WCRC - the ongoing battle with ORR.

[black and decker boy]

19 minutes ago, john new said:

Aren’t they (47s) 75mph locomotives everywhere these days. 
 

AIUI, the ETH 47s are still generally 95mph rated.

[john new]

5 hours ago, adb968008 said:

Perhaps railtour tickets themselves need to come with insurance ?

 

A lot of things went wrong here aiui..

 

1. the 86 had issues (not neccessarily wcrcs fault as its privately owned) and delayed the whole day
2. the 47 on the rear aiui wasnt 100mph, (75mph restricted ive read mentioned, and was added at NR insistence).

3. The incident at Preston

4. The cancelation of the 2000 to Euston (thus depriving the last ride home).

5. Engineering works closing the route back.

The combination of events shares blame across Network Rail, the 86 owner, Wcrc and Avanti to fail the end passenger.

 

(I put Avanti as I understand operators are supposed to help each other, but theres was canceled).

 

It wasnt one single event but a series of isolated ones that lead to a culmulative events for the passenger.

 

 

 

 

I think that blame is a bit strong, although responsibility across those involved rather than specifically Network Rail would be better wording. Viewing it from a pax perspective.

 

Some one has also suggested bussing from Preston, that assumes there were/are enough coaches/buses available WITH SPARE DRIVERS able to do a London round trip without overrunning drivers hours.

 

For what it is worth I would also bung in a (6). Tours too long to avoid ludicrously start finish times for pax even when all goes to plan. Consequence when you push to the margins there is very little wriggle room when something goes wrong.

 

Edited January 29 by john new
Deleting duplicated word.

[rodent279]

So if I understand correctly, the 86 (allegedly) overran a set of points that were set against it, yet (allegedly) didn't SPAD. How is that possible? Surely the signal is there to prevent unauthorised movement over those points?

[BoD]

I wonder if the RAIB will be taking a look at this one.

Does anyone know what their criteria/threshold is for deciding when to investigate or not?

[Darius43]

2 hours ago, john new said:

I think that blame is a bit strong, although responsibility across those involved rather than specifically Network Rail would be better wording. Viewing it from a pax perspective.

 

Some one has also suggested bussing from Preston, that assumes there were/are enough coaches/buses available WITH SPARE DRIVERS able to do a London round trip without overrunning drivers hours.

 

For what it is worth I would also bung in a (6). Tours too long to avoid ludicrously start finish times for pax even when all goes to plan. Consequence when you push to the margins there is very little wriggle room when something goes wrong.

 

I totally concur.  Living in Worthing, I would need to book hotel accommodation for the nights before and after a Cumbrian Mountains express tour from London - or any other one departing London before 7am and returning after 11pm.  Not really an option so I and my railtour friends restrict ourselves to trips starting and finishing at “sensible” times.

 

Cheers

 

Darius

[black and decker boy]

2 hours ago, rodent279 said:

So if I understand correctly, the 86 (allegedly) overran a set of points that were set against it, yet (allegedly) didn't SPAD. How is that possible? Surely the signal is there to prevent unauthorised movement over those points?

Stated elsewhere that the loco hadn’t set back far enough so hadn’t passed the signal before stopping and after changing ends, set off believing an adjacent line signal was  for them so technically haven’t passed a signal at danger.

[johnofwessex]

The problem I suppose is that the loco hadn't passed a signal..............

[black and decker boy]

Also stated that the driver was relieved and did not complete the diagram 

[adb968008]

1 hour ago, black and decker boy said:

Stated elsewhere that the loco hadn’t set back far enough so hadn’t passed the signal before stopping and after changing ends, set off believing an adjacent line signal was  for them so technically haven’t passed a signal at danger.

But yet the points where changed… despite the loco being on the wrong side of the signal, and I would presume still in an occupied section behind that signal as a result.

 

how does that happen ?

what would have happened if it didnt move and the other train crossed over it ?..

 

I am puzzled at this ?

Edited January 29 by adb968008

[newbryford]

9 minutes ago, adb968008 said:

But yet the points where changed… despite the loco being on the wrong side of the signal, and I would presume still in an occupied section behind that signal as a result.

