Oh dear, another one...

[Peter Kazmierczak]

All I know about this is the photo and video "evidence". I'm not making any comments, only what I can see.

 

Photo before derailment:

Up train disappearing in the distance. All signals at danger, trap lies correctly protecting down line. Person (not in hi-vis) standing in 6ft by driver's side of engine.

 

Video of derailment:

Quite windy conditions. All signals set at danger and trap point lies correctly, protecting the down line. There is movement inside the signalbox, but no flags waved either from box or from rear of train. Whistle heard from engine. Someone looks out from cab on firemans side, possibly towards rear of train. Train begins to move. Someone again looks out from firemans side - again possibly to rear of train. Whistle again heard from engine. Someone leans out from the drivers side of the engine. Tender and engine derails all wheels. First coach remains on the track - not derailed.

[The Stationmaster]

I am no expert on this.

 

Would in most cases the signal be interlocked with the point and most cases the trap point as well so the points and the trap point will have to be set for the route before the signal can be pulled of so by allowing the train to pass the signal at danger the trap point will be set to protect the main running line. 

Standard interlocking rules would require that in order to clear signal No.6 (reading from the Down Siding) then crossover no. 7 would first have to be reversed thus setting the route for a train from the siding.  A detector on the trap point end of No.7 would additionally ensure that the points are fully closed up before the signal will clear.  Thus in normal operation there are two safeguards - firstly the interlocking and secondly the detection.

 

As soon as any part of the signalling system can't be operated for some reason you lose the protection of one, or both, of those safety features and other safeguards have to be applied in order to mitigate their absence.  Exactly how that is done depends on the exact Rules of the railway concerned and the precise details - thus if the points can be reversed but the signal can't be operated the Signalman might have a requirement to check that the points are properly closed, and possibly also apply a point clip before giving a Driver a handsignal as authority to pass the fixed signal which cannot be cleared.  If the points will not go over for some reason the Signalman might be required to check what is stopping them and possibly bar them (and clip them) and/or call a technician.

 

The second line of defence - already mentioned by Torr Gifford  - is that if a Driver is instructed to pass a signal at danger and proceed over facing points then he would be required to check that the points are correctly set for his train.  Thus if, for example, a signal cannot be cleared there are potentially two lines of defence/checking - one by the Signalman and the other by the Driver (although this can vary according to the Rules used by the railway but a double check is invariably the safest).

 

From what the video shows it seems reasonably clear that the Driver either didn't check the points or he checked them sometime before moving off and they were subsequently altered.  We don't know what action the Signalman took either before or after the derailment but once he became aware of it - and we know that someone in the signalbox watched it happen - he should have immediately sent the 'Obstruction Danger' (6 bells) signal to the 'box in rear on the Down Line and placed the block to 'Train On Line' (or kept it there is he had previously Blocked Back for the movement) before checking to see if the Down Line was clear for movements to pass the site of the derailment. Again we don't know what happened but whether the Signalman behaved correctly or not at that stage is no doubt something the GCR will have quickly establlished.

 

Of course what we don't know is why the various folk involved acted in the way they did (or didn't) and unless the Railway discloses the results of its own inquiry or RAIB publish a report we might never know.  

[Hobby]

 he should have immediately sent the 'Obstruction Danger' (6 bells) signal to the 'box in rear on the Down Line and placed the block to 'Train On Line' (or kept it there is he had previously Blocked Back for the movement) before checking to see if the Down Line was clear for movements to pass the site of the derailment. 

 

And reversed all signals to danger as well... I thought?

[The Stationmaster]

And reversed all signals to danger as well... I thought?

They were already at danger - as is clear on the video.  (There is only one stop signal in rear of the connection to that siding and it was at danger, what any others on the Down were showing we don't know but they weren't in any case protecting the site.)

[Hobby]

I was just adding that was also a requirement when sending obstruction danger, not commenting on this incident in particular! 

