LMS2968

Rocket's boiler pressure was 50 p.s.i., the limit allowed by the Liverpool & Manchester Railway under its rules for the Rainhill Trials. The gauge was a mercurial gauge mounted vertically alongside the the chimney and with its lower end connected to the boiler; the higher the pressure, the higher the mercury stood in the glass tube which was visible to the enginemen. See II and V! below.

Answering all those, and possibly other questions, is of course, the purpose of an inquiry, whose answers will be evidence based rather than speculative.

The assumption being made, and this is also being made by Mike the Stationmaster, for whom I have the greatest respect, is that the driver knew the stock was where it was and not a lot further back. I'd suggest that the approach speed could indicate that this was the case, and being on a left-hand curve with that big tender in the way, he would not discover his error until the last minute. Of course, this would raise other questions, such as why he didn't know and why the fireman, who was looking back, did not intervene, at least in sufficient time. If this was so, stopping short of the stock has no relevance; you have to know where it is to do that. I'm sure Mike will agree with me that, however many knowledgeable railwaymen there are, you do not condemn a men or jump to a conclusion until you have heard his side of the story. It might turn out that all the above was wrong and the earlier theories are correct, but we don't know. Let the inquiry establish ALL the facts.

Various reasons, but amongst them is that copper is a better conductor of heat, is more easily worked and less prone to corrosion: steel fireboxes require a reliable and effective water treatment. On the other hand, they are cheaper and stronger for a given thickness.

I'm more inclined to the view that the injectors didn't pick up as there was insufficient water in the tanks to start with, so no means of pulling down the boiler pressure when the safety valves lifted.

From the 1950 BR Rule Book: 153. (a) A freight train must not be run on any running line beyond station limits without a brake van in rear, unless authorised by the Operating Superintendent. (b) Where a freight train is authorised to run without a brake van in rear, a brake van, or other suitable vehicle, for the use of the man in charge of such train, must be attached—when it can be conveniently done—as near to the rear of the train as practicable. Where no such vehicle is available the man may ride on the engine. A tail signal must be carried on the last vehicle.

The practice of assisting FAILED (correct railway terminology, not broken down. Break down implies derailment, hence breakdown crane to rerail it) trains from the rear is almost as old as railways themselves, and was noted on the Liverpool & Manchester Railway in the 1830s, long before radio, mobile phones or GSMR. Co-operation was by hand (lamps at night) and whistle signals. This happened before the introduction of the continuous automatic brake so the driver of the failed engine had no control over the assisting one. The rule covering assistance from rear is 179(c); the only instruction about working is, "The assisting train must run at reduced speed, and great caution must be observed by all concerned." Basically, use common sense.

I was privileged to know Jim Carter, who not only took thousands of railway photos from about 1954 to the end of his railway career on the footplate, but also published them in magazines, ABCs and even several books of his own. He never mentioned any managerial disapproval.

Yes, but it could be some distance away. The tank had to be higher than the column to give a pressure head but also to give a constant flow. The tank would hold more than a few tenders but had time to replenish between uses. At Bridgnorth the tank is to the west of the station set into the bank below the high level car park. I don't think you can see it from the station.

Glasses, I think.

This one's always intrigued me. 2959 at Leyland station with the 11.40 Wigan NW - Carnforth passenger, 19 September 1964. The driver - wearing glasses - is looking back for the tip. Apparently, he took exception to being passed in the station by a Class 40-hauled parcels and wanted to catch and pass it. This story was told to the SMF by the photographer, Steve Leyland.

I spent quite a lot of time in Liverpool Exchange Station in the 1950s, fascinated by the steam engines standing at the blocks. I remember the pigeons were a bit of a nuisance, but that's part of life. I gradually stopped going after 1968 as steam had gone and there were diesels instead. Gone too were the pigeons.

