  Could it be that the signal is permanently 'on' until communication from the previous box is received and the line is then cleared, as is usual practice.

 

Thanks

 

Karl

Edited January 1 by Silver_Link

[Nearholmer]

Signaling practice was fast-evolving in the 1860s, much of the evolution being on a ‘learning by mistakes” basis, so protocols varied hugely. On many lines operating to “time interval” the normal position of the signals was “clear”; they were only set to “stop”, then “caution” for a fixed periods after a train had passed. One good summary is a book called “Rapier on Signals”, published in 1874, which is the text of a lecture on the subject, together with a record of the ensuing discussion, and that makes clear how varied practices were, and lays out the case for the universal application of “lock and block”, which wasn’t mandated until 1889.

 

With that in mind, and allowing for the fact that the story was written by a great author, rather than a great railway signaling engineer, the red light might be a fixed signal, normally held at danger (it sounds like that to me), or simply a dramatic device inspired by seeing, but not fully understanding the function, of railway signals.

 

If you read the report into the Clayton Tunnel Crash, you’ll see that the Up Line, on which the collision happened, had a distant signal that was returned from clear to danger by the action of train wheels passing over a treadle, but no signal in the modern sense existed at the entrance to the tunnel; the signalman had to display white (clear) or red (stop) flags or lamps. You’ll also find that there was only one single-needle telegraph instrument and one bell to cover both Up and Down Roads, and that there was no logbook system in use, so the signalmen had to remember the most recent messages they’d sent and received (many accidents were caused by signalmen getting muddle when very  busy or otherwise stressed).

 

Incidentally, Dickens strongly implies that he had in mind a double-track railway when writing the story, because at one point he talks about the Down Line, so that’s a point of departure between the story and the film.

 

Incidentally II, both the story and accident reports of the time make clear that there was a lot of “free form” telegraphic  messaging involved in signaling at this time, that the very formulaic (and hence difficult to misinterpret) messaging by bell-codes that became the norm was in its infancy. In one report that I read (an accident at Sevenoaks, IIRC), the signalmen got themselves into a complete tangle of mutual incomprehension because they were exchanging messages by block telegraph, by ordinary (5 needle probably) telegraph, and by telephone, flipping between media almost at random ……. It was a bit like trying to run a railway by block instruments, phone and text messages all at once.

 

 

Edited January 1 by Nearholmer

[Steamport Southport]

Don't forget that when the film was made there wasn't that many tunnels on preserved railways.

 

Nowadays you could probably use one of the double track ones and if it has been singled, you could add the rest in using CGI.

 

Sharpthorne would be idea if anyone wants to do a remake!

 

 

 

 

Jason

[The Johnster]

The TV alteration of the date of the story to the early 1900s is entirely artistic licence.  The Absolute Block method of working of interlocked points and signals from a single frame in a signal box had been required by law from 1889 on all passenger lines, and the story could not have happened in the way it is depicted at a later date than that.  The red light in the oppressive dark cutting in which details are obscured as is reality (it is a ghost story), with the void of the tunnel behind it, is of course very atmospheric and no doubt what the producers wanted for the tv program, but has no basis in reality for the period in which the tv version was set.  The original Dickens story is much more realistic for it's period, when time interval working and flag/handlamp signalling was common even through tunnels, though one could probably find inacccuracies in it; he wasn't a railwayman or particularly interested in railway matters.

 

 

[kevinlms]

3 hours ago, The Johnster said:

The TV alteration of the date of the story to the early 1900s is entirely artistic licence.  The Absolute Block method of working of interlocked points and signals from a single frame in a signal box had been required by law from 1889 on all passenger lines, and the story could not have happened in the way it is depicted at a later date than that.  The red light in the oppressive dark cutting in which details are obscured as is reality (it is a ghost story), with the void of the tunnel behind it, is of course very atmospheric and no doubt what the producers wanted for the tv program, but has no basis in reality for the period in which the tv version was set.  The original Dickens story is much more realistic for it's period, when time interval working and flag/handlamp signalling was common even through tunnels, though one could probably find inacccuracies in it; he wasn't a railwayman or particularly interested in railway matters.

 

 

The Act come into place in 1889, after the dreadful crash at Armagh. In fact the Act came into being 79 days after the accident, which gives an indication of how urgent the government considered it to be.

 

https://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=62#top

 

The question is, how could the railways have installed the signalling, automatic brakes etc. in time. How much leeway if any was allowed.

I realise that most railways, would have in recent times anyway, already installed that equipment on much of their trackage. But what about the recalcitrant lines, that had stalled?

[Nearholmer]

1 hour ago, kevinlms said:

which gives an indication of how urgent the government considered it to be.

