NR suspend WCRC from tonight

[Glorious NSE]

Paul, I wasn't reporting a "conversation", I was commenting from what was said in the initial NR report which it says the info was taken from the equipment. I don't know what happened on the footplate that lead to the isolation of the equipment, however I believe to blame management "shortcomings" as some people are misses the point that actually it could be that the footplate crew were fully compliant and just ignored the Rules in this case (as happened at that incident in East Anglia)...

 

Sorry, that only works if you believe that the NR suspension was just about Wootton Basset, which it wasn't. 

[Reorte]

I'd suggest that how an organisation is managed can directly affect how it's employees approach doing their jobs.

And vice-versa (how it deals with employees who aren't doing their jobs properly), although I suppose that could be the same thing.

[PaulRhB]

Paul, I wasn't reporting a "conversation", I was commenting from what was said in the initial NR report which it says the info was taken from the equipment. I don't know what happened on the footplate that lead to the isolation of the equipment, however I believe to blame management "shortcomings" as some people are misses the point that actually it could be that the footplate crew were fully compliant and just ignored the Rules in this case (as happened at that incident in East Anglia)...

 

 

My apologies Blair I crossed wires with KenW's post on the previous page on the reporting a conversation bit.

 

I agree entirely with you on the point of compliance and that's hopefully what the investigation will clarify quickly. If there is clear evidence from records that procedures were known and signed for then part of the burden passes away from the company, this is what the suspension was about providing. Legal responsibility doesn't pass away entirely though for consequences.

WC have managed to step up to compliant recording and as you say anything else is speculation until the ORR and RAIB reports.

[The Stationmaster]

Balancing that - it's not just one single one-off incident that's caused the suspension though (look at the other links up-thread, several of which pre-date Wooton Basset) - which point to the story being about wider issues than just one "rogue crew". 

 

I'd suggest that how an organisation is managed can directly affect how it's employees approach doing their jobs. 

Absolutely correct.  And especially so with a railway organisation.

 

The first step is to have all the necessary procedures in place (many of them are required by legislation of various sorts, some are common railway sense, some really need railway experience in operations and engineering disciplines).

The second step is to make sure that all your staff (full time and part time) are trained in and understand those procedures (and that understanding is duly tested before authorising them to work).  

The third step is to monitor that the procedures are being correctly applied by both management and staff and to record (where recording is needed) and take corrective action where it is needed.

The fourth step is to continuously review your procedures against changes in legislation, changes arising within the industry and so on in order to ensure that your procedures, training, and monitoring remain fit for purpose.

 

For example some time back there was a bad SPAD at Stafford involving a private operator.  Following publication of the Report (and indeed in some respects following notification of the incident) any responsible operator would immediately review their own relevant procedures and monitoring to make sure that they are as effective as possible in order to reduce the likelihood of such an incident occurring in their organisation.  That might be the spur for them to call in an external audit of their procedures - that has certainly happened in some cases.

[Hobby]

I don't agree, to blame everything on the management and not on the workers who do not follow rules is also just as wrong. As i said in my earlier posts in our position as guards or drivers we are given a great deal of freedom without constant checks. The problem is that "rogue" workers sometimes only come to light when things go wrong and all the checks in the world may not highlight their shortcomings.

 

I still see a "blame the management" culture from many of you whereas that may not be the case, certainly in the WB case...

 

The Mods locked this thread earlier due to speculation, I'd suggest the blaming of management is exactly that until there is proof otherwise. Perhaps until  we have further concrete information we've gone as far as we can...

[Reorte]

But when something does come to light how management deals with it matters a great deal. Quite how it all stacks up in terms of responsibility is very much a case-by-case thing that's up to an investigation to try to get to the bottom of (no easy task by any stretch of the imagination).

