fire in London tower block

[vitalspark]

Im surprised no one has mentioned gas.

 

I believe these flats had gas heating and I suppose its entirely possible that a local fire in an appliance if left alone as it apparently was may well have affected an adjacent gas appliance which would certainly accelerate things.

 

On the criticism of speculation before the official enquiry I would suggest that mainly what is being stated by observers are facts as in 'Concrete doesn't burn so that only leaves the cladding' a quote from a fire service official on the tv.

 

It was also stated that the cladding stood off the concrete allowing a funnel effect up behind it and the firebreak partitions may have been incorrectly fitted or inadequate. This would all make sense.

 

On sprinklers yes of course they would make a huge difference but until they are mandatory they will be slow to appear.

 

I don't know of a single council block in Glasgow that has sprinklers fitted apart from in some service areas and there are dozens of high rise up to 23 storeys.

 

Its 7 years since I was involved in such buildings and then in an electrical capacity but back then I had never come across a single sprinkler fitted council high rise.

 

We did convert several buildings to electric heating from gas after Ronan Point in London suffered a partial collapse after a domestic gas explosion though.

 

You wonder back then at the planners even suggesting gas for a high rise property..I'm still bewildered when I come across them albeit now no doubt meeting all the relevant safety standards. Where did we hear that recently?

 

On alarm systems..no they would be open to abuse and likely would be in many blocks.

 

Decent maintained LED emergency lighting would definitely have helped though.  We heard of people trying to escape down stairs with no lighting and falling over each other.

 

That is inexcusable and tough very effective bulkhead fittings which require little maintenance could be fitted on all the stairwells in a block like this for a few thousands..not hundreds of thousands.

 

The other issue was the provision of only a single stairwell.

 

Surely blocks of this size should have concrete fireproof stairwells at either end. I can't remember a single block of this height that I was involved in having only 1 stairwell..they all had 2.

 

I would forecast that this last issue alone if recommended in any subsequent report will see many older blocks being demolished as the cost to modify would be just too high.

 

This of course is probably the best option for the tenants that have to reside in such buildings.

 

Many older people love their high rise because ironically they feel very safe with only one door to be concerned with but things will have changed now thats for sure.

 

It will be interesting to watch the finger pointing between architects builders and suppliers all trying to absolve themselves from what will very likely turn out to be down to economy of construction.

 

I just hope that this terrible tragedy has had such an effect on the nation that regardless of cost changes are implemented that ensure we never see the likes if this again.

 

Dave.

Edited June 17, 2017 by vitalspark

[Zomboid]

A terrible tragedy, and my sympathy goes to all affected.

 

I also understand the feeling of needing to do something now. But the fact is we don't know the facts, and doing something just for the sake of doing something is likely to result in that something being an inappropriate response.

 

The only responsible course of action is to wait until the experts have done their job and then act on their recommendations, or we risk thinking we've solved a problem when in fact we have not.

[kevinlms]

A terrible tragedy, and my sympathy goes to all affected.

 

I also understand the feeling of needing to do something now. But the fact is we don't know the facts, and doing something just for the sake of doing something is likely to result in that something being an inappropriate response.

 

The only responsible course of action is to wait until the experts have done their job and then act on their recommendations, or we risk thinking we've solved a problem when in fact we have not.

All well and good to wait. However see my previous post (post 100) in the Melbourne example, where an order has been made to remove the cladding, is being delayed due to legal appeals.

 

Edited to include post number.

Edited June 17, 2017 by kevinlms

[Pannier Tank]

Im surprised no one has mentioned gas.

 

The Gas Main was ruptured at some stage.

 

http://www.london-fire.gov.uk/LatestIncidentsContainer_grenfell-tower-fire-update-15-june-2017.asp

Edited June 17, 2017 by Pannier Tank

[NorthBrit]

Taking aside the terrible tragedy that it is,  I am amazed that the building still stands when, in New York, the Twin Towers fell like a pack of cards.

[jjb1970]

There are whole fire codes which address fire standards and testing for materials, heat insulation, structural design, fire suppression etc. That includes glazing, there are many applications where fire rated glazing is mandatory, it won't last limitless heat forever but should retain its integrity long enough to contain smoke and flame propagation long enough for evacuation measures to be safely carried out. Even a steel structure has limits. And then there is the question of filling spaces with combustibles.

This building was designed in the 60's and constructed in the early 70's, you can retrofit some systems but the basic structure is over 40 years old and designed to 1960's standards yet for all that what we saw this week should not have happened.

