Prototype for everything corner.

[w124bob]

We now have proof that our models with lights are actually correct. Who says the rear lights need turned off when hauling a train! I found this on a video on Youtube.

IMG_5038.PNG

Forgot to press f2

[keefer]

out of interest, what would the procedure be for that situation?

i was going to say 'signalman to contact next box to stop and inform driver', but these days there might not be a 'next box' or a signalman who can actually physically see the train?

[iands]

The "Signaller" could contact the driver via the GSMR. But more than likely, as signallers these days control much larger areas than previously, if it was important enough, would stop the train at the most appropriate location and inform the driver.

 

Regards, Ian.

[melmerby]

Apart from large stations with observant staff or lineside trackworkers who is around these days to see incorrect light settings?

The signalling centres can be anywhere and don't even need to see the railway!

 

A train could travel from A to B which could be a considerable mileage without anyone noticing.

 

Keith

[big jim]

Apart from large stations with observant staff or lineside trackworkers who is around these days to see incorrect light settings?

The signalling centres can be anywhere and don't even need to see the railway!

 

A train could travel from A to B which could be a considerable mileage without anyone noticing.

 

Keith

I went from Derby to Clapham jn via the MML, north london line and lots of other london suburban lines with a loco with no lights on at all after an MCB tripped and I never noticed while changing ends in derby, including stopping to pick up a route conductor at Leicester and no one noticed/reported it until Clapham town station!

[Chameleon]

I saw a unit following us into Glasgow central with red lights on the front. Must have gone the whole journey from wherever it was like that and noone had picked it up. No signalboxes and very few manned stations to spot it.

Cue frantic flashing of my own taillights to warn him. He changed them over just as we passed gantry A at the end of the station.

[The Johnster]

This highlights a potential problem with modern operation from signalling centres/panel boxes controlling large areas and sometimes with no clear view of the trains that pass them when they do get there; indeed, many trains never pass a signalbox of any form at all these days and, if incorrectly lamped, rely on other staff to alert their drivers to the situation.  At quiet times and at night there may be no staff about for 100 miles or so!

 

Does it matter?  Not until an accident results from it!

 

Imagined scenario: train fails in section between signals and driver requests assistance in rear by mobile phone.  His tail light is out, a situation of which he is unaware.  It is a damp, misty night, and despite his road knowledge he has misidentified the road bridge the train has come to a stand under and the signalling centre thinks he is a quarter of a mile further along than he actually is.  The following train is stopped at the section signal and advised to pass it at danger and proceed with caution to the assumed location of the failure.  The assisting train's driver is of course expecting to be able to clearly see the failure's tail light.  The failure's driver, or the guard, now walks back with detonators to protect.

 

The assisting train approaches at around 40 mph, which will prove too fast, and sees the protection's handlamp and shuts off power, but still thinks the failed train is a quarter mile further away than it actually is.  He fires off the first detonators, realises the situation, and hits the brakes hard, but the wheels slide on the greasy rail and falling gradient so he releases them just as he becomes aware that the next road bridge has a train under it; he re-applies the brakes but they pick up again, and he hits the train at about 20mph, fast enough to cause whiplash injuries to passengers and damage both trains.  A passenger with a heart condition is so upset as to suffer a fatal heart attack.

 

Part of accident prevention is imagining situations like this.  Events have a nasty habit of defeating any electrical, electronic, mechanical, or human system to prevent accidents, and the failure's driver's inability to correctly locate his position is tragic, but understandable in the conditions and has happened to all of us at one time or another.  The fault is this and the assisting driver's speed, which is excessive in the conditions but he believes the failure to be further away and is looking for a tail light which is not there, so one can sympathise a little with him as well; a board of inquiry may be less understanding...  It might have been better in this particular instance if the signalling centre had not told the assisting driver where they thought the train was, which might have led it's driver to approach with more caution at a lower speed.  He is only trying to help and there is pressure to clear the line, but the definition of 'proceed with caution' should be taken to mean 'at a speed consistent with being able to stop the train within the distance you can clearly see ahead'; the misinformation, misty night, greasy rail, and lack of a tail light have conspired to defeat the system, and the removal of any one of those factors would have prevented the accident. 

