Level crossing stupidity...

[talisman56]

I'm not so sure aboiut that. Every time I come across roadworks lights people just keep going through when the light goes to red.

 

Stewart

 

...and the waiting drivers at the other end get irate.

 

The main road at the end of my short cul-de-sac had roadworks on it (local gas board replacing pipes), and two-way temporary lights were in operation with no lights controlling the exit from the cul-de-sac. Right next to the lights, along with the 'When red light shows WAIT here' board, was one of equal size which said 'Joining traffic not light controlled'. As the road is on a curve, anyone waiting at the junction could not see either of the lights and queue, so it was a case of 'if no one in sight, go and drive with care'. On one occasion, I could see the traffic in one direction disappearing round the curve, so as it was the direction I wanted to go, I went. Of course as I got to the other end, the lights had changed and the first car in the queue was proceeding past the light. He immediately stopped, blocking the way, and got out and walked to my window, berating me for passing the lights at the opposite end when they were on red, saying he had to get to an appointment and I would have to reverse back down. To which I replied that I was 'joining traffic' per the board, that I couldn't care less about his appointment and I could sit here all day. He eventually got the message and reversed to let me out...

[caradoc]

...and the waiting drivers at the other end get irate.

 

The main road at the end of my short cul-de-sac had roadworks on it (local gas board replacing pipes), and two-way temporary lights were in operation with no lights controlling the exit from the cul-de-sac. Right next to the lights, along with the 'When red light shows WAIT here' board, was one of equal size which said 'Joining traffic not light controlled'. As the road is on a curve, anyone waiting at the junction could not see either of the lights and queue, so it was a case of 'if no one in sight, go and drive with care'. On one occasion, I could see the traffic in one direction disappearing round the curve, so as it was the direction I wanted to go, I went. Of course as I got to the other end, the lights had changed and the first car in the queue was proceeding past the light. He immediately stopped, blocking the way, and got out and walked to my window, berating me for passing the lights at the opposite end when they were on red, saying he had to get to an appointment and I would have to reverse back down. To which I replied that I was 'joining traffic' per the board, that I couldn't care less about his appointment and I could sit here all day. He eventually got the message and reversed to let me out...

 

So, how on earth is such an arrangement deemed to be safe and acceptable for road traffic, whereas the railway industry has to take every conceivable measure (and pay the bill) to eliminate absolutely any possibility of crossing user stupidity or disregard ?

[Colin_McLeod]

Probably because cars can be stopped in a relatively short distance and avoid a collision whilst trains can't.

[Budgie]

Are we still talking about Steventon? How much would it cost to improve the road access to the part of Steventon that's on the wrong side of the tracks, so the level crossings can be closed?

Edited November 15, 2017 by Budgie

[martin_wynne]

Are we still talking about Steventon?

 

We are talking about this one, near Teynham in Kent:

 

 https://goo.gl/maps/GJALKxexTQP2

 

(Modernised since the Google picture.)

 

See this RAIB news item: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/collision-at-frognal-farm-user-worked-level-crossing

 

Martin.

[Budgie]

Sorry, I got the wrong thread.

[caradoc]

Probably because cars can be stopped in a relatively short distance and avoid a collision whilst trains can't.

 

Indeed, although that doesn't prevent the daily carnage on Britain's roads which somehow seems to be accepted as just one of those things; Even horrendous lorry collisions causing multiple loss of life make the headlines for a couple of days and then disappear into obscurity. The issue for me is just how far the rail industry should be expected go to ensure safety at level crossings, and why whatever additional measures are necessary should increase the cost to the industry of maintaining and operating the network, when by far the majority of crossing incidents are road user error, deliberate or otherwise. 

[ejstubbs]

Probably because cars can be stopped in a relatively short distance and avoid a collision whilst trains can't.

 

And trains are driven to the signals - ie the assumption is that if the signal's green, the line should be clear - and signalling systems are designed and implemented according to that principle.