Without speculating it is relatively easy to identify a lot of the questions which need to be considered. The answers to those questions and indeed whether they're relevant in this case (I suspect some of them will be of no relevance in this case) are for the investigation team to consider and attempt to answer. There will clearly be multiple cuasal factors for the death toll, and the interdepencies between some of those causal factors will be a critical consideration.

I must admit I am a bit taken aback that there were no sprinklers and that there was only a single stairwell. In general terms I find both of those aspects appalling, however until the tragedy is properly investigated we don't know what happened, why it happened and why the death count is so high. One reason I think speculation unhelpful is that it is not unusual for the more significant failings to differ from the initial media circus answers and for politicians to walk down blind avenues or address perfectly valid concerns while dropping the ball on other things as a way of appeasing public pressure.

[Bernard Lamb]

Taking aside the terrible tragedy that it is,  I am amazed that the building still stands when, in New York, the Twin Towers fell like a pack of cards.

The two buildings used a totally different method of construction.

London used concrete. NY was a steel frame.

One stood up, the other twisted with the heat after receiving a massive impact.

Bernard

[sulzer27jd]

A terrible tragedy, and my sympathy goes to all affected.

 

I also understand the feeling of needing to do something now. But the fact is we don't know the facts, and doing something just for the sake of doing something is likely to result in that something being an inappropriate response.

 

The only responsible course of action is to wait until the experts have done their job and then act on their recommendations, or we risk thinking we've solved a problem when in fact we have not.

 

So what do you recommend as a standard operating procedure for firefighters attending a fire in a flat today?

[kevinlms]

Taking aside the terrible tragedy that it is,  I am amazed that the building still stands when, in New York, the Twin Towers fell like a pack of cards.

I'm no expert, but I'm sure there is a huge difference between a highly flammable sheet of cladding and a large aircraft hitting it while carrying an almost full load of fuel.

 

I suspect, the planning has already started on the best way to demolish the remains of the building.

[DougN]

A couple of years ago I built a 2 bed house which had to have a sprinkler system as it was down a long narrow driveway.  Because sprinklers need a consistent and high volume flow the water main to the property was twice the size for just 5 rooms and you have very good to high water pressure.

So for something like a 20+ storey building such as this I don't think it is straightforward to retrofit, water is already going to be pumped but the sprinkler system would demand very high volumes.

 

Regarding building regs, we are inspected thoroughly, Fire and fire doors are a closely monitored part of the regs, they're fitted with closers but people tend to remove them or wedge them shortly after occupation.

I have been involved with a large number of fire upgrade programs here in Melbourne generally for institutional buildings, some memorable ones are Kew cottages before the fire, tender was over budget and did not proceed... about 3 months later there was a lose of life at the facility.... then it was closed. Others have been quite economic to install this includes addressable detection through thermal and smoke detectors as well, as the full installation of sprinklers. Yes, A building of the size we are discussing I would expect 2x 150 dia incoming pipes and full back up pumping along with static storage of about 20000ltrs. So the cost to do the apartment block would be prohibitively but as we all agree define the value of 1 life!

 

Most of the comercial buildings I have been involved with including, childcare centres, schools and apartment blocks have all been fitted with thermal and smoke detectors to each room if not more than 1 to large rooms!

[Zomboid]

So what do you recommend as a standard operating procedure for firefighters attending a fire in a flat today?

 

Why would you ask me that? I know nothing about fire fighting, and I don't claim to. I do know a bit about problem solving and investigating events where things have behaved in unexpected manners, though.

 

My point is that if we make a hasty decision about this tragedy, we'd risk not preventing a repeat and potentially making things worse. The experts investigating this incident need to understand what the problem was before they can come up with a solution. And just doing *something* now for the sake of being seen to do something will be relying on luck.

[PhilJ W]

Taking aside the terrible tragedy that it is,  I am amazed that the building still stands when, in New York, the Twin Towers fell like a pack of cards.

 

 

The two buildings used a totally different method of construction.

London used concrete. NY was a steel frame.

One stood up, the other twisted with the heat after receiving a massive impact.

Bernard

Thats it in a nutshell, Grenfell tower was built around a central core that contained lifts, staircases and other services. This is both a blessing and a curse. The stairs remained intact and firefighters can reach the very top of the building but as stated the corners of the structure are giving concerns about their integrity. Also as can be seen from the floorplan it would be difficult if not impossible to add another staircase, the only way I can see it being done is to put it in a separate tower alongside the structure and that would involve losing one flat on each floor. From what one or two survivors have said the fridge that reportedly started the fire was placed under a window and given that with the current hot weather many windows would be left open one can see how the fire was able to spread to the cladding. 

