Class 800 - Updates

[Mark Saunders]

Why are class 800's referred to as 'Bi-mode', where as class 73's are called 'electro-diesels'?  Both are designed to be principally powered by an external electrical supply, supplemented by less powerful diesel when need be.

 

To paraphrase George Orwell/Eric Blair "New Speak" it sounds more modern and progressive!

 

Mark Saunders

[Ken.W]

Is that short-forming though? I thought that overall the seating capacity was similar (two fewer cabs, one fewer kitchen) and that's why the full length trains are 9 cars rather t0

 

As configured on the East Coast sets, a 9 car will have (slightly) more seats than a 2 x 5 car

[Coryton]

Sorry, I didn't explain my thought process very well.

 

It's often been mentioned that Hitachi are presenting the trains to service the wrong way round, so I thought I'd look at that. At the same time it came apparent that GWR are also struggling with reverse and short formed HSTs. So whilst there are indeed pretty much the same number of seats on 2x5 as on 1x9 I was thinking more about what Hitachi was delivering in terms of actual against planned (contracted) than actual seats. There did seems to be some 1x5 out on the South Wales route but quite how that might have churned around onto other diagrams I didn't study.

 

I might do the exercise again, but it won't be today...

 

Ah fair enough - and it's interesting seeing all that information put together.

 

And of course swapping a 2x5 for a 1x9 might not change the number of seats very much but it's still disruptive because you lose all the seat reservations.

[159220]

Hitachi are providing single units instead of pairs for some diagrams from what people in the industry are telling me, but they are short of IETs anyway as deliveries are slightly behind, a situation that won't be helped with the ORR action, as no more Class 802s can be accepted now until the problem is resolved.  I gather the HST transfer to ScotRail is contractually required to take place because of the Wabtec work, meaning that GWR are now potentially loosing HST sets with no '802s' for Plymouth/Cornish services to replace them, which might lead to further short-formed singles rather than doubles on some diagrams to release stock for elsewhere.  

 

 

Sadly, those "people in the industry" are misinformed. The ORR temporary freeze on acceptance of Agility EAST 800 series trains is independent of Agility West and remember, the class 802 is outside of the IEP - owned by Eversholt. Acceptance into passenger service is still very much on (as the GWR safety case mitigates the known risk) with the class 802/0 (and of course the Agility West 800/3s with 316 accepted the other day). 802012 should be accepted by weeks end with 013/014 not far of. Of course, 016 shall be out out sequence due to damage taking down the GWML wires the other evening under test. 

 

Three new IET diagrams start on Monday (22/10). Angel Trains is contractually obligated to provide the HSTs to Scotrail, allowing the release of a series of MUs to other operators in the new year. 

 

What has changed, and thus might be the cause to confusion is, the IET west country diagrams planned for Oct and Nov have been suspended until Dec/Jan to allow for the remaining Agility West 800/3s and Eversholt 802/0s to see off the remaining HSTs on Old Oak Common and Swansea Landore diagrams by December (10th). The complexity is, as the Penzance drivers who were planned to be on 802s this month need to keep their traction knowledge, a single 802/0 has been swapped with a 150 diagram in Cornwall. This, added with 802011 being out of service to a failed traction motor is putting an extreme pressure on the 802 diagrams (8 required daily for 10 (inc. 101) accepted for passenger service). Thus you are likely getting an additional single 802/0 on diagrams due to availability. 

 

Of course, on the wider GWR network, 4 diagrams are always booked as single 800/0. 

 

Lastly, I would not worry too much about the ORR action. You shall note it has not been publicly stated by the ORR! The 'ladder' safety risk has long been known about. Initially mitigated by the wiring being breach proof and shall break under the weight of a human. More recently, just before last Octobers fleet introduction, the known issue has been part of training for both onboard and platform staffing. I personally do not see the Agility East fleet acceptance and passenger service delayed much beyond December, if at all. 

 

(Deliveries are around 6 weeks delayed currently, and well, Newton Aycliffe won't survive after the last of the IEP build.....)

