NR suspend WCRC from tonight

[Supaned]

Like I said earlier, there's a lot of distractions on the footplate of a steam loco. Has anyone considered something like a gauge glass breaking, necessitating the attention of more than one crew member? For the earlier poster who seemed to thing that a steam loco cab isn't all that different from a modern diesel cab, they're from a totally different era.

 

It may be there was a genuine fault with the aws/tpws that needed it to be isolated in service. An electrical fault maybe? Flat battery? Let's stop speculating and wait the RAIB report.

 

I'd also say that every heritage railway has been under the spotlight recently following a couple of tragedies that have been discussed elsewhere on here. We're all subject to the same basic rule book and ROGS laws.

 

 the rulebook is quite clear on what to do in the event of an AWS/TPWS failure whilst in service - specifically STOP IMMEDIATELY and contact the signaller. Nowhere does it say "continue after isolating AWS/TPWS whilst on the move and not informing anyone of this", and that applies to ANY traction unit regardless of TOC/FOC or whether steam, diesel or electric. 

 

Likewise with a gauge glass breaking or similar , I was always taught "safety first" and in that circumstance , I'd have thought bringing the train to a stand to deal with that fault would have been the safest course of action should that event have occurred.

[The Stationmaster]

Regarding footplate crews and the number of people on the footplate , it matters not how many were there for the Wootton Bassett incident - each of them present was culpable for allowing a vital safety system to be isolated. The driver and fireman would certainly know the importance of it (assuming of course that they were actually trained and currently qualified on operating rules and procedures in the first place) , if there was an Inspector then they should certainly know the implications , and if a representative of the locomotive owner was there , who , we are told earlier in this thread , has a working knowledge of the systems on the locomotive to be able to assist with fault finding , then they would also have known the implications , after all , the requirements for ALL traction operating on the main line network are the same regardless of steam , diesel or electric.

 

Consider also that a driver from a TOC was recently prosecuted for a similar set of circumstances as this , therefore I'd hope that the footplate crew involved in this incident are treated in a similar manner - their actions were wilful and deliberate , and it's only a matter of good fortune that this wasn't a lot more serious.

 

Personally , I do have concerns about a lot of the open access operators on our rail network and their safety management "systems" - as a full-time driver for a large TOC I am expected to fully comply with rules and procedures , my work can be randomly downloaded at any time without me even knowing it has been done and if I do make a mistake I am expected to and am prepared to answer for the consequences of my actions. Likewise with route knowledge , I am required to be properly conversant with the routes I work over , assessed before I am permitted to drive over those routes for the first time , and have supplementary written exams on those routes to provide more evidence of my knowledge.

 Compare that with the incident at Stafford , where the person in the driving seat wasn't even a qualified driver (and why was that TOC still allowed to operate to this day) , or recent incidents such as Wootton Bassett and Loughborough (I'm sure that will come into the public domain soon if it already hasn't) and the "bodge" culture is plain to see. Sign any bit of paper and hey presto , instant driver with instant route and traction knowledge - all well and good until it goes wrong. 

 And there is evidence to support my assertions regarding route knowledge - one simply has to look at the signal passed at danger statistics , which the RSSB nicely tabulates into an excel document - sort them by TOC/FOC and the trend is readily apparent.

You have said a lot more in public than I would but in general I share your concerns especially in terms of compliance with managerial procedures and very particularly regarding route knowledge.  As far as the Wootton Bassett incident is concerned we still don't know what really happened beyond the initial - and possibly not even entirely accurate(?) - RAIB statement so it remains pointless to speculate or comment until we see the final public report from RAIB.

 

My main concern is the fact that NR have had to take this action with an operator because it seemingly represents an action taken following previous unsuccessful efforts to ensure they conform with requirements (and the law) and regrettably it does not surprise me although the incident which finally precipitated this action appears to have some other deeply worrying elements (but that is verging on speculation so I will say no more).

 

What also concerns me is that people seem to be confusing various issues so, again, it might be sensible to make them clearer - WCR suspension is, according to NR's letter, based on structural managerial failures, in other words they are not doing as part of their Safety Management System (SMS) things which they are required to do.  In view of the basic simplicity of what is required to be in place it is very worrying to me that it is not, particularly in an operator who works over the national network.  At least two heritage Railways have, in recent years, been threatened with closure unless they correct far less serious shortcoming or omissions in their SMS discovered by ORR Inspectors; the Railways concerned duly put things right and were allowed to continue operating.  The vast majority of what is in ROGS, and what should be in an operator's SMS, is nothing new - the Regulations largely enshrine in formal terms what any properly managed railway operator would already have been doing and what should have been part of their management and monitoring systems.  And, even if professional help is hired to sort the paperwork and formalise it into what ROGs requires, the cost of doing so is not great - it is no more than reorganising on paper and inserting into an auditable formalised system what should already exist - it perhaps might therefore be invidious of me to pass comment or opinion on any organisation where it does not exist or is not properly and formally organised.