 

how does that happen ?

what would have happened if it didnt move and the other train crossed over it ?..

 

I am puzzled at this ?

 

Presumably the report will detail what happened..

Until then, presumption helps no-one.

[The Stationmaster]

23 hours ago, phil-b259 said:

Correct.

 

Though things are confusing it’s not a SPAD as such because the loco involved didn’t actual go far enough to be behind a signal which applied tho their line in the first place!

 

It seems like the loco stopped short and after the driver changed ends they went and took a signal which actually applied to a different line as ‘theirs’ and seeing it was at a proceed moved off back towards the station.

 

This short of thing (if true) demonstrates why drivers NEED up to date and accurate route knowledge…..

I'm sorry Phil but I'm not with you on this.  If the loco hadn't reached the protecting signal how did it manage to run through some points because surely the signal in rear woiuld have been at danger if there were points in advance of it not correctly set?   So was it a handpoint in a siding or what exactly was it?    If the Driver misread and took another signal as applying to him he must surely have passed the protecting signal for his line in order to run through the points - how could it happen otherwise?

 

To be honest it sounds a bit like e the old Saltley problem - although there it was due to GPLs being on the wrong' side of the line they applied to.  This led to Drivers not very familiar with the place, especially Eastleigh men, taking a GPL as theirs when it wasn't and duly SPADing and running through points or hitting something that was making a legitimate move

 

Incidentally the expression 'behind the signal' is one of the most dangerously ambiguous terms I have ever come across and use of it has killed a few people over the years.  Unfortunately the current 'kiddiwinks reading age' version of the Rule Book dispensed with the terms 'in advance' and 'in rear' in the cause of 'plain English' (the same people who wanted the Rules to use the term 'faraway signal' instead of distant signal)

 

This incident  might however possibly take us back to WCRCs unfortunate past habit of not properly managing Drivers - assuming that it was their Driver.  But whoever the Driver belonged to he should have known the road and the layout and driven accordingly and it woud appear from what is being said that he did not do so.  That is a serious offence and probably still amounts to a Category A SPAD so the Driver would have to e relieved and taken off the job

[The Stationmaster]

15 hours ago, black and decker boy said:

Stated elsewhere that the loco hadn’t set back far enough so hadn’t passed the signal before stopping and after changing ends, set off believing an adjacent line signal was  for them so technically haven’t passed a signal at danger.

That is absolutely, frighteningly, laughable - what kind of halfwits were  - A. Driving the loco, and B, Controlling the movement ?   And misreading used to count as a category A SPAD and it might well (I sincerely hope) still count as one.

 

17 hours ago, BoD said:

I wonder if the RAIB will be taking a look at this one.

Does anyone know what their criteria/threshold is for deciding when to investigate or not?

Interesting one this.  SPADs are reportable, in bulk, monthly  (so therefore not immediately reportableor within X hours etc unless the SPAD results in something worse).   So the interesting question then arises about the status of the incident.  Misreading (a signal), which seems to be being claimed as what happened in this incident, used to be considered a serious SPAD.  I don't know if that is still the case but I'd be somewhat worried if it isn't.

 

So on the basis of my rathert dated knowledge it would have been reported to RAIB as part of a bulk return.  However if RAIB are keeping an eye on wider railway events there is maybe enough discussion on the 'net about this incident to ring their 'WCRC alarm bell' and they will be making discreet enquiries about the incident especially about whose Driver was involved.

 

If RAIB deoes not become involved the incident will be dealt with solely within the railway industry and no report is normally made public

[phil-b259]

18 minutes ago, The Stationmaster said:

I'm sorry Phil but I'm not with you on this.  If the loco hadn't reached the protecting signal how did it manage to run through some points because surely the signal in rear woiuld have been at danger if there were points in advance of it not correctly set?   

Train Opperated Route Release, if fitted, will release a route in sections behind a movement. Thus it’s entirely possible to set a second opposing route as it were which uses those same points thus speeding up train throughput.
 

As such I can well imagine a situation where the section of route through pointwork has released behind the incident loco  (allowing points to be swung and routes set over them) even if the loco hasn’t fully completed its signalled move from one signal to another.