 

Cars, however, are driven "on sight" ie it's the driver's responsibilbility to observe the road and control the vehicle according to what they see happening (at least, that's what they're supposed to do - but see the Driving standards thread).  Behind the wheel, you can't rely on a green light meaning that it's safe to go and put your brain in neutral (as just about any road user using whatever form of travel will know - or else likely be dead or seriously injured).

Edited November 15, 2017 by ejstubbs

[cheesysmith]

If you are talking of doubble standards, I keep thinking of the big accident (happend more than once) where due to fog, we have had cars and trucks crash causing loss of life, wich can be considered in the same light as southhall, where a train passed the caution aspect*.

 

Southall resulted in TPWS and black boxes fitted to trains. The big motorway smashes resulted in? The technology is there to prevent these big motorway smashes, radar mounted onto truck to warn of blockages ahead in fog. GPS speed limiters with a CD rom onboard, preventing speeding with a national map loaded onto it. Same GPS speed limiting tech could also have a override so the police or such can remotely enforce a lower speed limit in hazardous conditions. Proper data recording (not the basic tacho system fitted, as I know of drivers when loading containers join a cue of lorries for loading/unloading, put it into crawler gear, and spend the next 30 mins inching along but the tacho shows them as on the legal break). Also, where are the average speed cameras fitted everywhere, regardless of cost? And what about making sure every vehicle using the roads is so fitted, or not to be allowed to use UK highways until fitted?  Every incident on the railway results in a inquiry, and the outcome always seems to be a new safety system to prevent a reoccurrence regardless of cost. Road accidents always come down to human error**, but this never appears to result in a super expensive safety system installed to remove the chance of human error?

 

*Southall can come down to human error as the driver missed the caution aspect. Not debating this accident, just using it as a example.

 

**RTCs can be caused by equipment faults, but all that comes out of it appears to be fines, maybe a fine/conviction, and no new laws or action on the ground, as the usual statement is we don't have the resources to enforce it. The railways have to self finance and pay for the enforcement of any requirement, why not roads? 

[martin_wynne]

On a train, passengers have entrusted their lives entirely to the Railway, and are powerless to control what happens to them. That should and does concentrate Railway minds wonderfully.

 

On a road, drivers are responsible for their own destiny, and the destiny of those around them. That's a completely different level of risk, and travellers are free to choose which they prefer.

 

However, bus and coach passengers are in exactly the same position as railway passengers, so ought to be afforded the same regulatory protections.

 

Martin.

[peanuts]

If you are talking of doubble standards, I keep thinking of the big accident (happend more than once) where due to fog, we have had cars and trucks crash causing loss of life, wich can be considered in the same light as southhall, where a train passed the caution aspect*.

 

Southall resulted in TPWS and black boxes fitted to trains. The big motorway smashes resulted in? The technology is there to prevent these big motorway smashes, radar mounted onto truck to warn of blockages ahead in fog. GPS speed limiters with a CD rom onboard, preventing speeding with a national map loaded onto it. Same GPS speed limiting tech could also have a override so the police or such can remotely enforce a lower speed limit in hazardous conditions. Proper data recording (not the basic tacho system fitted, as I know of drivers when loading containers join a cue of lorries for loading/unloading, put it into crawler gear, and spend the next 30 mins inching along but the tacho shows them as on the legal break). Also, where are the average speed cameras fitted everywhere, regardless of cost? And what about making sure every vehicle using the roads is so fitted, or not to be allowed to use UK highways until fitted?  Every incident on the railway results in a inquiry, and the outcome always seems to be a new safety system to prevent a reoccurrence regardless of cost. Road accidents always come down to human error**, but this never appears to result in a super expensive safety system installed to remove the chance of human error?

 

*Southall can come down to human error as the driver missed the caution aspect. Not debating this accident, just using it as a example.