 

Some of it can be done in different formats and in the case of one Railway where I have been involved discussion with the ORR Inspector resulted in him conceding that that particular Railway's method of maintaining certain information was satisfactory and need not be changed to the format originally demanded by the Inspector.  In other words the important thing is having the information and having it in a cogent and understandable form - not doing it in a particular way, so again it is no more than continuing what an operator should already have been doing.

[PaulRhB]

Also assuming all on the footplate are familiar with the systems and always aware of what the others are doing is incorrect.

Why someone demands the whole crew is hung when we don't yet know what was done and by whom, or why, is hugely inappropriate.

It's legitimate to have non train crew on the footplate for observation or operational purposes. They can be an asset rather than a distraction if they are properly briefed.

[Mod3]

Topics merged and reopened - but please avoid idle speculation.

 

Perhaps this needs to be restated.

[Hobby]

Paul I take your point but would be very surprised if any company employed a fireman who had no knowledge of the safety equipment in a cab. I also stand by my earlier comment, I can see no excuse for the over-ride and the train not stopping straight away as per the rules. (Based on the initial report).

[Supaned]

Also assuming all on the footplate are familiar with the systems and always aware of what the others are doing is incorrect.

Why someone demands the whole crew is hung when we don't yet know what was done and by whom, or why, is hugely inappropriate.

It's legitimate to have non train crew on the footplate for observation or operational purposes. They can be an asset rather than a distraction if they are properly briefed.

 

 "Evidence shows that the driver and fireman instead took an action which cancelled the effect of the AWS braking demand after a short period and a reduction in train speed of only around 8 mph. The action taken also had the effect of making subsequent AWS or TPWS brake demands ineffective."

 

 

The quote above is taken directly from the RAIB website - so clearly the RAIB believe that both of the footplate crew had knowledge of what the other party was doing.

 

Surely if their actions have endanged safety to the same degree as the TOC driver punished fairly recently , they should be treated in exactly the same way ?

[Bon Accord]

I hope a lot of the contributors to this thread are never called up for jury service.

[woodenhead]

All the evidence points to a longstanding issue with regards the SMS of WCRC culminating in the incident at Wooton Bassett.

 

Whether that final incident will result in prosecution is clearly what the RAIB are investigating now but in the meantime NR have taken the sensible decision to stop WCRC running trains until they at least address the flaws in the SMS because the next incident might not be a line side fire, a hot box or a SPAD.

[ianp]

As an interested observer, I'd like to say that it is simply astonishing - genuinely mind-boggling in fact - that a train crew could do anything that meant they came to a halt right across a junction on a high speed main line. I thought that you were meant to obey signals and warnings precisely to avoid that sort of thing happening. They were lucky the high speed train had passed. But what if the points had still been set against the offending train - derailment. Then what?

[beast66606]

But what if the points had still been set against the offending train - derailment. Then what?

 

Unlikely, but (probably) substantial damage to the P&C - but I'd have been more worried about the reasons the points were still set against the train - i.e another one approaching.

[Gary H]

As an interested observer, I'd like to say that it is simply astonishing - genuinely mind-boggling in fact - that a train crew could do anything that meant they came to a halt right across a junction on a high speed main line. I thought that you were meant to obey signals and warnings precisely to avoid that sort of thing happening. They were lucky the high speed train had passed. But what if the points had still been set against the offending train - derailment. Then what?

IF they had correctly followed the explicitly laid down rules after the driver missed the first AWS warning, (ie, stop the job) they would not have come to a stand straddling the junction.

If the points had been set against them, they would have been "run through" which results in lots of damage to the points and detection system and so disabling the signalling system throughout the whole junction.

Its seldom causes derailment though.

[Talltim]

Whether that final incident will result in prosecution is clearly what the RAIB are investigating now.

RAIB investigations are not for prosecution purposes and sometimes have publication delayed until after the court case for an incident

[Mark Saunders]

As an interested observer, I'd like to say that it is simply astonishing - genuinely mind-boggling in fact - that a train crew could do anything that meant they came to a halt right across a junction on a high speed main line. I thought that you were meant to obey signals and warnings precisely to avoid that sort of thing happening. They were lucky the high speed train had passed. But what if the points had still been set against the offending train - derailment. Then what?

 

Also the same applies to car drivers on the roads!