[Glorious NSE]

Saying that the suspension was not because of Wootton Basset, but because of wider issues with the management that pre-dated that incident is not "speculation", it's out there in black and white in Network Rail's documents and press releases. This is an excerpt from Network Rail's press release into the suspension, the highlights are mine - I've also highlighted 30th March 2015, as that was BEFORE the incident at Wootton Basset:

(Link: http://www.networkrailmediacentre.co.uk/resources/wcr-suspension-notice)

 

Network Rail believes that an Event of Default has occurred because a breach of the Safety 

Obligations has already taken place or, in the alternative, is reasonably likely to take place. You are 

aware that Network Rail has had concerns about WCR’s performance of its Safety Obligations for 

some time and recent events lead Network Rail to believe that the operations of WCR are a threat to 

the safe operation of the railway. Specifically: 
 

 WCR’s senior management response to the recent SPAD at SN45. This ranked as the most 

serious SPAD that has taken place this year when the industry risk ranking methodology was 

applied; 

 The response by the senior management of WCR to the issues raised in the meeting of 30 

March 2015, where WCR demonstrated that its controls, communication and commitment 

following the recent SPAD were inadequate; 

Network Rail also has serious concerns about the fact that WCR unilaterally suspended the 

response to Network Rail’s review of WCR’s Safety Management System undertaken in January 

2015. The review raised some serious and significant issues and there was no communication with 

Network Rail to explain that the response was being suspended 

 

 

And whilst I agree you can't have a manager looking over your shoulder all the time (and nor should you have!), i'd be gobsmacked if your drivers work for a mainstream TOC or FOC and do not have any checks on what they do.

[Titan]

 I'd suggest the blaming of management is exactly that until there is proof otherwise.

 

 

Not only is there proof, but the proof is abundant and has been for some time. It was because of that proof that WCR got their suspension. No ifs, no buts, no maybes, no speculation etc. at all.

[Hobby]

Some people have expressed surprise how quickly NR have revoked the suspension, many have speculated why that is, surely one interpretation is that all the rules, checks and compliance were in fact being done correctly following the earlier warnings from NR and the company were able to prove that quickly with evidence, that would certainly seem a logical interpretation of the timescales. That would then give a different view of events which lead up to the suspension following WB... I'm not saying that the Company's attitudes may or may not be "right", I don't know any more than the rest of you, but I'd suggest that it is pure speculation to say one way or the other are until we have the facts...

 

My comments are just a different interpretation of events as the rest of you but equally as valid.

[Glorious NSE]

Sorry, but it's you that's speculating! 

Sorry, but NR's press release refers to these existing issues being raised by January, Wootton Basset was on the 7th March, the suspension went into effect on the 4th April, and lasted over a month - I don't see any sign to support the idea that they could or did "quickly provide evidence" that there were no problems.

If they had done so there never would have been a suspension in the first place!

[Titan]

surely one interpretation is that all the rules, checks and compliance were in fact being done correctly following the earlier warnings from NR

 

This interpretation is not possible as it is factually untrue. 

 

It is precisely because the management were not following the rules/checks/procedures etc. despite the earlier warnings from NR that got them the suspension. The suspension letter from Network Rail makes this absolutely clear.

 

I don't know how you can expect your interpretation to be valid under those circumstances!

 

Edit - beaten to it!!

[acko22]

I think one thing that's sticks out is the fact outsiders had to come into WCR to sort the records out, this says there were issues in WCR at middle to higher level management.

 

This does directly effect the people below, while it would be totally unfair and wrong to say every member of train crew within WCR is a bad egg, if there is documents saying train crew member x is not playing by the rules and that paperwork is not properly dealt with then the reality is the chances of this person not been dealt with (Retraining, warnings or in worse case sacking) are slim and could lead to an incident what ever that may be.

 

It's only human nature if you aren't getting warned and told you are doing it wrong well you just keep doing it, but it works both ways management have to duty to ensure their staff do things properly but at the same time staff have to flag things up if they feel something is wrong (may that be someone reporting someone for ignoring guidelines through to someone saying can I go through this again I am not 100% happy).

 

At the end of the day NR felt there were systematic failures in WCR operation which have been dealt with, the question is will this be a re-occurring issue? What can NR and WCR learn from this?