 

However I think he would have had to set both line's signals to danger until he had ascertained which lines were blocked and what could safely run, I'd have thought that it would have been too early to make the decision that one line could still run at the point he was sending 6 bells? Same as we are trained when protecting a train after an accident, block all lines until we are sure that it's safe for other trains to run, better safe than sorry we'd rather not have wandering passengers run down by passing trains. One for a signaller to answer I think... 

[beast66606]

I was just adding that was also a requirement when sending obstruction danger, not commenting on this incident in particular! 

 

However I think he would have had to set both line's signals to danger until he had ascertained which lines were blocked and what could safely run, I'd have thought that it would have been too early to make the decision that one line could still run at the point he was sending 6 bells? Same as we are trained when protecting a train after an accident, block all lines until we are sure that it's safe for other trains to run, better safe than sorry we'd rather not have wandering passengers run down by passing trains. One for a signaller to answer I think... 

 

When I had to do it I threw all the signals to danger first and then sent 6 beats on both blocks simultaneously - the reason being a signalman flying to the ground - wonder how that forum name came about.

 

That aside I think you will find StationMaster more than adequately skilled to make statements given the years he's been involved and the positions he's held.

[Hobby]

I'm aware of The Stationmaster's expertise, B, but I didn't realise I couldn't comment if I thought that something had been missed out.

[The Stationmaster]

I'm aware of The Stationmaster's expertise, B, but I didn't realise I couldn't comment if I thought that something had been missed out.

Nothing wrong with commenting Hobby but don't overlook the fact that I was talking about the specifics of that incident, where the protecting signal was very clearly standing at danger and in any event (depending on what was going to happen) there might already have been a 2-4 'Inside Home Signal' Block Back in force as the movement was obviously going to foul the Clearing point and might well have been going to come to a stand in it.

 

If we are talking about applying Regulation 12 (as it once was known) then 'yes' replacing signals to, or maintaining them at, danger is part of the full procedure.  The decision to apply the bell signal to both lines depends entirely on what is involved and in this case the Up Line was patently well clear of any potential obstruction although it might, or might not, have been considered prudent to caution Up trains past the site for a variety of reasons.  However that of course - depending on which version of the Regs the GCR uses - doesn't necessarily mean applying Regulation 12 as the site on the Up is protected by stop signals and there appeared to be no need to stop trains approaching that blockpost (which is of course all Regulation 12 etc does - it is used to stop trains approaching, among other things).  

[roythebus]

Have we had an update on the cause of this incident yet?

[PhilH]

I was asking the same question when I was at the Mid Hants yesterday. Usually when they reach some sort of conclusion we get new recommendations or directives but nothing yet, so the silence might not be so golden for heritage railways.

[PaulRhB]

Or it's just a simple error and no major actions are required, as long as they had blocked the adjacent line as the national rulebook (which they evidently use), requires when authorising the first move over a route that has been set then no other trains were in danger.

RAIB often don't formally investigate derailments in sidings as its not a passenger line as long as it posed no threat to passenger trains or public (no dangerous goods on the GCR). So if they establish from the initial investigation that all protection was in place and it was just route setting error they don't do a full investigation and report.

As they cleared it up quick and it was very public I suspect they reported to RAIB and were told they wouldn't attend, certainly how it works for similar incidents on the national network. RAIB do get very upset though if its not reported properly which has been an issue with previous preserved line incidents. So the lack of urgent operating advice could well mean they did it all by the book and its been left to them to deal with internally.

[The Stationmaster]

I was asking the same question when I was at the Mid Hants yesterday. Usually when they reach some sort of conclusion we get new recommendations or directives but nothing yet, so the silence might not be so golden for heritage railways.

I've heard no 'whispers' but it could well be a possibility - ORR/RAIB definitely have a very strong interest in operational standards on 'heritage' etc railways at present and at times their sausage machine can grind slow & very fine while they take into small pieces the Railway's SMS, Rule Book, training records, staff health records, supervision records and so on and so forth.  If that is going on the Railway won't be able to say anything in the public domain and RAIB/ORR aren't going to until they've got their ducks in a row.