Edited November 5, 2017 by The Johnster

[iands]

This highlights a potential problem with modern operation from signalling centres/panel boxes controlling large areas and sometimes with no clear view of the trains that pass them when they do get there; indeed, many trains never pass a signalbox of any form at all these days and, if incorrectly lamped, rely on other staff to alert their drivers to the situation. At quiet times and at night there may be no staff about for 100 miles or so!

 

Does it matter? Not until an accident results from it!

 

Imagined scenario: train fails in section between signals and driver requests assistance in rear by mobile phone. His tail light is out, a situation of which he is unaware. It is a damp, misty night, and despite his road knowledge he has misidentified the road bridge the train has come to a stand under and the signalling centre thinks he is a quarter of a mile further along than he actually is. The following train is stopped at the section signal and advised to pass it at danger and proceed with caution to the assumed location of the failure. The assisting train's driver is of course expecting to be able to clearly see the failure's tail light. The failure's driver, or the guard, now walks back with detonators to protect.

 

The assisting train approaches at around 40 mph, which will prove too fast, and sees the protection's handlamp and shuts off power, but still thinks the failed train is a quarter mile further away than it actually is. He fires off the first detonators, realises the situation, and hits the brakes hard, but the wheels slide on the greasy rail and falling gradient so he releases them just as he becomes aware that the next road bridge has a train under it; he re-applies the brakes but they pick up again, and he hits the train at about 20mph, fast enough to cause whiplash injuries to passengers and damage both trains. A passenger with a heart condition is so upset as to suffer a fatal heart attack.

 

Part of accident prevention is imagining situations like this. Events have a nasty habit of defeating any electrical, electronic, mechanical, or human system to prevent accidents, and the failure's driver's inability to correctly locate his position is tragic, but understandable in the conditions and has happened to all of us at one time or another. The fault is this and the assisting driver's speed, which is excessive in the conditions but he believes the failure to be further away and is looking for a tail light which is not there, so one can sympathise a little with him as well; a board of inquiry may be less understanding... It might have been better in this particular instance if the signalling centre had not told the assisting driver where they thought the train was, which might have led it's driver to approach with more caution at a lower speed. He is only trying to help and there is pressure to clear the line, but the definition of 'proceed with caution' should be taken to mean 'at a speed consistent with being able to stop the train within the distance you can clearly see ahead'; the misinformation, misty night, greasy rail, and lack of a tail light have conspired to defeat the system, and the removal of any one of those factors would have prevented the accident.

 

A purely hypothetical scenario, yes? Why wouldn't the driver/guard going to place the protection at the rear of the failed train check the tail light? As the train has failed between signals, wouldn't this give an indication to the driver as to where the train is stood? How did the driver/guard contact the signaller to obtain assistance? Lineside telephones all have location details in them, and the 'phone circuits calling into the signal box are clearly identified on the telephone concentrator. Also, the occupied track circuit would be indicated on the panel/screen. Yes, this could well be a scenario on a section of line operated under Absolute Block rules, but there aren't many of those left today. I'm not saying such an occurrence couldn't happen in the way you describe, but with today's modern control and communications systems in place it is far less likely than say 20 years ago.

 

Regards, Ian.

 

Self edit: Just realised that you stated the driver contacts the signaller via mobile phone - why? The mobile phone should be the last means of contacting the signaller, unless of course you forgot to add into the mix that all linesdie phones and the GSMR had all failed?

 

Regards, Ian.

Edited November 5, 2017 by iands

[big jim]

The johnster, Have you ever though you over think things?

Edited November 5, 2017 by big jim

[jonny777]

Now, I am not sure about anything in this photo; but it would look good on a model. 

 

I can't identify the Peak, and can't see enough of the train to know if it is heavy enough to warrant two brake tenders. I can't read the writing on the brake van, and the last vehicle in shot appears to be a motor driving coach from some elderly electric unit. 