 

As for acceptance/deliveries, here is my list:

 

GWR IET Status 15/10/18

 

800/0 

 

001/002 - Hitachi/Agility Trains West Accepted, Used for testing till Dec, Bristol/North Pole.

003-036 - GWR Accepted/Passenger Service. Total available units: 34/36.

 

800/3 

 

302–310/313-316 - GWR Accepted. Total available units: 13/21. 

 - Agility Trains West Acceptance/Mileage, Bristol/North Pole.

318 - Hitachi Commissioning, Doncaster.

317/319 - Hitachi Commissioning, Eastleigh.

301/311/312/320/321 - Hitachi, Newton Aycliffe.

 

802/0 

 

001/002  - GWR Accepted/Driver Training

003-011 - GWR Accepted/Passenger Service. Total available units: 9/22. (011 out of service due to failed traction motor - Truro)

012-020 - Hitachi Commissioning, North Pole

021-022 - Hitachi, Pistoia, Italy. All built, under testing

 

802/1 

 

101 - GWR Accepted/Passenger Service. Total available units: 1/14. 

102-114 - Hitachi, Pistoia, Italy.

[MarshLane]

Sadly, those "people in the industry" are misinformed. The ORR temporary freeze on acceptance of Agility EAST 800 series trains is independent of Agility West and remember, the class 802 is outside of the IEP - owned by Eversholt. Acceptance into passenger service is still very much on (as the GWR safety case mitigates the known risk) with the class 802/0 (and of course the Agility West 800/3s with 316 accepted the other day). 802012 should be accepted by weeks end with 013/014 not far of. Of course, 016 shall be out out sequence due to damage taking down the GWML wires the other evening under test. 

 

 

They may be misinformed .. but the info came from an individual who is definitely 'in the know' at the ORR, and who when asked "are the 802s affected by this, or are those not yet in service covered by the existing authorisations", specifically said any Class 802s not currently authorised will not be until Hitachi have undertaken further work on this issue.  

 

And yes, the ORR have issued a media statement on the matter, I've been sent a copy of it from a source at one of the industry magazines - it says ....

 

An ORR spokesman said: "We can confirm that we have paused the granting of further authorisations to place Hitachi IEPs in service. The reason for this is the inter-car connectors and the possibility they could be used as a ladder to climb on the vehicle roof. Hitachi have made some modifications on trains before they entered service with GWR. We are writing to the company to ask for further controls to put in place.

 

For trains not yet authorised we are using the authorisation process, particularly safe integration  to accelerate the development of a solution. We did not have a 'significant safety concerns' when we authorised the first batches. Inter-vehicle connectors are now part of the authorisation process. We are working with the manufacturer to help find a resolution to the issue"

[The Stationmaster]

They may be misinformed .. but the info came from an individual who is definitely 'in the know' at the ORR, and who when asked "are the 802s affected by this, or are those not yet in service covered by the existing authorisations", specifically said any Class 802s not currently authorised will not be until Hitachi have undertaken further work on this issue.  

 

And yes, the ORR have issued a media statement on the matter, I've been sent a copy of it from a source at one of the industry magazines - it says ....

 

An ORR spokesman said: "We can confirm that we have paused the granting of further authorisations to place Hitachi IEPs in service. The reason for this is the inter-car connectors and the possibility they could be used as a ladder to climb on the vehicle roof. Hitachi have made some modifications on trains before they entered service with GWR. We are writing to the company to ask for further controls to put in place.

 

For trains not yet authorised we are using the authorisation process, particularly safe integration  to accelerate the development of a solution. We did not have a 'significant safety concerns' when we authorised the first batches. Inter-vehicle connectors are now part of the authorisation process. We are working with the manufacturer to help find a resolution to the issue"

 

Although oddly it does not appear on their website.  The critical question is the very simple one - has HMRI issued either a Prohibition Notice or an Improvement Order?  Or does it boil down to East Coast paperwork not reflecting the mitigations taken into account by GWR?

[MarshLane]

Although oddly it does not appear on their website.  The critical question is the very simple one - has HMRI issued either a Prohibition Notice or an Improvement Order?  Or does it boil down to East Coast paperwork not reflecting the mitigations taken into account by GWR?