 

As I don't know this do NR carry out random inspections and visits to TOCs (bit like ofsted do with schools) to check up and ensure that TOCs are doing things within guidelines on a day to day basis? 

[PhilH]

A 'phased return' then...

 

http://www.steamdreams.co.uk/executables/GT410WebContent.exe?ActionCode=Timings

[roger440]

Some people have expressed surprise how quickly NR have revoked the suspension, many have speculated why that is, surely one interpretation is that all the rules, checks and compliance were in fact being done correctly following the earlier warnings from NR and the company were able to prove that quickly with evidence, that would certainly seem a logical interpretation of the timescales. That would then give a different view of events which lead up to the suspension following WB... I'm not saying that the Company's attitudes may or may not be "right", I don't know any more than the rest of you, but I'd suggest that it is pure speculation to say one way or the other are until we have the facts...

 

My comments are just a different interpretation of events as the rest of you but equally as valid.

With respect, i think you really ought to think about your interpretation of events. You say that you dont know anymore than the rest of us, but there are some knowlegeable people on hear explaining how it is (who i agree with entirely) who DO know more than you.

 

Im of the view that NR were probably not firm enough following the lineside fire incident, when the root causes started to become clearer.

[Edwin_m]

I don't agree, to blame everything on the management and not on the workers who do not follow rules is also just as wrong. As i said in my earlier posts in our position as guards or drivers we are given a great deal of freedom without constant checks. The problem is that "rogue" workers sometimes only come to light when things go wrong and all the checks in the world may not highlight their shortcomings.

 

I still see a "blame the management" culture from many of you whereas that may not be the case, certainly in the WB case...

Last year a driver on Great Northern was sent to prison for a sequence of events that included resetting the TPWS after passing a signal at danger, and continuing without seeking authorisation. 

 

http://orr.gov.uk/news-and-media/press-releases/2014/train-driver-receives-prison-sentence-for-ignoring-safety-systems

 

This demonstrates that the driver can be severely penalised if they ignore the rules that they have been informed of and trained to follow, for the safety of themselves and others.  Any employee is liable to prosecuation under the Health and Safety at Work Act for similar behaviour, although train driving is a more risky occupation than most others. 

 

I don't think we yet know whether there will be any prosecutions for the Wootton Bassett incident.  If one of the train crew goes on trial then the prosecuting authorities must consider there is an arguable case that that person should have been aware that what they allegedly did was grossly wrong. 

[The Stationmaster]

 

 

As I don't know this do NR carry out random inspections and visits to TOCs (bit like ofsted do with schools) to check up and ensure that TOCs are doing things within guidelines on a day to day basis? 

There were certainly 'audits' during the early years of privatisation and in many cases TOCs used independent auditors which was acceptable to Railtrack provided the concern doing the auditing was recognised by them.  This sort of audit was concentrated on operational matters and was very much based on the process of checking that procedures were in place and that those procedures reflected what the operator said in their Safety Case but in addition some audits also included practical checks to see that not only was the procedure in place but the records were maintained and frequencies met etc.  In addition some operators carried out procedure checks on others (at their request) and I did some of that in respect of some traincrew management procedures in another company while I was still on the big railway.

 

I have carried out similar checks and audits (measured against ROGS compliance and various other things, such as an LRO - but not on operators involved in working over the national network in respect of any working on that network) as I was trained in operational audit procedures while working for a large company which specialised in that field (among many other things) after leaving the big railway.

 

What I don't know is whether or not NR carry out such checks and audits but I suspect that they might not.  However some operators I understand might still use independent assessors to check compliance - as do soem railways in the heritage sector.

[acko22]

Thank you for the education Mike (every day is a school day)

 

One thing that struck me though was if they don't currently carry out these types of  spot checks on train crew and records is that not potentially dicing with the devil so to speak?

While they have taken retrospective action with WCR if they were carrying out spot checks would that not mitigate things getting so severe?