 

I have no idea of the location, except that the older signals look to be of MR origin. 

 

 

[russ p]

Is that langham junction?

[big jim]

It could possibly be that the ‘elderly unit’ is unbraked and the rulebook requires/required that the first and last 3 vehicles of the formation be braked to provide enough brake force, still happens today with the likes of the Lul s-stock moves to and from derby

[russ p]

Looks like one of the DC units used on the Watford DC lines or a Morecambe unit

The rear would just have a van as unlike today's air pipes there were no portable through vacuum pipes

[jonny777]

The date for this is given as December 1977, so if anyone has a decent "news" magazine from that time I would be interested to know if there are any details of who was having a clearout and which to scrapyard the train was heading.

 

A second image identifies the next unit in the consist as being a 2-BIL (I think), in green livery with the old BR multiple unit symbols on the sides. 

Edited November 5, 2017 by jonny777

[jonny777]

And now that I have a little more time, here it is - 

 

 

[jonny777]

And a third slide turns out to prove that the truth really is stranger than fiction. 

 

 

[billbedford]

And now that I have a little more time, here it is - 

 

 

2-bil rutland 3:12:77.jpg

 

 

That first carriage is an ex-LNWR Oerilkon motor driver.

 

The last carriage looks to be in LSWR livery, It could be research red/blue, but the roof profile looks wrong.

 

Could this be a train taking withdrawn stock to the NRM?

Edited November 5, 2017 by billbedford

[russ p]

Was this when Preston park was cleared? Definitely looks like Langham junction

[30851]

And now that I have a little more time, here it is - 

 

 

2-bil rutland 3:12:77.jpg

 

Not that I am an expert on these but I would guess this is the remains of 4 Sub 4308 (motor coaches 8143/8144) which had been stored in 'as-withdrawn' condition for preservation in York until 1977. In 1977 it was taken for restoration - well 8143 was, 8144 was cannibalised to provide parts and then scrapped.

 

Rob

[jonny777]

I think it is the wrong bodyside profile for a 4-SUB, plus the window shapes are all different to those units. 

 

 

4-SUB 

 

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3c/SR_4-sub_4101.jpg

Edited November 5, 2017 by jonny777

[30851]

I think it is the wrong bodyside profile for a 4-SUB, plus the window shapes are all different to those units. 

 

 

4-SUB 

 

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3c/SR_4-sub_4101.jpg

 

Well I should have said it was originally a 3-SUB converted to a 4-SUB at some point. This is what 8143 looks like now

 

http://www.cs.vintagecarriagestrust.org/se/CarriageInfo.asp?Ref=538

 

 

Rob

[royaloak]

This highlights a potential problem with modern operation from signalling centres/panel boxes controlling large areas and sometimes with no clear view of the trains that pass them when they do get there; indeed, many trains never pass a signalbox of any form at all these days and, if incorrectly lamped, rely on other staff to alert their drivers to the situation.  At quiet times and at night there may be no staff about for 100 miles or so!

 

Does it matter?  Not until an accident results from it!

 

Imagined scenario: train fails in section between signals and driver requests assistance in rear by mobile phone.  His tail light is out, a situation of which he is unaware.  It is a damp, misty night, and despite his road knowledge he has misidentified the road bridge the train has come to a stand under and the signalling centre thinks he is a quarter of a mile further along than he actually is.  The following train is stopped at the section signal and advised to pass it at danger and proceed with caution to the assumed location of the failure.  The assisting train's driver is of course expecting to be able to clearly see the failure's tail light.  The failure's driver, or the guard, now walks back with detonators to protect.

 

The assisting train approaches at around 40 mph, which will prove too fast, and sees the protection's handlamp and shuts off power, but still thinks the failed train is a quarter mile further away than it actually is.  He fires off the first detonators, realises the situation, and hits the brakes hard, but the wheels slide on the greasy rail and falling gradient so he releases them just as he becomes aware that the next road bridge has a train under it; he re-applies the brakes but they pick up again, and he hits the train at about 20mph, fast enough to cause whiplash injuries to passengers and damage both trains.  A passenger with a heart condition is so upset as to suffer a fatal heart attack.