 

Clearly not the sort of incident which would usually be prompting 'instant' type reminders etc but definitely one that could provide fertile ground for deeper investigation of the sort of stuff I've listed although it could be that the Railway were on top form with all the paperwork and procedures and - as Paul has said - the Inspectors, various, found nothing to inspect.

[roythebus]

I've just read on another preserved railway forum that "the whisper" internally is that the bobby tried to clear the signal from the siding to main; couldn't so assumed equipment  failure. authorised driver to pass at danger which he did with great gusto. Had the bobby checked WHY the equipment had failed, he would have seen he hadn't pulled the points over. Had the driver checked the road before moving, he wouldn't have moved.

 

Reportedly the bobby resigned straight after, the station manager was ex pub trade and didn't have much of a clue, the RAIB found out about it via videos posted on social media.....reportedly; allegedly....

 

Rule 1 on every railway, don't assume anything!!

[roythebus]

This is the thread from "internal sources" courtesy of Lobbychat:

 

 

"Well it may have been that after the signal possibly failed to clear, it was assumed to be defective. Therefor the Signalman may have authorised the Driver to pass the Signal at danger, proceed at caution, be prepared to stop short of any obstruction and obey all other signals {or he may have said "Off you trot chap"}
Then the Signalman may have neglected to check the route was set before authorising the movement {and so discovering the cause of the signal failing to clear}. The driver may have proceeded back to his fine engine and gave it a large helping of regulator without checking the points directly in front of his machine. {Because he's a driver and it's his job to give impressive displays of masculine machinery to people who come to watch him}.
After the derailment, the Signalman may have resigned on the spot and the Operating Managermay have decided that further investigation might not be necessary {possibly because he doesn't know how to carry one out}. So as to how the Signalman came about the alleged method of passing signals at danger without checking the route, or following a fault finding chart for signal possibly failing to clear, will perhaps never be known.
It may also be true that the RAIB found out about the incident by watching the video on Youtube. "

 

 

So after all that, they learn nothing about how to manage an incident, how to improve procedures, how to avoid expensive incidents, and how to drop the rest of the heritage railway movement in the deep poo for every minor misdemeanour.

[darren01]

HI

I have seen some photo taken from that side of the track before the loco sets back and in a few of the photo you can see two chaps in orange looking at the signal,Could  these be ST chaps looking at maybe a failed signal?.

Darren01

[PhilH]

This is the thread from "internal sources" courtesy of Lobbychat:

 

 

"Well it may have been that after the signal possibly failed to clear, it was assumed to be defective. Therefor the Signalman may have authorised the Driver to pass the Signal at danger, proceed at caution, be prepared to stop short of any obstruction and obey all other signals {or he may have said "Off you trot chap"}

Then the Signalman may have neglected to check the route was set before authorising the movement {and so discovering the cause of the signal failing to clear}. The driver may have proceeded back to his fine engine and gave it a large helping of regulator without checking the points directly in front of his machine. {Because he's a driver and it's his job to give impressive displays of masculine machinery to people who come to watch him}.

After the derailment, the Signalman may have resigned on the spot and the Operating Managermay have decided that further investigation might not be necessary {possibly because he doesn't know how to carry one out}. So as to how the Signalman came about the alleged method of passing signals at danger without checking the route, or following a fault finding chart for signal possibly failing to clear, will perhaps never be known.

It may also be true that the RAIB found out about the incident by watching the video on Youtube.

 

 

"

 

 

So after all that, they learn nothing about how to manage an incident, how to improve procedures, how to avoid expensive incidents, and how to drop the rest of the heritage railway movement in the deep poo for every minor misdemeanour.

And that may or may not be a load of nonsense. Pointless posting stuff like this until FACTS are known.

It's also potentially libellious.

[roythebus]

Possibly but I doubt it. At the moment it is "speculative" but taken from someone with very reliable industry inside information. I'd already deleted a couple of sentences from the original post which were of a personal nature. I'll happily delete the post if the mods deem fit to do so.

[PhilH]

 

At the moment it is "speculative"

 

 

Precisely, so I repeat,  IMO, it shouldn't have been posted.