 

**RTCs can be caused by equipment faults, but all that comes out of it appears to be fines, maybe a fine/conviction, and no new laws or action on the ground, as the usual statement is we don't have the resources to enforce it. The railways have to self finance and pay for the enforcement of any requirement, why not roads? 

most new trucks come fitted with a form of anti collision radar supposed to prevent rear end collisions tho many drivers switch it off due to its tendency to activate at 56 mph for no apparent reason which can be hair raising to say the least ! some are activated by sensing a brake light ahead even if a different lane think its now mandatory on new trucks 

[uax6]

Well it responds to the situation in the RAIB news report, where seemingly a user opened the gates using the power button without first contacting the signaller. This would prevent a user doing that. The signaller is effectively giving a release to open the gates, without which they won't work.

 

But it does that without adding any extra connections into the signalling system between the signalbox and the crossing.

 

The extra cost is minimal. A small processor in the push button unit (a Raspberry Pi would do the job easily, cost £20) plus a weatherproof industrial number pad, cost £26:

 

 

See: http://uk.rs-online.com/web/p/access-control-keypads/8861670/

 

The extra work for the signaller consists of clicking the name of the crossing on his computer screen and reading out the 4-figure number which comes up, while talking on the phone to the crossing user.

 

regards,

 

Martin. 

I think you have a very optimistic way about signallers work loads, also about the limitations of the equipment that is available in the boxes. The power boxes will have the equipment that that could be interfaced with, but it would probably add even more to their workload, whereas the proper boxes probably do not.

 

How do you make this system fail safe? How do you prevent the signaller getting the crossing confused with another and therefore releasing the wrong gate?

 

Being in a box and having been exposed to heavy UWC use during Harvest season (which here in Norfolk lasts from about January to Dec!) I can tell you that not only can you have high volumes of calls (upto 20 an hour) but these also tend to be made by people with minimal grasp of English. Add into the mix the way the train service runs, and then you can get into the situation where you end up asking them to wait 8 minutes, and sometimes they do, and sometimes they don't. Then there are the ones that just phone to say 'I have tractor I cross' and do, even if you say no.

One box has a call from a crossing (That's any type of crossing) on average ever 2 minutes in Anglia, can you imagine that level of decision making?

 

It is a bout time that we made people think for themselves again....

 

Andy G

[phil-b259]

Well it responds to the situation in the RAIB news report, where seemingly a user opened the gates using the power button without first contacting the signaller. This would prevent a user doing that. The signaller is effectively giving a release to open the gates, without which they won't work.

 

But it does that without adding any extra connections into the signalling system between the signalbox and the crossing.

 

The extra cost is minimal. A small processor in the push button unit (a Raspberry Pi would do the job easily, cost £20) plus a weatherproof industrial number pad, cost £26:

 

 

See: http://uk.rs-online.com/web/p/access-control-keypads/8861670/

 

The extra work for the signaller consists of clicking the name of the crossing on his computer screen and reading out the 4-figure number which comes up, while talking on the phone to the crossing user.

 

regards,

 

Martin. 

 

And what about MAINTANCE or FAULTING issues.

 

Every single bit of kit you attach to the railway requires someone to maintain it and repair it - particularly ANYTHING that relates to safety in any shape or form.

 

A classic example would be a fixed train warning system for track staff to allow them to patrol in safety. All super wonderful, but who has to maintain it in working order? the S&T - but what do THEY use to protect themselves etc.....

 

An occupation crossing with nothing more than signage is nice and simple - all the railway has to do is arrange for the signs to be wiped over and the vegetation cleared.

Responsibility for determining whether it is safe to cross lies, from a legal perspective with the user (assuming the signage and vegetation situation are in order).

 

Put a phone in (a very 'simple' device to most folk) and immediately have transferred that legal obligation to the railway - including a responsibility to keep it in working order at all times. That now means you involve the S&T department to look after the phone, the telecoms department to look after the phone line back to the signal box and the telephone concentrator there. Operations become more complicated because if the phone has a defect then trains must be cautioned unless the crossing is staffed etc...

 

So you need to be very careful before coming up with 'simple solutions' because as others has noted expectations of what the railway needs to do are vastly higher than occur in virtually any other industry.