 

Part of accident prevention is imagining situations like this.  Events have a nasty habit of defeating any electrical, electronic, mechanical, or human system to prevent accidents, and the failure's driver's inability to correctly locate his position is tragic, but understandable in the conditions and has happened to all of us at one time or another.  The fault is this and the assisting driver's speed, which is excessive in the conditions but he believes the failure to be further away and is looking for a tail light which is not there, so one can sympathise a little with him as well; a board of inquiry may be less understanding...  It might have been better in this particular instance if the signalling centre had not told the assisting driver where they thought the train was, which might have led it's driver to approach with more caution at a lower speed.  He is only trying to help and there is pressure to clear the line, but the definition of 'proceed with caution' should be taken to mean 'at a speed consistent with being able to stop the train within the distance you can clearly see ahead'; the misinformation, misty night, greasy rail, and lack of a tail light have conspired to defeat the system, and the removal of any one of those factors would have prevented the accident. 

I would hope that a driver who drove the train in that manner would be thrown off the railways forever!

[iands]

I would hope that a driver who drove the train in that manner would be thrown off the railways forever!

Yet there are some similarities in the above 'scenario' with the accident at Lunan Bay in 1975. The guard of the failed train, after protecting his train in the rear, rang the signalman and gave incorrect location details. The signalman passed this info on to the driver of the rescuing loco. All three thought the train was further along the line than it actually was, after expolding the dets and then seeing the rear of the train in front of him (and not where he was expecting see it), the driver could not prevent a rear-end smash.

 

Would you stiil throw the driver off the railway? Or perhaps the guard for giving incorrect information? Or the signalman for not double checking the location of the guard and the train? Or maybe even all three?

 

Easy to blame the driver for excessive speed, but all factors have to be taken into account - which is why we have inquiries/investigations.

 

Regards, Ian.

[The Johnster]

Yes; as i said, most (probably all) of us who have been involved in working trains have made similar mistakes and got away with it, which is mostly what happens, and it is very easy to criticise from a warm dry sitting room when you have not actually experienced the disorientation and uncertainty life out in the dark on a mucky misty night, never mind the ultimate confusion of fog.  Route knowledge is vital, but humans are not perfect and, while the systems designed to protect them from their imperfections are good, they are not perfect either, mostly because they are designed, built, and maintained by humans...

 

The driver in my example, who royaloak wants to throw off the railway, is driving at a low speed and has been given incorrect information about the train he is looking for, which he can hardly be blamed for.  This in turn is the result of a genuine mistake by the other driver who can also hardly be blamed; it is a dark and misty night.  All staff have carried out the correct procedures, yet an accident has occurred and a life has been lost, as well as several injuries being sustained.  They may well be facing dismissal or disciplinary procedures.  Do you drive a car, royaloak?  Do you always know exactly where you are, do you always drive it within the bounds of legality, and is it always in a 100% roadworthy condition in all situations?

 

Little bit of tolerance, please!

[royaloak]

Yet there are some similarities in the above 'scenario' with the accident at Lunan Bay in 1975. The guard of the failed train, after protecting his train in the rear, rang the signalman and gave incorrect location details. The signalman passed this info on to the driver of the rescuing loco. All three thought the train was further along the line than it actually was, after expolding the dets and then seeing the rear of the train in front of him (and not where he was expecting see it), the driver could not prevent a rear-end smash.

 

Would you stiil throw the driver off the railway? Or perhaps the guard for giving incorrect information? Or the signalman for not double checking the location of the guard and the train? Or maybe even all three?

 

Easy to blame the driver for excessive speed, but all factors have to be taken into account - which is why we have inquiries/investigations.

 

Regards, Ian.

Lessons should have been learned after Lunan Bay, especially after Lunan Bay because that incident highlighted a lot of the problems which could occur.

That was then and this is now and a lot of the things that were a daily occurrence then would result in being sacked today.