 

Without knowledge of the actual layout or the control tables for the interlocking, nor any actual replay of what the interlocking saw it is rather difficult to rule anything out though - and I suspect the incident won’t be seen as one the RAIB will need to get involved in so we are unlikely to get the complete story.

 

All that has come out is (1) the loco didn’t go far enough along the route and failed to stop behind the signal they should have done plus (2) Upon changing ends the driver saw a signal showing a proceed and assumed it applied to his line rather than an adjacent one. The driver then set of and ran through a set of points which were not set correctly due to the signaller not having set a route for that movement.

[Reorte]

30 minutes ago, The Stationmaster said:

Incidentally the expression 'behind the signal' is one of the most dangerously ambiguous terms I have ever come across and use of it has killed a few people over the years. Unfortunately the current 'kiddiwinks reading age' version of the Rule Book dispensed with the terms 'in advance' and 'in rear' in the cause of 'plain English' (the same people who wanted the Rules to use the term 'faraway signal' instead of distant signal)

I've argued before that, in terms of general English, that they're both equally ambiguous. It's the industry standard of what exactly a term means that makes it unambiguous rather than the language itself; from a pure language point of view "behind" and "in rear" would normally be regarded as synonymous, and it still wouldn't be clear to the non-railway layman what that means; it's the well-established industry definition that everyone who needs to know does know that makes it unambiguous.

 

This is why it's important that people joining an industry learn the terms the industry uses and sticks with them, and they aren't changed, or others used, without an extremely good reason. Those who complain about "jargon" frequently don't understand exactly why it's there, because general language is usually imprecise and it removes that lack of precision (or in some cases means one word can be used instead of a dozen).

 

The idea that the replacement terms are somehow simpler English is pretty laughable anyway.

[keefer]

I'd suggest that an even simpler case than 'in advance/rear of' would be whether a signal is 'on' or 'off' - i think most people not aware of railway terms would think signal off=at danger/stop, signal on=cleared/go

[phil-b259]

14 hours ago, adb968008 said:

But yet the points where changed… despite the loco being on the wrong side of the signal, and I would presume still in an occupied section behind that signal as a result.

 

how does that happen ?

what would have happened if it didnt move and the other train crossed over it ?..

 

I am puzzled at this ?

Given the nature of the layout at somewhere like Preston a route from signal ‘A’ to signal ‘D’ will pass through a lot of different track circuits.

 

Each track circuit will have a route locking relay and when a route is set all these route locking relays will lock all points and prevent conflicting routes etc.

 

However if we wait until the train has fully completed its route before we release these route locking relays you tie up the layout for quite a while - and on a busy area this is undesirable as it constrains train throughput.

 

So what most modern signalling installations (particularly those covering complicated / large layouts) will have is something called ‘Train Opperated Route Releasing’ - know as TORR for short.

 

With TORR, the interlocking does not have to wait until a movement is fully completed before it can release those route locking relays. Instead the interlocking looks for the sequential occupation and clearing of track circuits to effectively monitor the train as it moves through the route. Assuming the track circuits operate and clear in the correct manor then they will trigger the release of the route locking relays behind the train.
 

This means that the train can still be passing through the last few track circuits / points at the end of its route but the track circuits at the start of its route are clear and free of route locking so the points under them may be swung and new routes set across them.

 

 

 

[Oldddudders]

TORRS is quite fun to watch on a complicated layout on an NX panel. First, the signaller 'strips up' the route, using the entry and exit buttons, the route typically now shown with a set of white lights, and after checking, the interlocking clears signals as appropriate. The train then proceeds along the route, typically turning the white of the set route to red as it occupies each track circuit. Then, as Phil says, the TORRS drops sections of the route as each track circuits clear behind the train, leaving those sections available for setting an alternative route. This is very worthwhile in busy areas!

[Jeremy Cumberland]

25 minutes ago, keefer said:

i think most people not aware of railway terms would think signal off=at danger/stop, signal on=cleared/go

Agreed. It is something I usually have to teach new starters on the heritage railway where I volunteer. Having seen this, I now try to avoid these terms when I am unsure of my audience (and when they don't need to be taught). These, at least, are easy enough to avoid ("clear" and "at danger/caution" are obvious alternatives). "In advance" and "in rear" can only be replaced with some other specialist term which seems just as likely - or more likely - to be misunderstood.