Mike,

My contact says not all ORR media statements go on the website, especially if it can be portrayed negatively by mainstream media, they provide them on request, as happened here.

 

I may be wrong but there’s no improvement or prohibition order because they are not stopping the fleet from running. Each individual set has to be individually authorised, presumably a paperwork process to say the vehicle(s) comply. ORR are saying no more will be authorised for any operator until changes have been made. Those changes will then need to be retro-fitted to existing GWR traffic and LNER testing sets, presumably Hull Trains and TPE builds as well. To be clear, I asked the question today, the changes made GWR sets do not reach the level the ORR now requires after further investigation. But a improvement or prohibition notice would bring GWR services to chaos by taking the IETs out of traffic, given the lower number of HSTs GWR now has, and the risk level was not deemed high enough to do that. That’s what I am told.

 

Given the nature of the issue, I cannot imagine it is insurmountable or something that will take a lengthy period to resolve. It’s just another of those issues on the modern day railway that develops as testing and introduction progress.

[Covkid]

Mike,

My contact says not all ORR media statements go on the website, especially if it can be portrayed negatively by mainstream media, they provide them on request, as happened here.

 

I may be wrong but there’s no improvement or prohibition order because they are not stopping the fleet from running. Each individual set has to be individually authorised, presumably a paperwork process to say the vehicle(s) comply. ORR are saying no more will be authorised for any operator until changes have been made. Those changes will then need to be retro-fitted to existing GWR traffic and LNER testing sets, presumably Hull Trains and TPE builds as well. To be clear, I asked the question today, the changes made GWR sets do not reach the level the ORR now requires after further investigation. But a improvement or prohibition notice would bring GWR services to chaos by taking the IETs out of traffic, given the lower number of HSTs GWR now has, and the risk level was not deemed high enough to do that. That’s what I am told.

 

Given the nature of the issue, I cannot imagine it is insurmountable or something that will take a lengthy period to resolve. It’s just another of those issues on the modern day railway that develops as testing and introduction progress.

 

But surely the ladder effect of the inter car connectors is either a safety risk, or it isn't.  It is binary and there is no middle ground.  Therefore if the existing GWR sets are in traffic without modifications they must be deemed safe or unsafe, just like the LNER ones would be. 

 

I fail to see how the ORR can produce such an ambiguous message and retain any kind of industry credibiity.  

 

It would of course be very easy to speculate that GWR have all else to run the service with as the HSTs migrate via Doncaster to Scotrail, so ORR would place the industry in an awkward situation by enforcing a stop on the GWR sets pending modification to the cables.    

Edited October 19, 2018 by Covkid

[Legend]

The whole things a farce anyway. Has anyone been seen climbing the connectors? Honestly why would anyone with a modicum of common sense do this ? I do appreciate Health and Safety rules . Heaven knows there have been huge improvements in the last 50 years. But really , who did the risk assessment on this ? The chances of someone doing it has got to be minute.

Edited October 19, 2018 by Legend

[HillsideDepot]

The whole things a farce anyway. Has anyone been seen climbing the connectors? Honestly why would anyone with a modicum of common sense do this . I do appreciate Health and Safety rules . Heaven knows there have been huge improvements in the last 50 years. But really , who did the risk assessment on this . The chances of someone doing it has got to be minute.

 

I can see what you're saying, but I suppose the precedent is that the steps were removed from the ends of Mk1 coaches decades ago, and that was primarily to stop staff using them. Likewise I've seen covers over steps on steam loco tenders when on the mainline. OK those were properly designed steps, with handrails, rather than step-like cables, but I can see the thought process.

 

Of course the counter argument is that someone should have looked at the history of such things and not designed the Pendolinos like that; meaning the IEPs would also have been designed differently. As it is its now, no doubt, another variation order which Hitachi will add to the bill.

 

[BWsTrains]

Has anyone got a good photo of the offending hardware in situ?

 

Colin

[jim.snowdon]

I can see what you're saying, but I suppose the precedent is that the steps were removed from the ends of Mk1 coaches decades ago, and that was primarily to stop staff using them. Likewise I've seen covers over steps on steam loco tenders when on the mainline. OK those were properly designed steps, with handrails, rather than step-like cables, but I can see the thought process.