 

Mark Saunders

[Captain Kernow]

So the acid test; would you currently be happy to be on a mainline train hauled by WCRC traction and crew?

 

I wouldn't.

Actually, I would have no problem with that, even right now.

 

Lots of water is going to flow under this particular bridge in a pretty short timescale. If WCR have found a way to hire in the services of other operators to run their contracted railtours, then I'm glad. I'm looking forward to the time when the company have met all the conditions required by NR and can return to the fold and start rebuilding confidence.

[Gary H]

Actually, I would have no problem with that, even right now.

 

Lots of water is going to flow under this particular bridge in a pretty short timescale. If WCR have found a way to hire in the services of other operators to run their contracted railtours, then I'm glad. I'm looking forward to the time when the company have met all the conditions required by NR and can return to the fold and start rebuilding confidence.

I agree, Tim.

I think we'll see a better WCRC come out the other side- it will reach a satisfactory conclusion for all concerned I am sure.

[Captain Kernow]

We do not know the complete set of circumstances in any case.

I am aware of part of the background, which is why I commented as I did.

 

However, the suspension was entirely correct and appropriate under the circumstances and I am hopeful that one of the end results will be that this kind of suspension won't ever be necessary again. Wishful thinking, perhaps, but as others have pointed out, the rest of the rail industry will be closely watching how this one turns out.

 

The first instance I recall of removal of track access permissions was with regard to Cotswold Rail/Advenza, several years ago. I was aware of the background to that, which ended up being a permanent ban, and one that was entirely justified in that particular case.

[ianp]

IF they had correctly followed the explicitly laid down rules after the driver missed the first AWS warning, (ie, stop the job) they would not have come to a stand straddling the junction.

If the points had been set against them, they would have been "run through" which results in lots of damage to the points and detection system and so disabling the signalling system throughout the whole junction.

Its seldom causes derailment though.

You missed my point. What if they had slammed on the brakes at the last moment (after ignoring the warning) to find that the points were still set against them? Derailment and disaster I suspect. Whatever the fine detail, it was a terrible mistake to make, which could have left hundreds dead.

[Captain Kernow]

Hmmm - wonder if it was the same guy driving that I experienced doing some COSS training a few years ago.

 

That would explain a great deal (to me) about this particular incident...................

Not sure that it is appropriate to start singling individuals out on here, even under the cover of anonymity.

[Captain Kernow]

So does it make a nonsense of this I saw this afternoon on the way home, posted at Exeter St.Davids ?

 

image.jpg

 

Just wondering !

Grahame,

 

The Torbay Express charters have always run with DB Schenker as long as I can remember, and we have been working with them to get everything in place for this coming Summers trips as well.

[Peter Kazmierczak]

 

You missed my point. What if they had slammed on the brakes at the last moment (after ignoring the warning) to find that the points were still set against them? Derailment and disaster I suspect. Whatever the fine detail, it was a terrible mistake to make, which could have left hundreds dead.

As Gary mentioned above, IF the points had been set against the train, there would've been a "run through", with no derailment of the train - though expensive damage to the permanent way would've resulted.

[PaulRhB]

 "Evidence shows that the driver and fireman instead took an action which cancelled the effect of the AWS braking demand after a short period and a reduction in train speed of only around 8 mph. The action taken also had the effect of making subsequent AWS or TPWS brake demands ineffective."

 

 

The quote above is taken directly from the RAIB website - so clearly the RAIB believe that both of the footplate crew had knowledge of what the other party was doing.

 

Surely if their actions have endanged safety to the same degree as the TOC driver punished fairly recently , they should be treated in exactly the same way ?

I wasn't refering to that quote I was refering to the other posts about ALL the people on the footplate, incl guests, being responsible

[PaulRhB]

Paul I take your point but would be very surprised if any company employed a fireman who had no knowledge of the safety equipment in a cab. I also stand by my earlier comment, I can see no excuse for the over-ride and the train not stopping straight away as per the rules. (Based on the initial report).

It was a wider reference to the posts including loco representatives etc really Blair. I'm also wary of quoting the 'evidence' that they both took this action as it's unconfirmed at present until the investigation is finalised.

 

I agree with you totally about the following the rules bit.

[Mod3]

Until further facts emerge this thread can now be locked off.

[Mod3]

Some further information has been published and a member has asked for this link to be added to the thread

 

http://railwayherald.com/uknews/orr-considers-revoking-wcr-safety-certificate

[Mod3]

The following link has been passed to us for posting here.

 

http://www.networkrailmediacentre.co.uk/news/statement-network-rail-revoke-west-coast-railways-suspension-notice

 

The topic is open again but please stick to facts and not conjecture.