“Lock and block” was treated by successive governments with all the urgency of an arthritic snail with a wooden leg, feeling a bit weary.

 

The basic technology was available as early as the 1840s, quite developed versions based on good understanding of the issues of achieving safety were available by the 1850s, and by the 1860s were in fairly wide, although nothing like universal, application, but avoidable accident after avoidable accident occurred because of the all-round reluctance to regulate in a firm fashion. It was a scandal at the time; multiple Inspecting Officers lamented the situation in multiple accident reports; experts like Rapier gave lectures and ran influencing campaigns; the Directors of the companies that were “on board” with the idea (LNWR and SER for instance) advocated it strongly, and spoke very clearly about its financial, as well as safety benefits; but it took roundly forty years to become statutory.

 

If the government displayed any sense of urgency after Armagh, it was because everyone could see that governments had failed to act in the public interest anything like soon enough.

 

It makes for a classic study in the way the Victorian mind worked, the deep cultural antipathy against regulation, the faith in the free market to deliver beneficial solutions without regulation, ability of shareholders and boards to fend-off regulation that they perceived would cripple profit-streams, and the consequences of over-capitalisation and over-provision of railways in terms of their ability to afford essential improvements. 
 

 

[kevinlms]

17 minutes ago, Nearholmer said:

“Lock and block” was treated by successive governments with all the urgency of an arthritic snail with a wooden leg, feeling a bit weary.

 

The basic technology was available as early as the 1840s, quite developed versions based on good understanding of the issues of achieving safety were available by the 1850s, and by the 1860s were in fairly wide, although nothing like universal, application, but avoidable accident after avoidable accident occurred because of the all-round reluctance to regulate in a firm fashion. It was a scandal at the time; multiple Inspecting Officers lamented the situation in multiple accident reports; experts like Rapier gave lectures and ran influencing campaigns; the Directors of the companies that were “on board” with the idea (LNWR and SER for instance) advocated it strongly, and spoke very clearly about its financial, as well as safety benefits; but it took roundly forty years to become statutory.

 

If the government displayed any sense of urgency after Armagh, it was because everyone could see that governments had failed to act in the public interest anything like soon enough.

 

It makes for a classic study in the way the Victorian mind worked, the deep cultural antipathy against regulation, the faith in the free market to deliver beneficial solutions without regulation, ability of shareholders and boards to fend-off regulation that they perceived would cripple profit-streams, and the consequences of over-capitalisation and over-provision of railways in terms of their ability to afford essential improvements. 
 

 

Yes, I know all that and agree. But a government finally passing an Act, doesn't mean that it was instantly complied with.

 

But of course, these days governments are keen to promote 'self-regulation', which often means that there are regulations, but companies sort of pretend that they conform. I'll give you VW and 'economy standards' and recently Hyundai crash standard compliance.

[JohnR]

After the Staplehurst crash, Dickens became an activist for greater safety, and studied many previous accident reports to inform his criticism. He would surely have been familiar with the Clayton tunnel crash. 

[The Stationmaster]

17 hours ago, Nearholmer said:

I’ve only ever read it (freebie here https://gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1289/pg1289-images.html#page312 ), not watched the programme, and I have to say that it shouted ‘Clayton Tunnel’ to me. 

That is exactly what I thought when this was first screened a good many years ago.  The single line was no doubt the production team having to use what they could find (at a reasonable price no doubt) but apart from that it very much had ex choes of the Clayton Tunnel disaster.

 

And ona slightly different, but related, matter -

 

54 minutes ago, Nearholmer said:

“Lock and block” was treated by successive governments with all the urgency of an arthritic snail with a wooden leg, feeling a bit weary.

 

The basic technology was available as early as the 1840s, quite developed versions based on good understanding of the issues of achieving safety were available by the 1850s, and by the 1860s were in fairly wide, although nothing like universal, application, but avoidable accident after avoidable accident occurred because of the all-round reluctance to regulate in a firm fashion. It was a scandal at the time; multiple Inspecting Officers lamented the situation in multiple accident reports; experts like Rapier gave lectures and ran influencing campaigns; the Directors of the companies that were “on board” with the idea (LNWR and SER for instance) advocated it strongly, and spoke very clearly about its financial, as well as safety benefits; but it took roundly forty years to become statutory.

 

If the government displayed any sense of urgency after Armagh, it was because everyone could see that governments had failed to act in the public interest anything like soon enough.

 

It makes for a classic study in the way the Victorian mind worked, the deep cultural antipathy against regulation, the faith in the free market to deliver beneficial solutions without regulation, ability of shareholders and boards to fend-off regulation that they perceived would cripple profit-streams, and the consequences of over-capitalisation and over-provision of railways in terms of their ability to afford essential improvements. 
 