Of course the counter argument is that someone should have looked at the history of such things and not designed the Pendolinos like that; meaning the IEPs would also have been designed differently. As it is its now, no doubt, another variation order which Hitachi will add to the bill.

 

Health and Safety expectations (there are no "Rules" as such) have a distinct tendency to be different in the UK compared to the rest of Europe, if not the world. One result is the proliferation of claims lawyers, followed by a decided risk averseness on the part of asset owners and operators, often hidden behind "health and safety regulations". H&S did not say that trains shall not be designed so that they are unclimbable; what it did say was that the operator/builder has a duty of care to others and shall consider all reasonably foreseeable risks. Risk itself is a combination of probability and consequence. What it has ended up as being is an urge to eliminate all possible events, irrespective of probability. There is an element of H&S law that allows for doing what is reasonably practicable; whilst a sensible approach that has its origins in past legal judgments, it is an unquantifiable element where compliance can only be determined by a judge in a court of law, and no one wants to go there. One result is that legal opinions are sought, but any giver of opinion will always side with the least risk option in order to minimise their risk of being prosecuted. The result - an overbearing approach to safety with no room for common sense and personal responsibility.

If someone decides, knowing that there are high voltage cables above the train, to climb up the end of a carriage using something that was clearly not intended as steps, then that is their responsibility. It is, as far as I am aware, the case in other countries, but not in ours and we have our own legal system, with its dependence on judicial opinion, to blame for that.

 

Jim

[Talltim]

Has anyone got a good photo of the offending hardware in situ?

 

Colin

http://www.rmweb.co.uk/community/index.php?/topic/94506-class-800-updates/?p=3327377

[jonny777]

But surely the ladder effect of the inter car connectors is either a safety risk, or it isn't.  It is binary and there is no middle ground.  

 

 

Precisely. And it's your choice. 

 

Do you - 

 

(a) Declare there not to be a high safety risk, keep the perceived problem as low-key as possible (in order not to give idiots any ideas about trying) and implement a process to change the position of the cables while keeping the units in daily operation?

 

(b) Declare the problem to be high risk, and insist all affected units are removed from service immediately - thus throwing the entire GWR network into total chaos for months, with thousands of cancelled trains due to shortage of replacement stock, and disrupting millions of peoples' travel plans between now and 2019 at the earliest?

[BWsTrains]

The whole things a farce anyway. Has anyone been seen climbing the connectors? Honestly why would anyone with a modicum of common sense do this ? I do appreciate Health and Safety rules . Heaven knows there have been huge improvements in the last 50 years. But really , who did the risk assessment on this ? The chances of someone doing it has got to be minute.

and idiots who do are prime candidates for the Darwin Award. https://darwinawards.com/

 

While we have so many hazards that we manage to avoid, this case cries out for pragmatism, remove the temptation but along the way do not throw baby out with bathwater.

[Wickham Green]

Has anyone got a good photo of the offending hardware in situ?

 

Colin

...... or of the cabling on a Javelin perhaps ?

[locoholic]

I can see what you're saying, but I suppose the precedent is that the steps were removed from the ends of Mk1 coaches decades ago, and that was primarily to stop staff using them. Likewise I've seen covers over steps on steam loco tenders when on the mainline. OK those were properly designed steps, with handrails, rather than step-like cables, but I can see the thought process.

Of course the counter argument is that someone should have looked at the history of such things and not designed the Pendolinos like that; meaning the IEPs would also have been designed differently. As it is its now, no doubt, another variation order which Hitachi will add to the bill.

 

But on the Mk 1 coaches they were steps, designed to be used as... steps, with hand-holds to facitiltate their use.

 

Anyone thinking of using the Cl 800 cables as steps would have to take the risk that they wouldn't come unplugged under the weight of the climber, because they are cables, which unplug, and obviously not designed to be used as steps.

[bimble]

every time you try to make something idiot proof, they just come along with a better idiot....  people still climb down onto the tracks after all... eventually someone will try climbing them (just because they wanted to), and they'll probably die, and the papers will be full of quotes of "what an angel they were", which raises the sort of question of what sort of angel does something like that... but not publicly, because you mustn't speak ill of the dead (especially if they're a child....)