[beast66606]

48 minutes ago, phil-b259 said:

Train Opperated Route Release, if fitted, will release a route in sections behind a movement. Thus it’s entirely possible to set a second opposing route as it were which uses those same points thus speeding up train throughput.
 

 

Warrington, of a similar vintage (50 years) is not fitted with TORR, not sure about Preston but I'd guess not unless the interlocking has been updated.

[jjb1970]

Definitions are critical, terms should be clearly and unambiguously defined and providing this is the case and people are instructed then it is not unusual for terms to be used in regulatory requirements and rules in ways which would not make much sense to a normal person. For example, in IMO regulations for engine certification natural gas is within the definition of fuel oil.

[Oldddudders]

9 minutes ago, beast66606 said:

 

Warrington, of a similar vintage (50 years) is not fitted with TORR, not sure about Preston but I'd guess not unless the interlocking has been updated.

My observation was about London Bridge, commissioned in 1976, so slightly newer. Having spent a few months as a temporary supernumerary Traffic Regulator, I had plenty of time to watch stuff!

[The Stationmaster]

2 hours ago, phil-b259 said:

Train Opperated Route Release, if fitted, will release a route in sections behind a movement. Thus it’s entirely possible to set a second opposing route as it were which uses those same points thus speeding up train throughput.
 

As such I can well imagine a situation where the section of route through pointwork has released behind the incident loco  (allowing points to be swung and routes set over them) even if the loco hasn’t fully completed its signalled move from one signal to another.

 

Without knowledge of the actual layout or the control tables for the interlocking, nor any actual replay of what the interlocking saw it is rather difficult to rule anything out though - and I suspect the incident won’t be seen as one the RAIB will need to get involved in so we are unlikely to get the complete story.

 

All that has come out is (1) the loco didn’t go far enough along the route and failed to stop behind the signal they should have done plus (2) Upon changing ends the driver saw a signal showing a proceed and assumed it applied to his line rather than an adjacent one. The driver then set of and ran through a set of points which were not set correctly due to the signaller not having set a route for that movement.

That sounds like very odd locking if a signal section is still occupied and points within it can be reset to conflict with the movement that is in that section.  One thing where a train si going on its way  in a very busy area where pre-releasing can havea. value in traffic movement but- very different when yo re shunting a light engine about

 

If the Driver had not moved to the correct place priotr to reversing it was down to either him or any other person in charge of the movement.  And if the Driver took, for whatever reason, a signal which did not apply to the line on which his loco was standing that is SPASD due to misreading (unless things have changed).  and clearly someone in authority would seem to have adopted that view because he was taken off (as he indeed should have been).

 

But once again this dangerously sloppy term 'behind the signal' appears.  What on earth does it mean?  if anyone had had given me that answer in a Rules & Regs exam theywould have been told that it was stupid and that as it was dangerous use of words they wouldn't be doing much until they returned properly prepared for examination.  It fou look back in HMRI Reports , usually where someone on the ground had been killed, you will find use of that term very forcibly condemned

 

 

Edited January 30 by The Stationmaster

[phil-b259]

8 minutes ago, The Stationmaster said:

That sounds like very odd locking if a signal section is still occupied and points within it can be reset to conflict with the movement that is in that section.

 

It’s not odd as you put it - the whole point of TORR (or sectional route release if the releasing is done by the signaller manually cancelling the route behind the train) is that the interlocking only releases the route when it believes the train has occupied and cleared a particular track circuit and it is therefore available to be used by other movements.

 

If follows there can never be any conflict - if there was then the route would remain set until danger was no longer present.

 

Moreover there has never been any restriction on signalmen moving points once they have verified a train has passed the points in question, particularly in areas of intensive services.

[Reorte]

7 hours ago, The Stationmaster said:

(the same people who wanted the Rules to use the term 'faraway signal' instead of distant signal)

Which might be confused with "small signal." :D

[Grovenor]

Sectional route release, TORR or not is a hazard in any area where shunt moves occur and thus a train/loco may reverse in section, and the route releasing should be designed with that in mind.