 

While the issues NR have had with WCR are by no means small and from all accounts the SPAD seems to have been the final straw for NR, if they were taking a more proactive part could this have not mitigated the risk of such an incident, as has been pointed out is was a matter of minutes in which made the difference and like has happened in the past sometimes luck isn't on our side (Selby Rail crash a sad example).

 

If it is the case that NR don't carry out these checks then while the burden of blame has to be taken by WCR as a company, but also NR should take some blame for not been proactive enough with it's supervision of the TOCs it allows to use the network, as it only takes substandard operation by a single organization / group to cause a potentially horrific incident which may well be avoidable if such checks were common practice (if not currently).

 

If they are current practice already then the question has to be asked what can NR do proactively when a TOC is concerning them? Could they not go in and not so much shut them down but a period of retaining and direct supervision? I know this again puts a big emphasis on NR but at the end of the day their number 1 priority is to ensure the network is safe may that be the actual track through to the TOCs it allows to use the network.

[phil-b259]

Thank you for the education Mike (every day is a school day)

 

One thing that struck me though was if they don't currently carry out these types of spot checks on train crew and records is that not potentially dicing with the devil so to speak?

While they have taken retrospective action with WCR if they were carrying out spot checks would that not mitigate things getting so severe?

 

While the issues NR have had with WCR are by no means small and from all accounts the SPAD seems to have been the final straw for NR, if they were taking a more proactive part could this have not mitigated the risk of such an incident, as has been pointed out is was a matter of minutes in which made the difference and like has happened in the past sometimes luck isn't on our side (Selby Rail crash a sad example).

 

If it is the case that NR don't carry out these checks then while the burden of blame has to be taken by WCR as a company, but also NR should take some blame for not been proactive enough with it's supervision of the TOCs it allows to use the network, as it only takes substandard operation by a single organization / group to cause a potentially horrific incident which may well be avoidable if such checks were common practice (if not currently).

 

If they are current practice already then the question has to be asked what can NR do proactively when a TOC is concerning them? Could they not go in and not so much shut them down but a period of retaining and direct supervision? I know this again puts a big emphasis on NR but at the end of the day their number 1 priority is to ensure the network is safe may that be the actual track through to the TOCs it allows to use the network.

 

Look, it's not NRs job to babysit TOCs anymore than it is the job of the VOSA to give detailed one on one guidance to road haulage companies that use the motorway network. There is a legal requirement for companies to prove THEY have suitable management systems in place to ensure compliance with the rules and all the evidence is readily avalible that they take a proactive stance when it comes to ensuring compliance. If they don't comply they get banned until they get their house in order as they pose a safety risk (for which they have only got themselves to blame). In the rail industry there are plenty of bodies out there qualified to audit TOCs and ensure that everything is in order when Network Rail / the ORR calls after an incident has occurred.

 

Ultimately you need to recognise that all this is self inflicted by WCR and as such it is up to THEM to fix it. NR is an infrastructure provider, not a operator and asking it to spend money on something a operator such as WCR can, and SHOULD readily buy in is totally inappropriate.

 

I hope that your comments are not clouded by WCRs near monopoly when it comes to steam traction - because they are no different to other open access operators like Hull trains in my opinion and must be treated acordingly. Mainline steam can only continue providing the companies that operate it behave responsibly - if they don't then I am quite happy to see them booted off the network, even if that does mean no more steam.

[PaulRhB]

Phil is absolutely correct, NR isn't the auditor for TOCs it only asks for proof that they are using the systems as part of the licence.

NR provides a service to the TOCs like the ROSCOS do and the terms of that contract are enforceable as it's their internal regulations they have agreed to abide by.

If the proof is there then it just forms part of the investigation and all carries on as normal.

Any TOC or NR can be audited by the Govt body currently in charge at any time on internal processes and it's always looked at after an incident to check they are.

[Hobby]

With respect, i think you really ought to think about your interpretation of events. You say that you dont know anymore than the rest of us, but there are some knowlegeable people on hear explaining how it is (who i agree with entirely) who DO know more than you.

 

Until we know the full facts that does not make you or me or any other poster right unless you are saying that these people are quoting from information that is not in the public domain, which I doubt, but is a simple question for those people to confirm one way or the other, until then all is speculation.

 

As the incident at FCC (not GN) as highlighted by that other post proves you can have all the checks and compliance you want but there can still be a rogue element that those checks and compliance won't show up. It's not always down to "management".

[Talltim]

You're right, it's not always down to management, but FCC (and Chiltern in another case where the driver ignored/disabled/didn't enable safety systems) didn't get their track access taken away because (presumably) their systems and procedures were in place and correct so they 'got away' with just some recommendations in the RAIB report and it was shown to be just a case of 'rogue' staff members.

That's the difference here, it would appear thatNR were already unhappy WCR's systems and processes and while I hope what the crew reportedly did would have been against WCR's rules anyway, it made NR feel that WCR management wasn't doing enough to promote adherence to safe working by their staff.

[Glorious NSE]

until then all is speculation.

 

Again, no, this is not speculation, the background to the suspension is clearly spelled out, in black and white, in documents you can go and read yourself, which come directly from Network Rail, and they repeatedly refer to management issues.

 

I really don't see where your doubt is coming from here. Unless you think Network Rail are lying to everybody with their explanation, and there is some weird (to me) conspiracy theory in play?

[acko22]

Phil,

 

You say NR shouldnt have to babysit which is true but like vosa DO they have have the gov rules set out and issue licenses for HGVs. Yet they still carry out spot checks on HGVs and companies to make aure they are playing ball. How is this any different?

You say NR hust provides the infrustructure is that were the case they wouldnt be able to stop a TOC from running, just like WCR have a managerial responability over its staff and should deal with them NR has the same responability when it comes to all TOCs.

Paul my thoughts are in no way rose tinted regards WCR just a mere observation as to the bigger picture, like in my job I cannot punish people if they have been warned they are doing it wrong but not shown them the right way to do it.

[Titan]

Until we know the full facts that does not make you or me or any other poster right unless you are saying that these people are quoting from information that is not in the public domain, which I doubt, but is a simple question for those people to confirm one way or the other, until then all is speculation.

 

 

 

Not only have we the facts, they have been there since post number five on this thread. That is what makes us right about the management issue. The facts are in the public domain - here is the link:

 

http://www.networkrailmediacentre.co.uk/news/statement-west-coast-railways-suspension-notice

 

It is the same link as posted in post number five on this thread. There is a link at the bottom to a pdf of the official Network Rail suspension letter which details all the management issues which needed sorting, that were still a problem at the meeting held a few days previously,(i.e WCR management was still not working correctly right up to their suspension) which was why WCR was suspended. You can read it for yourself.

 

Now there you have it, in black and white, in the public domain, direct from Network Rail, as it has been since the beginning of April.

 

 

Is there any way that is not clear?

[Edwin_m]

Phil,

 

You say NR shouldnt have to babysit which is true but like vosa DO they have have the gov rules set out and issue licenses for HGVs. Yet they still carry out spot checks on HGVs and companies to make aure they are playing ball. How is this any different?

You say NR hust provides the infrustructure is that were the case they wouldnt be able to stop a TOC from running, just like WCR have a managerial responability over its staff and should deal with them NR has the same responability when it comes to all TOCs.

Paul my thoughts are in no way rose tinted regards WCR just a mere observation as to the bigger picture, like in my job I cannot punish people if they have been warned they are doing it wrong but not shown them the right way to do it.

If you want to draw an analogy with roads, the VOSA role of granting licences to operate is filled by ORR.  Network Rail is probably more comparable to Highways England (don't know exactly what applies in the rest of the UK) and the local authorities, providing the infrastructure to operate on. However railways are more complicated than roads, and each operator has to have a contract for track access which is subject to certain conditions.  If they breach those then NR has the right to suspend the contract.