Edited November 18, 2017 by phil-b259

[Budgie]

So you need to be very careful before coming up with 'simple solutions' because as others has noted expectations of what the railway are vastly higher than occur in virtually any other industry.

I have a 'simple solution': close the crossings. Farmers will complain, but they only have themselves to blame for their staff nor using the crossings properly.

[phil-b259]

I have a 'simple solution': close the crossings. Farmers will complain, but they only have themselves to blame for their staff nor using the crossings properly.

If only it were that easy.

 

One of the most frustrating about the railway industry is the apparent need to appease anyone and everyone (usually to prevent politicans from getting grief) when in reality some people need to be told to stop being so selfish and think of the needs of others for a change.

 

As we saw with Ufton Nevet AHB crossing (locals campaigned against its closure even though it only required a 1/4 mile detour for cars to use a nearby bridge) or even the Wimbledon loop Thameslink service (locals up in arms over the thought that they might have to change at Blackfriars to get to City Thameslink) hugely benifical changes have to be sacrificed / have huge sums of money spent on them to the detriment of society at large.

Edited November 16, 2017 by phil-b259

[Coryton]

most new trucks come fitted with a form of anti collision radar supposed to prevent rear end collisions tho many drivers switch it off due to its tendency to activate at 56 mph for no apparent reason which can be hair raising to say the least ! some are activated by sensing a brake light ahead even if a different lane think its now mandatory on new trucks 

 

I don't think a radar could sense a brake light. It would take a fairly sophisticated machine vision system and I would indeed think such a thing would end up with a large number of false positives.

 

I think you have a very optimistic way about signallers work loads, also about the limitations of the equipment that is available in the boxes. The power boxes will have the equipment that that could be interfaced with, but it would probably add even more to their workload, whereas the proper boxes probably do not.

 

How do you make this system fail safe? How do you prevent the signaller getting the crossing confused with another and therefore releasing the wrong gate?

 

I take the point about workload (and made elsewhere about increased maintenance costs), but I'm not sure how releasing the wrong gate is a problem. The gate the person is standing in front of doesn't open, they tell the signaller who then realises he's mixed up the crossings and tries again. Without the remote release, instead the user opens the gate when in fact it might not be safe to do so because the signaller got confused between crossings.

 

Incidentally, I don't think there would be a need for a set of stored codes for the keypad system - you could use the same technology as an online banking or corporate log-in fob which has an accurate clock and generates a code valid for the next so many minutes.

 

On a train, passengers have entrusted their lives entirely to the Railway, and are powerless to control what happens to them. That should and does concentrate Railway minds wonderfully.

 

On a road, drivers are responsible for their own destiny, and the destiny of those around them. That's a completely different level of risk, and travellers are free to choose which they prefer

 

I'm really confused by this. As you say, a driver is responsible for the destiny of those around them, so just like a train an individual user is at risk from other people's actions. I really don't think this (or the fact that cars are - supposedly - driven "on sight") fully justifies the different standards for road safety.

 

I think there are two main reasons - firstly the immense disruption that would be caused if we tried to impose the same levels of safety seen on the railways and indeed in just about any other area in the UK, and secondly because any attempt to enforce this on drivers would be highly unpopular and almost impossible to enforce.

 

Individuals make decisions and - apart from often being poor at assessing risk - they generally don't look at the overall picture, i.e. parking on a pavement on a road with fast traffic because they don't want their car to be hit. Forcing pedestrians out into the road isn't their problem. On the railways it doesn't work like this.

 

I remember when the Great Heck accident happened my colleagues first reaction was that it was dreadful that there had been yet another train crash. When it became clear that it was caused by a car on the line it became just one of those things...you can't expect cars to stay on the road all the time after all....

[The Stationmaster]

 

 

I take the point about workload (and made elsewhere about increased maintenance costs), but I'm not sure how releasing the wrong gate is a problem. The gate the person is standing in front of doesn't open, they tell the signaller who then realises he's mixed up the crossings and tries again. Without the remote release, instead the user opens the gate when in fact it might not be safe to do so because the signaller got confused between crossings.

 

 

 

 

 

When a Signalman has a number of such crossings in the area he is controlling he is immediately presented with a problem because he relies on the crossing user to correctly identify which crossing he is speaking from (even with selective 'phone lines).  The Sgnalman(ler) also has the problem of not necessarily knowing where a train is in relation to any particular crossing.  All of this, plus the matter of user responsibility, is why I have never considered these sort of crossing as a 'level crossing' - they are a very different sort of beast with a very different way of working and totally different problems from a proper level crossing, and that includes some very different problems for the person in the nearest signalbox (as related above).

 

It is all too easy for a Signalman to make a mistake, especially if he has a succession of busy crossings in his area and it is equally all too easy for poor user discipline to go undetected until a collision results.  One little example - on a past patch of mine we had a collision between a train and a herd of calves at an occupation crossing.  In that case the crossing didn't have a 'phone and a train was running late and the farmer hadn't bothered to call the signalbox from the 'phone in his house.  But what would he have said if he had called because as far as the railway was concerned the crossing was Forde Abbey No. 3, as far as the farmer was concerned it was probably the crossing by the so & so pasture and he hadn't got a clue about the railway name for the crossing.  

[uax6]

I take the point about workload (and made elsewhere about increased maintenance costs), but I'm not sure how releasing the wrong gate is a problem. The gate the person is standing in front of doesn't open, they tell the signaller who then realises he's mixed up the crossings and tries again. Without the remote release, instead the user opens the gate when in fact it might not be safe to do so because the signaller got confused between crossings

 

But if you happen to release a gate that someone else happens to be at, and they haven't called in, they are naturally going to think it's ok to cross. Now you could be on the same bit of railway, so it could be safe, but its just as possible that that crossing is on an entirely different line with a train on it. Its just not a fail safe system so cannot be used.

 

 

Incidentally, I don't think there would be a need for a set of stored codes for the keypad system - you could use the same technology as an online banking or corporate log-in fob which has an accurate clock and generates a code valid for the next so many minutes.

 

Nice idea. I've used these sorts of cards before, and I have to say that using one in a signalling location would be completely impracticable, there just isn't the time to make the decision and then enter that code, and the then code for one of possibly a hundred crossings. From experience I can tell you that the decision process to determine if the user can cross takes about 10 seconds (that's working out where the trains are, where the user is and if it is safe. Any longer than that and I just won't be able to get that user over most of the time...

 

Anyone who says men can't multitask should just look at signalmen, its our job to do it, and we do welcome any help we can get, but it does have to be useful help, that does actually save time and work, rather than half baked help which makes life harder...

 

Andy G

(with apologies to Stationmaster to nicking his italics, but I can't get the hang of multi-quoting!

 

 

 

[Coryton]

 

I take the point about workload (and made elsewhere about increased maintenance costs), but I'm not sure how releasing the wrong gate is a problem. The gate the person is standing in front of doesn't open, they tell the signaller who then realises he's mixed up the crossings and tries again. Without the remote release, instead the user opens the gate when in fact it might not be safe to do so because the signaller got confused between crossings

 

But if you happen to release a gate that someone else happens to be at, and they haven't called in, they are naturally going to think it's ok to cross. Now you could be on the same bit of railway, so it could be safe, but its just as possible that that crossing is on an entirely different line with a train on it. Its just not a fail safe system so cannot be used.

 

But it wasn't fail safe before. This system removes the risk of someone just opening a gate without picking up the phone and adds what I would have thought was the much smaller risk of someone trying a gate before picking up the phone and happening to do it at the moment that the gate was inadvertently released. Overall risk is reduced, and it hasn't added risk to someone using the crossing properly...but maybe that's not how these decisions are made.

 

Of course this flaw doesn't apply to the keycode system because the code to release the wrong gate never makes it to the person standing there.

 

Now, if we did want to implement a remote release system, how would we do it? The simplest way I can think of is to send a tone down the phone line, in which case again you can't accidentally open the wrong gate because the tone only goes to the person you are talking to (though of course if you think they are at a different crossing then they are, you still have a problem). If there's no phone I very much doubt you're going to be wiring a gate for remote release.

 

 

Nice idea. I've used these sorts of cards before, and I have to say that using one in a signalling location would be completely impracticable, there just isn't the time to make the decision and then enter that code, and the then code for one of possibly a hundred crossings. From experience I can tell you that the decision process to determine if the user can cross takes about 10 seconds (that's working out where the trains are, where the user is and if it is safe. Any longer than that and I just won't be able to get that user over most of the time...

 

 

I wasn't proposing that the signaller has to fiddle around with a banking style system.  You could have a screen showing the current code for each crossing if there weren't too many....in principle a VDU could show these codes on a track diagram along with all the other information....though it might clutter the screen too much and I'm sure implementing it would not be cheap.

 

But in any case, maybe the answer is that the workload would be too much for the signaller and therefore improving safety requires more people.

 

Anyhow - I very much doubt that I or anybody else on this thread is going to come up with something clever that hasn't happened just because people haven't thought of it. But it's interesting to see why what sound like clever solutions don't actually work on the ground. And the keypad idea does sound clever.

[The Stationmaster]

And the keypad idea does absolutely nothing to solve one basic part of the equation  - it still doesn't let the Signalman(ler) know where the train is and whether or not it has passed the crossing.

[martin_wynne]

And the keypad idea does absolutely nothing to solve one basic part of the equation  - it still doesn't let the Signalman(ler) know where the train is and whether or not it has passed the crossing.

 

But it didn't set out to solve that or all the other problems.

 

The idea was simply to prevent a user opening a gate without first contacting the signaller. Which the RAIB news report implied was the cause of the collision.

 

Martin.

[Trog]

And what about MAINTANCE or FAULTING issues.

 

Every single bit of kit you attach to the railway requires someone to maintain it and repair it - particularly ANYTHING that relates to safety in any shape or form.

 

A classic example would be a fixed train warning system for track staff to allow them to patrol in safety. All super wonderful, but who has to maintain it in working order? the S&T - but what do THEY use to protect themselves etc.....

 

A super wizzo experimental fixed safety system with sirens and yellow flashing lights triggered by the trains was set up on the curves north of Leighton Buzzard on the WCML some years ago at vast expense, (£ millions). The head office people responsible brought some representatives of the RAIB out to see it, and I heard that they were somewhat un-impressed to find a local PW maintenance gang working in the middle of it under the protection of a lookoutman.

 

So presumably the S&T could do the same if anybody reported it as broken.

[Gary H]

Indeed, although that doesn't prevent the daily carnage on Britain's roads which somehow seems to be accepted as just one of those things; Even horrendous lorry collisions causing multiple loss of life make the headlines for a couple of days and then disappear into obscurity. The issue for me is just how far the rail industry should be expected go to ensure safety at level crossings, and why whatever additional measures are necessary should increase the cost to the industry of maintaining and operating the network, when by far the majority of crossing incidents are road user error, deliberate or otherwise. 

The other big difference between the two transport modes ofcourse is that whilst a road traffic collision is deemed to be a driver's fault, most incidents on the railway (like drunk passengers falling between platform and train for example) become the the railway's fault.

Everybody is responsible for their own safety unless they happen to be on the railway, then it becomes the railway's responsibility. 

[Coryton]

 

So presumably the S&T could do the same if anybody reported it as broken.

 

So long as you don't find out that it's broken the hard way....

[ejstubbs]

Everybody is responsible for their own safety unless they happen to be on the railway, then it becomes the railway's responsibility. 

 

Nowadays it seems that everyone is responsible for their own safety unless they happen to be staring at a mobile phone, when it becomes everyone else's responsibility to protect them from their own stupidity.  Can't see any other reason for roadside clutter like this: http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/traffic-lights-pavement-smartphone-users-look-down-dutch-pedestrians-netherlands-a7584081.html to be considered a good idea.

Edited November 18, 2017 by ejstubbs