All true, of course, at least to an extent. Attracting labour to a hard and filthy work environment was becoming more and more difficult, but did it have to be that way? The LMS had introduced self-cleaning smokeboxes, rocking grates and hopper ashpans to the last Black Fives. This equipment, which was relatively cheap and easily fitted at works overhauls, could have been retrospectively fitted to the rest of the Black Fives, 8Fs, Crabs, 5XPs and Royal Scots, over 2,000 engines. Similar on other engines and other regions. It would have made the work less unpleasant ('pleasant' would be pushing it) and allowed engines back into traffic sooner after finishing a working. It wasn't done. As for diesels' ability to start and go, it wasn't, and isn't, as instantaneous as that. Many Western Region engines were hot start only, a process taking about five hours, or the equivalent of raising steam from cold.

I don't know about that happening on a preserved railway but it did happen on the main line, between Crewe and Holyhead.

Ooh! Nasty!

Yes it is; it certainly was on Thursday last week. I think the ticket expires in January and it will not enter works until then.

Unfortunately, what happened on the big railway back in the day and what happens in preservation don't always gel. I remember when 2968 visited another (best remain anonymous) railway and I was the owner's rep on it. I noticed that the safety valves were more or less permanently blowing off. I mentioned this to the driver, whose exact words were, "Oh, we don't worry about that sort of thing!" My thoughts were along the lines of, "Well, it's your coal bill."

It was still the wrong - and expensive - policy, but your contention, "Very little of that (thinking) was going on in terms of a traction strategy," is at fault. Whether or not Riddles' ideas or the Modernisation Plan were wrong,, whether or not the original plan was eventually dropped, the thoughts for an overall strategy were present.

The 'more efficient traction scheme' was the actually the long-term plan: electrification which by-passed the diesel option, rather the direction we are currently moving but seventy years late. Electrification was and is expensive and also time consuming to implement and it was anticipated that the full system would take to between 1980 to 2000 to achieve. The new steam locos were to cover the gap, replacing worn-out and obsolete types in the short term and displaced pre-Nationalisation engines as the system was electrified sector by sector. Eventually, few lines would be left to be electrified and these would have entirely BR Standard types as motive power until they too were made redundant as these last areas were electrified. That was Robin Riddles grand scheme, unceremoniously dumped into the waste bin with the 1955 Modernisation Plan which took the country down the expensively disastrous diesel route with an untried (in this country) motive power type without the knowledge and experience needed to make it work.

Strangely, I've just been reading about that in John Thomas's book, although not for the first time. The guard was a Cameron too, which might be what you meant.

Yes, the ex-LNWR line through Tyldesley. I remember calls to reopen the line as a normal railway, Leigh being the biggest town in Britain no longer rail served (or so it was said). Then one of the idiot councillors suggested it should be a monorail, thereby demonstrating Wigan Metro's go-ahead attitude and ignoring all the disadvantages of route changes and inability to link into the main network. And in the end, they settled for this guided busway.

No, it came later as an act of desperation. If you think about it, it could make things rather awkward on shed: if the thing was in the way and out of steam, there was no way to shift it.

Several B1s passed into service as stationary boilers on being withdrawn, although they remained fully capable of working around the shed under their own steam. Failures on the road were so common and rescue locos so scarce that these were often sent out to worked the failed train. Instructions from on high not to do this made little difference, so in the end all the drawhooks were removed; the loco could still move around the depot but could no longer work a train.

A friend of mine was a driver from Warrington Arpley and one did it to him on a bitterly cold, frosty night. He was stopped at a signal and looked out sideways to see a red glow emanating from under the 47; it was the remains of the block and some of the rigging that was glowing. Having considered just carrying on, he asked the bobby to be to be put inside and a fitter called out. As the morning light arrived he noticed the landscape was all white, except for a ten foot semi-circle around this brake block. The fitter eventually arrived and changed the necessary parts, but then announced that the engine was a failure since the tyre was loose on the wheel. Since the train was loaded petrol tankers, my mate was rather glad he stopped!

That was 8408 and it wasn't actually covering a failure. It had received an overhaul at Eastleigh (several 8Fs did) and was then used around the system for a bit. Still a bit of an oddity.