[Clearwater]

To ask a question: are sprinklers effective against all types of fire? I seem to recall that electric fires are generally extinguished with carbon dioxide for example. In any event, and promptly demonstrating why its important to leave discussions to experts, is there not a risk that in a high temperature fire, that any sprinkler water is promptly vapourised into steam thus increasing, not reducing, the hazard. Like most things, I suspect to say "why were there not sprinklers" is too simplistic and ignores some very valid reasons about how a fire management and containment system is designed and implemented.

 

In the end, like some other major disasters, it may well be a combination of events/circumstances that created the disaster. A hot night, open windows and doors that should act as fire breaks instead acting as a chimney, cladding that was fire safe up to a certain temp that was exceeded etc. As others have observed, it is impossible to completely eliminate risk. That doesn't mean that there aren't lessons to learned, that mistakes weren't made, people weren't negligent - none of that we will know before a senior member of the judiciary sets out, with the aid of a lot of supremely bright barristers and experts, to work out the sequence of events, the proximate cause and any underlying issues that need to be addressed.

 

We mustn't let this happen again. Our record on safety in this country is extremely good. For all the moaning about "Health and safety", when there has been major loss of life, we've adapted our procedures to reflect. Rail is a great example (eg banning of smoking on underground post Kings Cross). So too is major construction where the fatality rate is extremely low (eg CTRL). I have no doubt that an inquiry will produce robust recommendations that Government will implement.

 

David

[APOLLO]

The two buildings used a totally different method of construction.

London used concrete. NY was a steel frame.

One stood up, the other twisted with the heat after receiving a massive impact.

Bernard

 

Don't forget the third building that collapsed alongside the Twin Towers of 9/11. Tower 7 was a separate 47 story building that caught fire just after the twin towers were impacted by aircraft. It was a steel framed building, burned & collapsed 7 hours after the main towers fell. 

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7_World_Trade_Center

 

http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/design/a3524/4278874/

 

Brit15

[NorthBrit]

The two buildings used a totally different method of construction.

London used concrete. NY was a steel frame.

One stood up, the other twisted with the heat after receiving a massive impact.

Bernard

I am not arguing about anything, just passing comment.

[jjb1970]

So what do you recommend as a standard operating procedure for firefighters attending a fire in a flat today?

 

I'd recommend that the fire service does what any competent organisation does in the aftermath of an incident. Review their response and performance and consider what can be changed to improve their procedures. That can be done immediately and does not have to await the full investigation report as if considering how  to improve the operational response aspects you don't  need to know the full details of what happened.

[sulzer27jd]

Why would you ask me that? I know nothing about fire fighting, and I don't claim to. I do know a bit about problem solving and investigating events where things have behaved in unexpected manners, though.

 

My point is that if we make a hasty decision about this tragedy, we'd risk not preventing a repeat and potentially making things worse. The experts investigating this incident need to understand what the problem was before they can come up with a solution. And just doing *something* now for the sake of being seen to do something will be relying on luck.

And my point is that not everything can wait until the expert's guidance is in the public domain. You are advocating waiting and I am asking what should be done in the meantime. What should the fire service tell people who are currently worried about their homes and their lives? What should the fire service control tell a caller who is in a building where there is a fire? Stay (as is the current guidance) or leave? How does the fire service crews on the ground react and how do they adapt their procedures? 

 

Of course, we need to understand more about why the cladding reacted the way it did, but any recommended action cannot be allowed to take the length of time that these things tend to. If there is even a hint of liability, then recommendations can take years to be implemented.

[Reorte]

It's sad that improvements for health and safety are always reactive than proactive. It has to be proven to be a danger before something is done.

I'm still not certain whether everything was done in accordance with the rules or not, if not it doesn't really matter what the rules are. You can inspect and monitor to ensure compliance of course but you need to avoid becoming too police state about it.

 

If you get too proactive you run the risk of implementing all sorts of rules that might end up prohibiting unnecessarily, will almost certainly play in to the "boy who cried wolf" nanny state accusations, and still might let some things slip through the cracks. You should certainly go so far in that direction, I'm certainly not saying "assuming everything is safe until it kills someone,.