 

What the 1889 Act actually did was to move things from a position of 'recommending the railways to introduce ... etc'  and monitoring their progress by means of legally required Returns (i.e an 1873 Act in respect of signal interlocking etc and  the 1878 Continuous Brakes Act) to a situation where the Board of Trade was empowered to order compliance with section 1 of the 1889 Act. (The returns required by the earlier Acts were continued).

 

In simple terms the 1889 Act changed things  from a situation of 'recommending and monitoring' the rate of introduction on existing railways to one where the railways could be compelled to comply with Section 1 of that Act.  What is often misquoted is that the 1889 Act made Section 1 ('block, lock, and continuous automatic brake') a legal requirement;  it did not do that, it simply gave the Board of Trade additional powers to order that it be complied with.

[melmoth]

4 hours ago, Nearholmer said:

 

It makes for a classic study in the way the Victorian mind worked, the deep cultural antipathy against regulation, the faith in the free market to deliver beneficial solutions without regulation, ability of shareholders and boards to fend-off regulation that they perceived would cripple profit-streams, and the consequences of over-capitalisation and over-provision of railways in terms of their ability to afford essential improvements. 
 

 

Unfortunately perhaps not a world view confined to the Victorian age or to railways.

[The Johnster]

6 hours ago, Nearholmer said:

It makes for a classic study in the way the Victorian mind worked, the deep cultural antipathy against regulation, the faith in the free market to deliver beneficial solutions without regulation, ability of shareholders and boards to fend-off regulation that they perceived would cripple profit-streams, and the consequences of over-capitalisation and over-provision of railways in terms of their ability to afford essential improvements. 
 

 

 

Very much a description of current free market enterprise-led capitalism as it is practiced in this country.  Profit is still the prime mover, and safety measures will not be introduced unless by law, and Parliament is in the pockets of the lobbyists, or unless they can be made to increase profitability.  Cab signalling, for example, may be eventually taken up but only becuase it provides paths for more trains, not because it is safer.

 

The Victorian Board of Trade, to their credit, pushed for 'lock, block & brakes' for many years until the public outcry following the Armagh accident forced parliament's hand.  And one doubts that the outcry would have been so forceful had the victims not been children; the Great Famine had shown what the general attitude to the Irish was in the days before 'Celtic Cool' and global St.Pat's day!  Apparently, Irish children were still children, however.

 

'Remember, lad, every one of these rules was found at the bottom of a bucket of blood'.

[Nearholmer]

I was going to say that there is no modern parallel for the over-capitalisation and over-provision of railways in Victorian times which made it genuinely difficult for them to earn enough to afford necessary improvements, but then I thought about the way that water companies have created giant debt-burdens for themselves, and continued to pay dividends, while not fixing leaky pipes, under capacity distribution systems, or sufficient poo-processing to avoid pollution of rivers, and decided that perhaps there are some near-parallels.

[kevinlms]

20 hours ago, JohnR said:

After the Staplehurst crash, Dickens became an activist for greater safety, and studied many previous accident reports to inform his criticism. He would surely have been familiar with the Clayton tunnel crash. 

Of course he had personal reasons to be interested in the subject matter. Most people injured, didn't have the resources to advocate anything.

[2251]

20 hours ago, The Stationmaster said:

And ona slightly different, but related, matter -

 

What the 1889 Act actually did was to move things from a position of 'recommending the railways to introduce ... etc'  and monitoring their progress by means of legally required Returns (i.e an 1873 Act in respect of signal interlocking etc and  the 1878 Continuous Brakes Act) to a situation where the Board of Trade was empowered to order compliance with section 1 of the 1889 Act. (The returns required by the earlier Acts were continued).

 

In simple terms the 1889 Act changed things  from a situation of 'recommending and monitoring' the rate of introduction on existing railways to one where the railways could be compelled to comply with Section 1 of that Act.  What is often misquoted is that the 1889 Act made Section 1 ('block, lock, and continuous automatic brake') a legal requirement;  it did not do that, it simply gave the Board of Trade additional powers to order that it be complied with.

 

This is entirely accurate -- unlike so much written by railway "historians" who appear never to have bothered to consult the primary sources.

 

The 1889 Act did two important thigs. Section 1 empowered the BoT to "order" the railway company to adopt any or all of (a) the block system, (b) interlocking of points and signals, and (c) the automatic brake. Section 3 empowered the railway company in question to borrow to fund the capital cost and for such borrowing to be secured and have priority over existing secured debt of the company in question. That second aspect is almost never mentioned but was very important indeed: the cost of these measures had to be borne somehow, and the Act provided for it. 

 

Section 1 reads:

 

 

Section 3 reads: