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Confessions of a Canton goods guard


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6 hours ago, The Johnster said:

I had to on one occasion, train of empty tanks behind a Peak at night in heavy rain, driver's windscreen wiper flew off into the River Wye on the bridge at Chepstow.

 

You've just reminded me of an occasion I went for a walk with my aged parents to Tutshill via the Grade I listed Town Bridge built by Rennie (then still the  A48) one sunny day, when a speedboat came roaring up the river driven by a policeman - he gave my parents a salute!

 

Strange to think that before Brunel's tubular railway bridge was completed, the Severn Tunnel also didn't exist so all the goods between South Wales and England had to be unloaded and transported by horse-drawn carts on those steep hills between Chepstow and a temporary station at Tutshill called Chepstow East.

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8 hours ago, The Johnster said:

The fire station is on the opposite side of Cowbridge Road West from it's junction with Grand Avenue, and in line of sight to the site of the crash, not much more than 100 yards away.  Am I correct in remembering that Clive had to have his leg amputated in the car as part of the process of removing him from it?

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Whilst you are correct that 'The Grand Avenue' (to give it the correct title) starts opposite the Fire Station, the accident took place between Grand Avenue 'bottom shops'  and Crossways Road, not far from, but out of sight of the fire station.

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I believe the paramedics may have adopted the course of action you describe, on the grass verge.

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The patrol car, a Ford Granada was halted by the tree, yet the engine and gear box became detached by the impact and came to rest some 5-10 yards  ahead of the police car.

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A very sad incident, and one which I used many times over the years to instill in my probationary constables that 'we are not infallible'.

.

 

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17 minutes ago, The Pilotman said:


Thanks for providing that extra detail. Based on what you’ve written, it does sound like some sort of issue with the signalling equipment somewhere. Perhaps something was being worked on at the time and the signalman was trying to cover for an error that he knew someone else had made (that certainly used to happen). Whilst I’ve never heard of an incident quite like this (a signal aspect completely at odds with the actual route set), extremely unlikely events can occur as the Clapham Junction crash demonstrated. 

The situation described by Johnster could have had far more serious consequences of course, had there been a train on the road he was diverted to.  This type of situation can happen through unintended circuits, though it is quite rare for an accident to occur.  Most accidents need more than one thing to go wrong, and many faults manifest themselves in the form of unexpected equipment behaviour not resulting in an accident.  The Inspectorate now investigate near misses as well as accidents, provided they get reported of course.

 

Clapham (1985) was a wiring error caused by a loose wire which had erroneously been left connected at one end

 

There are other accident reports though, for example ...

 

Bethnal Green derailment 1953  - points moved, technician probably allowed two links accidentally connect

Thirsk derailment 1954 - false feed to a point motor because of several electrical problems

King Edward Bridge 1962 collision - points disconnected and being worked by hand, set to goods line but signal for main still able to clear

Bethnal Green derailment 1964  - point control relay manually unlatched by technician while a train was crossing it

Barnham derailment 1962 - short circuit caused by a stray washer bridging a couple of terminals

Copyhold Junction derailment 1971 - signalman was able to move point after restoring signal because approach locking was faulty.

Waterloo collision 2017 - points not set, fault not detected because of a test wire incorrectly left in place after testing

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10 minutes ago, Michael Hodgson said:

The situation described by Johnster could have had far more serious consequences of course, had there been a train on the road he was diverted to.  This type of situation can happen through unintended circuits, though it is quite rare for an accident to occur.  Most accidents need more than one thing to go wrong, and many faults manifest themselves in the form of unexpected equipment behaviour not resulting in an accident.  The Inspectorate now investigate near misses as well as accidents, provided they get reported of course.

 

Clapham (1985) was a wiring error caused by a loose wire which had erroneously been left connected at one end

 

There are other accident reports though, for example ...

 

Bethnal Green derailment 1953  - points moved, technician probably allowed two links accidentally connect

Thirsk derailment 1954 - false feed to a point motor because of several electrical problems

King Edward Bridge 1962 collision - points disconnected and being worked by hand, set to goods line but signal for main still able to clear

Bethnal Green derailment 1964  - point control relay manually unlatched by technician while a train was crossing it

Barnham derailment 1962 - short circuit caused by a stray washer bridging a couple of terminals

Copyhold Junction derailment 1971 - signalman was able to move point after restoring signal because approach locking was faulty.

Waterloo collision 2017 - points not set, fault not detected because of a test wire incorrectly left in place after testing

.... and Dalwhinnie April 2021 - points not set correctly, .... signalling system failed to detect this because an unwanted link and a strap were not removed from the internal wiring of one of the point machines when it was replaced ....

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Plus Dalwhinnie 2021: https://www.gov.uk/raib-reports/report-10-slash-2022-wrong-side-signalling-failure-and-derailment-at-dalwhinnie-badenoch-and-strathspey - [edit - cross-post with Ian, but I'll leave the link in...]

 

And one under investigation at the moment: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/wrong-side-signalling-failure-at-wingfield

Edited by Nick C
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13 hours ago, The Johnster said:

Wiring and circuitry of MAS signalling is a mystery to me; I know what the signals did, not how they did it, but there seemed to be work going on at this relay box at all sorts of times of day and night, and I suspect that our incident was part of an ongoing issue at this location.  They were certainly hard at it later that evening, though it is only assumption on my part that whatever they were doing was connected to our incident.  Seems highly likely, though, and as I said there were other occasions when I had cause to mistrust Newport Panel.

Electrics can cause problems.

 

Back in the last Century we had a near miss at Ashchurch, (Glos) when the ground frame controlling the MoD sidings was opened to release the Class 37 on a Speedlink service into the path of a Southbound HST.

 

Very fortunately,  our shunter who was operating the ground frame, looked North up the line, saw the HST in the far distance (yellow nose and front headlights!) and was able to reset the road to trap the Speedlink service until  after the HST had passed. 

 

The road was set for the HST by Gloucester at exactly the same time that our shunter activated the frame to release the Speedlink service.

 

There was a microscopic time gap where the electrical interlocking was ineffective which allowed this to occur.

 

It was a fault that was extremely difficult to physically replicate, and was one of those 'million to one'  chances, where it may never have happened, but it could have.

 

I believe the circuitry was very quickly changed to prevent a reoccurrence.

 

 

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1 hour ago, Michael Hodgson said:

Clapham (1985) was a wiring error caused by a loose wire which had erroneously been left connected at one end


It was three years later; Monday December 12th 1988. I remember it well. 

Edited by The Pilotman
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One wonders what might have happened had the loco turned over, and it was very close to doing so.  IMHO only the good luck of a low-mileage loco with springs in perfect condition saved us.  The loads shifted in the vans and they had a slight list to starboard on the run to Newport, so the stability of the train was IMHO compromised, though not catastrophically, as a result.  If the loco had gone over on it's right hand side, we'd have both been injured or worse; I'd have probably been killed (as it was I was thrown across the cab to that side), as I would have been very close to the ground sliding past my ear at 60mph or so as the van piled up on top of me.  Ray managed to remain in his seat; he saw the turnout switched for the down recep at the last second and hung on.  We both thought we were goners.

 

It would have been a matter of his word against theirs if S & T had closed ranks (which was the culture at the time, you sorted matters out 'in house' and covered your *rses), as we discussed afterwards, and as there are plenty of documented instances of drivers misreading signals and few of misrouting/false aspects due to wiring issues and faults, and my comments would have been igored, and the weight of evidence would have been very much against us.  We would have been unable to prove to an internal inquiry that the signal showed a green aspect, and Ray's record would have been permanently blotted.  And, don't forget, Ray's initial reaction was that he'd misread the signal and it was his fault; he couldn't believe his own eyes.

 

The only evidence to support our account would have been that the train was not booked to be routed into the down recep, it was a Class 4 premium parcels under the Royal Mail contract and booked main line at line speed.

 

It was all in all a very unpleasant experience and a lucky escape from a far worse one.  I often saw work being carried out at this relay box, and frequently out of normal hours and there was clearly an ongoing issue there.

Edited by The Johnster
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1 hour ago, Happy Hippo said:

Electrics can cause problems.

 

Back in the last Century we had a near miss at Ashchurch, (Glos) when the ground frame controlling the MoD sidings was opened to release the Class 37 on a Speedlink service into the path of a Southbound HST.

 

Very fortunately,  our shunter who was operating the ground frame, looked North up the line, saw the HST in the far distance (yellow nose and front headlights!) and was able to reset the road to trap the Speedlink service until  after the HST had passed. 

 

The road was set for the HST by Gloucester at exactly the same time that our shunter activated the frame to release the Speedlink service.

 

There was a microscopic time gap where the electrical interlocking was ineffective which allowed this to occur.

 

It was a fault that was extremely difficult to physically replicate, and was one of those 'million to one'  chances, where it may never have happened, but it could have.

 

I believe the circuitry was very quickly changed to prevent a reoccurrence.

 

 

 

Mechanical interlocking systems were not immune to this sort of thing, as the head-on at Hull Paragon (1927) proved.

Edited by The Johnster
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50 minutes ago, The Johnster said:

 

Mechanical interlocking systems were not immune to this sort of thing, as the head-on at Hull Paragon (1927) proved.

Yes, but they weren't quite as sophisicated as electrical locking and thus there was more scope for signalman error to combine with design limitations (as happened at Hull).  The accident report recommended an additional (electrical) control in the form of a track circuit.

 

There was in fact another less serious collision at the same station less than a fortnight previously, caused by a train running past inner and outer homes at Danger, the driver not having route knowledge and having been incorrectly advised by his pilot driver.  The Inspector said it was preventable by Automatic Train Control (which in the 1920s should probably be interpreted as what we now call AWS)

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9 hours ago, The Pilotman said:


Thanks for providing that extra detail. Based on what you’ve written, it does sound like some sort of issue with the signalling equipment somewhere. Perhaps something was being worked on at the time and the signalman was trying to cover for an error that he knew someone else had made (that certainly used to happen). Whilst I’ve never heard of an incident quite like this (a signal aspect completely at odds with the actual route set), extremely unlikely events can occur as the Clapham Junction crash demonstrated. 

Some similarities to this derailment, probably caused by technicians doing the wrong thing, though inside the equipment room in this case.  The chain of events is consistent with someone working on the circuits and managing to reverse the points after the train put the signal signal back to red but before it reached them.  Depending on circuit design and the exact error made, the route lights could be wrong and the point out of correspondence on the panel, but the former could be explained if the signaller put the route back as soon as the train passed, and the latter if whatever fault was cleared before anyone noticed.  

 

https://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=529

Edited by Edwin_m
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7 hours ago, The Pilotman said:


Whilst I’ve never heard of an incident quite like this (a signal aspect completely at odds with the actual route set), extremely unlikely events can occur as the Clapham Junction crash demonstrated. 

Farnley Junction Leeds in 1976 or1977; a miswire in a location cabinet resulted in a clear aspect when a a crossover was reversed, which allowed a Trans - Pennine unit to collide head - on with a train stood at a signal on the opposite line, killing the driver.

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17 hours ago, 62613 said:

Farnley Junction Leeds in 1976 or1977; a miswire in a location cabinet resulted in a clear aspect when a a crossover was reversed, which allowed a Trans - Pennine unit to collide head - on with a train stood at a signal on the opposite line, killing the driver.

 

I remember this incident.

My dad worked on the railways in Leeds at the time.

I think that S&T were working in the relay cabinet when the crash happened.

The fact that the driver was in the cab and was killed was taken to show that the secondman was actually driving the train at the time.

If I recall correctly he was on the SPT to the panel when the crash occured.

 

Ian T

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22 hours ago, Happy Hippo said:

There was a microscopic time gap where the electrical interlocking was ineffective which allowed this to occur.

 

It was a fault that was extremely difficult to physically replicate, and was one of those 'million to one'  chances, where it may never have happened, but it could have.

 

I believe the circuitry was very quickly changed to prevent a reoccurrence.

Sounds like a design error.   The contacts on a relay have to open and close in the right sequence, so there is a difference between simple changeover and make-before break contacts.   Standardisation of circutry for common functions such as releases should reduce the risk of such errors creeping in.

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23 hours ago, Rivercider said:

My geography at Severn Tunnel Junction is not great, but this view from the bridge over the yard is looking east towards the Tunnel with the down hump out of sight to the right. I assume the parcels train came to a stand at one of the ground signals in view?

 

Peaks at Severn Tunnel Junction

46051 hauls fire damaged 45009 to the depot at Severn Tunnel Junction 9/9/80.

 

cheers

 

 

 

Close but no apple, Kevin; we came to a stand on the road behind the platform, at the gantry signal for which the post and lower part of the bracket can be seen behind 46051.  This was effectively the start of the down relief, permissive block as far as Magor, and not where we were supposed to be at all, we were supposed to be on the down main, the platform road, immedieately to the left.  The down hump was indeed out of shot to the right of the frame.

 

I still find it hard to believe, on my occasional forays along the M4, that there is nothing left of the down yard here, and on vestigial remains on the up side.  How could such a major hub just simply vanish like that?  Of course it's by no means the only one, but I'm familiar with this one, and can't quite get used to it not being there. 

 

On the other side of the overbridge, the road accessing the rifle range which is now beneath the motorway and some farm land, looking in the Newport direction, one would have seen the sorting sidings fanning out from the hump, which (IIRC) 4 dead-end roads between the reception/start of the down relief and the sorting sidings proper.  These were usually where we picked up down trains from, our diagrams involving this traffic being largely transfer freights for Cardiff Tidal.  These were class 8s, and often loaded up to the 60 SLU length limit, trains for East Usk or Ebbw/A.D. Junction being allowed 90 SLU if they could be guaranteed a clear road into A.D. reception from Maindee.  The Up and Down Reliefs west of Magor had a 40mph line speed, with 60mph allowed west of Ebbw Jc all the way to Pengam.  The mains were restricted to 75mph between Cardiff and The Tunnel (40mph through Newport High Street and over the bridge) because of the marshy sub-formation. 

 

Brunel had dealt with this when he built the SWR by pouring ballast in until it stopped sinking, but it continued to sink slowly and ballast is still being poured in.  It's wet under the surface as well, so as the ballast wears and more dust is produced, it results in places where the limestone ballast (from Penderyn or Coleford mostly) pumps a sort of light grey limey slurry when the weight of a train passes over it (eventually the track is damaged and has to be replaced).  This would be felt on the loco as a solid drop of what felt like about a foot, as the springs bottomed out because the ballast was completely failing to function as a load spreader at that point; this could be quite alarming on high mileage engines with worn springs, particularly 47s!  HSTs were allowed 90mph.  I remember one driver suggesting to me that it might be worth using Meldon Granite ballast, until I pointed out with all the authority of a sixth form geologist that wet granite degrades into China Clay, which would not have been helpful in this instance!

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4 minutes ago, The Johnster said:

 

 I remember one driver suggesting to me that it might be worth using Meldon Granite ballast, until I pointed out with all the authority of a sixth form geologist that wet granite degrades into China Clay, which would not have been helpful in this instance!

 

 

Perhaps not, but it does take a fair while to do so..... 😄

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Interesting the pumping effect. About 2 months ago there was a YouTube filmette taken at Cardiff Central (possibly by Colin Prosser who is a regular there) showing a freight train (don't recall the consist) passing rather unusually along the Platform 2 road and you could see quite clearly a jet of slurry hitting the underside of the leading bogie of the loco. There is also a joint along that same section of track that gives at a definite 'clacketty-clack' when passenger stock rolls over it on approach ready to pick up for a departure to London (usually).

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These are a couple of other views I took from the bridge over Severn Tunnel Junction. I have previously posted them on RMweb, but  I think they have disappeared into the ether.

 

Severn Tunnel Junction Down Hump

 

The down hump at Severn Tunnel Junction looking east. Pilot 08932 has just finished a shunt and a pair of bitumen tanks roll down the hump. 9/9/80

 

Looking the other way off the bridge, to the west down towards Newport and Cardiff

Severn Tunnel Junction Down Yard

A view of the down yard, with the diesel depot across the main lines . 6/6/83.

 

Another view looking west (correction - sorry)

 

31424 passes Severn Tunnel Junction

I think, from the previous posts that the upside traincrew relief point is the loops where two class 25s are standing with a bitumen train, with 45033 beside them with the 08.45 service for Hallen Marsh.

31424 passes Severn Tunnel Junction with 08.15 Cardiff Central to Portsmouth Harbour. 9/9/80

 

cheers

 

Edited by Rivercider
correction of one caption, looking west not east.
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1 hour ago, Dunsignalling said:

 

Perhaps not, but it does take a fair while to do so..... 😄

And Meldon ballast is not actually granite, but another metamorphic rock known as hornfels.

 

cheers

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3 hours ago, Rivercider said:

 

These are a couple of other views I took from the bridge over Severn Tunnel Junction. I have previously posted them on RMweb, but  I think they have disappeared into the ether.

 

Severn Tunnel Junction Down Hump

 

The down hump at Severn Tunnel Junction looking east. Pilot 08932 has just finished a shunt and a pair of bitumen tanks roll down the hump. 9/9/80

 

Looking the other way off the bridge, to the west down towards Newport and Cardiff

Severn Tunnel Junction Down Yard

A view of the down yard, with the diesel depot across the main lines . 6/6/83.

 

Another view looking west (correction - sorry)

 

31424 passes Severn Tunnel Junction

I think, from the previous posts that the upside traincrew relief point is the loops where two class 25s are standing with a bitumen train, with 45033 beside them with the 08.45 service for Hallen Marsh.

31424 passes Severn Tunnel Junction with 08.15 Cardiff Central to Portsmouth Harbour. 9/9/80

 

cheers

 

In the top photo the two lines behind the hump control cabin were used as reception lines avoiding the hump to get to the west end of the yard with a hand signal from the rear of the cabin . The two  reception lines for trains out of the tunnel were shorter than the other reception roads and trains had to draw past the hump connection to the next signal , the hump pilot having to draw the train back prior to propelling over the hump , and being the only two roads from the tunnel were always humped as a priority to keep clear . In the second shot the hard standing is the site of the Powell Dyffryn wagon shops

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7 hours ago, Rivercider said:

 

31424 passes Severn Tunnel Junction

I think, from the previous posts that the upside traincrew relief point is the loops where two class 25s are standing with a bitumen train, with 45033 beside them with the 08.45 service for Hallen Marsh.

31424 passes Severn Tunnel Junction with 08.15 Cardiff Central to Portsmouth Harbour. 9/9/80

 

That's right.  This was also where trains were held for examination before being allowed to proceed through The Tunnel (it is called The Tunnel in the same way that the Forth Bridge is called 'The Bridge').  On the Welsh side, trains starting from Ebbw/A.D. Jc and East Usk yards and running through The Tunnel were not required to have examination here, and on the English side those from Stoke Gifford, Bristol East & Bristol West Depot, and Temple Meads Goods were similarly 'excused'.  At Pilning, the down loop was where trains from further afield were examined, and there were several sidings kicking back off it that were used to accommodate any cripples.

 

To the left of the 31 are the up SW main, down SW main, and the through road that was the start of the down relief, with the dead-end roads next, followed by the down hump sorting sidings.  The down yard shunter's cabin can be seen in the distance just to the left in the frame of the nearest floodlighting tower.

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