Edited June 17, 2017 by Reorte

[Nearholmer]

Clearwater

 

This is almost certainly OT, because it's probably irrelevant to this case, but an alternative to CO2 for fuel fires and electrical fires, and solid material fires in confined spaces, is the use of water fog/mist.

 

This is distinct from sprinklers, which use a high volume of water and large droplet sizes, because it uses small volumes at very tiny droplet size. It is quite amazingly effective, because the fog is drawn into the seat of the fire by the airstream feeding it, and acts to cool and smother.

 

About twenty years ago, I led a trial where we fogged an energised 11000V switchboard, to check the electrical effect and clean-up process. The earth fault protection on the board cut the supply very effectively, and we were able to dry the board and safely reenergise in about three hours. The key is that the fog doesn't soak everything, just covers it in what looks like condensation.

 

JJB will probably be able to tell us about use of these systems in ships engine rooms.

 

Kevin

[jjb1970]

We mustn't let this happen again. Our record on safety in this country is extremely good. For all the moaning about "Health and safety", when there has been major loss of life, we've adapted our procedures to reflect. Rail is a great example (eg banning of smoking on underground post Kings Cross). So too is major construction where the fatality rate is extremely low (eg CTRL). I have no doubt that an inquiry will produce robust recommendations that Government will implement.

 

David

 

Agree 100%, sadly the tombstone imperative is still with us.

[jjb1970]

There is a wide range of deluge and fire suppression systems which can be extremely effective. The water based ones fall into two types if we generalise, the traditional sprinkler type systems, and high fog/mist type systems which are more an alternative to CO2 type fire suppression systems. Some of the most effective suppression systems are gaseous and wouldn't really be suitable for domestic applications, CO2 is brilliant but if the fire doesn't get you then the CO2 will if you're in a space without BA when CO2 flooding is activated. There are also powder based systems, although they're often used more for blast suppression than fire suppression. All the technologies work on one of three basic principles - cooling, smothering or chemical interference with the reactions of the fire. I don't know much about domestic buildings but I think you'd be looking more at low pressure sprinklers which retard propagation, smoke and heat long enough for people to get out rather than the sort of high fog type suppression systems.

[jjb1970]

One point worth making is that the investigation need not take that long. If things really are as simple as our informed and temperate media is assuring us then the formal investigation would be very quick. If it is not quite that simple then obviously it'll take longer but my experience is that is professionally competent investigators are left to get on with their job they will usually prepare their preliminary findings very quickly. The wrangling over wording for the published report followed by arguments over the report very often take far longer than the actual investigation.

[sulzer27jd]

I'd recommend that the fire service does what any competent organisation does in the aftermath of an incident. Review their response and performance and consider what can be changed to improve their procedures. That can be done immediately and does not have to await the full investigation report as if considering how  to improve the operational response aspects you don't  need to know the full details of what happened.

I totally agree and that is exactly what will be happening right now. However what turned this incident from a domestic fire to a national tragedy was the reaction of the external cladding. And what is being advocated by some in this discussion is waiting (everybody) until we have an outcome from the expert investigation. That is all well and understandable, but what happens in the meantime, for those organisations that are not given the luxury of waiting. From experience, we should anticipate that any recommendations that can be interpreted as indicating any form of liability will not enter the public domain until after the legal proceedings have run their course. That could be years away. 

 

Current fire service procedures have been developed and adapted over the years, usually as a result of the sort of reflection (often post-tragedy) you rightly describe. This incident may very well tear up the entire high rise rule book. It is all very well people advocating patience and letting the experts do their work, I am simply pointing out that at some point today, somebody will need to brief their crew about going into a fire in a high-rise block. Perhaps some people should put themselves in their boots and then think about how patient they want to be.

[brian777999]

Forgive me if somebody else has mentioned this earlier but the problem with external cladding has been known about for quite some time and nobody has seen to fit to do anything about it. The authorities should have stopped any further use of the product and ordered it removed from existing buildings.

 

A report in the newspaper this morning said it does cost a lot of money to remove it from a block of apartments. Perhaps this might explain why nobody has put their name on a decision.

Edited June 17, 2017 by brian777999

[sulzer27jd]

I don't know much about domestic buildings but I think you'd be looking more at low pressure sprinklers which retard propagation, smoke and heat long enough for people to get out rather than the sort of high fog type suppression systems.

 That is exactly what they are intended to do.  TV and movie makers have done more to damage the reputation of sprinklers than anyone, often showing an entire building being flooded as a result of their use. In reality, only the activated head will allow water flow and that is usually sufficient to prevent a fire developing.