[jim.snowdon]

It is worth keeping in focus that the existence of the step, cables or whatever, is not by itself the risk. They are simply one precursor to a hazard event; the other is that the person comes within the danger zone of the live contact wire. The risk is the combination of the probability of those events occurring and the severity of the consequence. The consequence of being zapped by 25kV for the time it takes the feeder circuit breakers to trip is unarguably severe, but is the probability is very low, the risk may be considered minimal. The necessity for any mitigating measures is then considered, depending on just how low the initial risk is, and the practicability of taking such measures. The 800s may be new, but in any risk assessment, reference would be made to anything similar, like the Pendolinos, that has been in service for a sufficient time to allow reliable data to be obtained.

 

To keep things in perspective, it is possible (for a really fit person) to climb a standard H-section overhead line pole and get close to live fittings. It is, however, considered an unlikely event, and therefore a tolerable risk. It is not normal practice to put anti-climbing measures (spiked collars) on OLE poles unless there are other factors present.

 

Jim

[Fenman]

... whilst a sensible approach that has its origins in past legal judgments ... we have our own legal system, with its dependence on judicial opinion, to blame for that.

 

I was with you until the end, where you seem to have changed your mind. In a large and complex system there are inevitably some judgments which are outliers, but the 21st century English judicial system - at least, the higher parts of it - is generally pretty good at correcting its own mistakes (the court of appeal earlier this week, for instance, on the fracking protestors whose original sentences were “manifestly excessive”).

 

One part of my job involves managing law suits against my employer, which can be anywhere in Europe, the Americas, or Asia-Pacific. I’m much more confident about the predictability of the outcome in the High Court than I am in the courts of many other parts of the world (and while, for example, some US states are pretty good, many are towards the very bottom end of the spectrum of predictability).

 

In my experience English high court judges do generally tend to be both learned and reasonably pragmatic, while trying to be fair. An example: despite spending squillions on trying to avoid what lower court judges have decided are its liabilities, Ryanair has utterly failed to convince higher English courts to minimise the amount of compensation it has to pay out to passengers for “extraordinary” delays. Aircraft parts wearing out, crew members being off work sick - all are to be expected in everyday activity, so the courts have held that, by definition, they are not “extraordinary”. Seems like a pragmatic and sensible approach to me.

 

Equally, no-one enjoys being hauled before the courts to justify decisions (especially where someone has been hurt or killed), and erring on the side of reasonable caution seems to me to be, well, reasonable.

 

Paul

[jonny777]

Looking at the cables, if the lower group could be repositioned to a level between the two groups higher up, then no one would be able to raise their leg that high in order to use them as a "ladder" (which I think is rather a misleading description of them anyway). 

 

I have no idea how difficult the re-positioning of a cable group might be, but it doesn't seem to be an insurmountable (pun not really intended) problem. 

Edited October 19, 2018 by jonny777

[Gwiwer]

Aside from the climb-ability or otherwise of a series of coach-end cables there remain other design issues with the 8xx-series IETs.

 

The toilets are consistently awash with what I hope is only water but usually also are rendered unpleasant by the presence of part-dissolved toilet tissue across the floors.  There is a slight risk of slipping on that but the fault seems to be the positioning of the concealed water outlet to the washbasin.  This is towards one end of the strangely-shaped receptacle - no doubt "built-to-fit" into an awkward corner - and slightly closer to the front edge.  So every time it is operated water reached the floor either as over-spray, off-hand drips or by other means.  I have yet to make use of the facilities and not find them awash and with tissue dissolving across the floor.  

 

Catering is very obviously an issue.  That is a factor of specified fit-out.  It has become very clear to staff and passengers alike that attempts to serve the longer-distance trains from a trolley just do not work.  The trolley cannot carry enough stock which requires staff to ferry supplies from the "brake van" (for want of a better term) through as many as nine coaches.  On single-staffed duties there is no option but to remain with the trolley so if the milk or carrier bags run out - as has happened on several trips so far - there are no more hot drinks.  The trolley has difficulty negotiating luggage unless it is perfectly placed in racks or under seats. That seldom happens and as noted before the provision for larger luggage is woefully inadequate.  So it can become trapped and unable to reach some or most passengers.  

 

Some passengers have already found it preferable to walk to the trolley rather than wait.  This tends to cause queueing in a doorway or vestibule which is hardly ideal and when serving hot drinks is arguably unsafe.  Attendant and customers alike rely on good balance and having both hands free to conduct the transaction rather than hold on.  The lack of hot food is already generating complaints among long-distance passengers.  The substitution of IETs for HSTs at short notice often means customers do not have the time to purchase items on the platform - and that assumes there is somewhere on the platform to buy stuff. Not everyone wants to take their teas, coffees and sandwiches onto a train several hours before they would choose to consume them.  In my experience the staff are both apologetic and hugely frustrated about this situation.  I understand representations are being made regarding health and safety at work from the staff side.  It ought to be possible to retro-fit a decent fixed catering module at the expense of a handful of seats.

 

Having now travelled the length of the Paddington - Penzance route on these things and made quite a number of trips up and down the Thames Valley to / from Reading I continue to find the ride very firm in common with other recent types notably the 700s and 707s.  Traversing pointwork can be decidedly un-nerving with thumps and clunks which one just does not get from the superior-quality HST bogies.

 

It has become apparent, too, now that leaves are falling that these units suffer appalling wheel slip at the slightest hint of a leaf.  Re-starting from Castle Cary was ponderous; from St. Germans and some other Cornish stations was nearly impossible.  Do we have a fleet which is only just capable of passing Dawlish and which cannot cope adequately with our Autumn???

 

Time will tell whether any improvements are forthcoming.  If they are not I fear we have a generation of trains which are loved by no-one and are not the tool required for the job.  Maybe for the Bristol run which is much shorter.  Possibly for Oxford though preferably under the wires (which currently end just short of Appleford) but not on journeys of five to six hours.

[david.hill64]

Health and Safety expectations (there are no "Rules" as such) have a distinct tendency to be different in the UK compared to the rest of Europe, if not the world. One result is the proliferation of claims lawyers, followed by a decided risk averseness on the part of asset owners and operators, often hidden behind "health and safety regulations". H&S did not say that trains shall not be designed so that they are unclimbable; what it did say was that the operator/builder has a duty of care to others and shall consider all reasonably foreseeable risks. Risk itself is a combination of probability and consequence. What it has ended up as being is an urge to eliminate all possible events, irrespective of probability. There is an element of H&S law that allows for doing what is reasonably practicable; whilst a sensible approach that has its origins in past legal judgments, it is an unquantifiable element where compliance can only be determined by a judge in a court of law, and no one wants to go there. One result is that legal opinions are sought, but any giver of opinion will always side with the least risk option in order to minimise their risk of being prosecuted. The result - an overbearing approach to safety with no room for common sense and personal responsibility.

If someone decides, knowing that there are high voltage cables above the train, to climb up the end of a carriage using something that was clearly not intended as steps, then that is their responsibility. It is, as far as I am aware, the case in other countries, but not in ours and we have our own legal system, with its dependence on judicial opinion, to blame for that.

 

Jim

Jim, I would add that under our Common Law system (everything permitted unless it’s prohibited) has different effects to that prevalent elsewhere in Europe ( everything prohibited unless it’s permitted).

 

One effect of this is the subconscious mindset of those drafting standards. ‘Why do you need a standard to cover something that is already not allowed?’

 

I’ve had this discussion a few times with French and German engineers and there is a definite mental block on both sides (theirs and mine) driven by our cultural differences.

[Wickham Green]

 

Anyone thinking of using the Cl 800 cables as steps would have to take the risk that they wouldn't come unplugged under the weight of the climber, because they are cables, which unplug, and obviously not designed to be used as steps.

Sorry ....... can't have cables coming unplugged and precipitating the 'poor unfortunate' individual down onto the track .......................... c'mon - that would be dangerous !

[dibber25]

Has anyone got a good photo of the offending hardware in situ?

 

Colin

Try this (CJL):